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This study is a  preliminary attempt  to estimate the employment  effects of 
intra-EEC foreign direct  investment. 
The  methodology is mainly  concerned with  examining  effects on  employment 
at the micro  level in one  industry  - plastics and  synthetics.  It is found, 
in the majority of the 8  cases  studied in depth,  that  such  investment  has 
had  a  positive effect on  employment.  Exceptions arise from  post  EEC  entry 
rationalisation of  production  and  from  cutbacks in foreign  employment  in 
a  period of recession.  Of  critical importance is the "alternative position" 
assumption  - we  find that foreign and ·domestic  investment are far from 
perfect  substitutes and  for a  firm to compete  effectively often requires a 
product  or presence in a  foreign  market,  even  within a  customs  union. 
Indirect  job creation is found  to be  positive,  but  is estimated to be 
smaller than  previous studies  have  suggested. 
This is a  tentative conclusion and  requires much  fuller investigation. 
Clearly,  a  much  broader  study is required to establish employment  effects 
with any  certainty and  to enable cross-industry comparisons to be  made. 
The  methodology for such  an  investigation  has  been  established in this pilot 
study. 
This  study was  financed  by  the Commission  of the European  Communities  as 
part of its Programma  of Research and  Actions  on  the Development  of the 
Labour  Market.  The  analyses and  the results presented  do  not necessarily 
reflect the views  of the Commission  nor do  they  commit  it to a  particular 
view  of the labour market  or on  other policy matters. 
The  report  has  been  made  available for information only.  It should  not 
be  quoted  or referred to in  published material  without the authority of 
the Commission. 
Enquiries relating to the study  should  be  addressed to the Directorate 
General  for  Employment  and  Social Affairs  - attention of Division V/B/2  -
Commission  of the  European  Communities  - 200,  rue  de  la Loi  - 1049  - Bruxelles. ..  CONTEllTS 
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1.  ObJectives 
The  major aim  of this project is to investigate,  on  a  small  sample 
basis,  the employment  effects of intra-EEC foreign direct investment  (FOil. 
Further objectives are an  estimation of  the effect on  skill levels and  wage 
levels in the  EEC  as a  whole,  and  to assess the importance of technology 
transfer via  such foreign direct investment •  • 
The  study is based  on  8 cases  in one  industry  (plastics and  synthetics) 
en~ cannot  therefore be  considered  in any  way  definitive.  However,  we  believe 
that the study goes  some  way  towards  refining methodology  and  is important for 
1ta presentation of the findings of detailed case investigations. 
2. .  Methodology 
The  difficulties encountered with official data at a  macro  level,  and 
recognition that the issues which  concerned  us  could only be  successfully 
dealt with at the level of the firm itself,  made  it desirable that we  con-
oentrate our attention not  on  the economies  of member  countries,  but  on  the 
behaviour of firms within those economies.  Information was  gathered from  a 
sample  of eight firms  by  a  structured questionnaire. 
Of  critical importance  in an  attempt  to ascertain the impact  of intra-
EEC  FDI  on  employment  is the relevant  "alternative position",  i.e. what  would 
have  happened  if the  investment  under  investigation  had  not  taken  place. 
Several  possibilities ariseJ  in the absence  of the FDI  either (i)  the firm 
would  have  invested at  home  and  possibly  ~erviced the target market  via 
exports,  or (ii) an  investment  outside the  EEC  would  have  been  undertaken 
end  the target market  supplied  from  there,  or (iii)  no  investment at  home  or 
in other locations would  have  been  undertaken.  The  alternatives to the  EEC 
investment outside the source country,  i.e.  the  'actual'  situation,  are 
therefore: 
08881 
(1)  An  investment  in the  source country  (+  exports) 
Cii)  An  investment  outside the  EEC 
(iii)  No  investment,  no  replacement  by  exports 
Clearly,  the effect  on  employment  in the EEC  is different in each 
(1)  If the alternative is home  investment,  the employment-creating 
effect of the  •actual'  investment  may  be  either greater or less 
than the alternativeJ  i.e. the actual  jobs created may  merely 
substitute for  'home'  employment  and  therefore the real  employ-
ment  effect can  be  positive or negative for the  EEC  as a  whole. 
(ii)  If the alternative is an  investment  outside the  EEC.  then the 
'actual'  investment  is likely to be  job-creating for the EEC, 
except  in the extreme  situation where  the investment  outside 
the  EEC  creates more  jobs in the source country than  the 
•actual'  EEC  investment  adds  to total  employment  in the EEC 
as a  whole. -2-
· If  ~· 
(111)  If the alternative is no  investment,  then the  'actual' 
investment is clearly employment-creating. 
It is most  likely that the firm would  consider  (i)  and  (iii) as 
alternatives rather than  (iil  except for  "offshore"  type  investments,  set 
up  specifically to  service the source country market. 
Alternative  (i)  is of great interest.  The  effect of the alternative 
position  here is bound  up  with an  examination of the technology of production. 
The  amount  of employment  created by  a  particular investment will depend 
on  the  labour intensity of production- or on  the capital labour ratio •.  .Con-
sequently it might  be  expected that  a  given  investment in a  cheap  labour 
country  (UK,  Ireland)  will  yield a  greater employment  return than  in a  dear 
labour country  (West  Germany)  if the multinational  enterprise  (MNE)  is respons-
ive to factor costs.  We  are thus interested in the degree to which  firms 
utilise a  given technology throughout  the  EEC,  and  how  far this is modified  in 
response to factor price signals  (particularly wage  rates).  If MNEs  are 
responsive then the  location of investments and  the production process will 
be  interdependent.  The  choice of the plastics industry allows  us  to examine 
this issue in  a  situation of changing  and  "malleable" technology,  and  across 
a  wide  product  and  process range. 
The  integration of national  economies  can  be  expected to  have  two 
opposing  effects on  the nature of integration of MNEs  within the boundaries 
of the  union. 
(i)  The  removal  of tariffs and  barriers to trade and  investment 
may  be  expected to result in decreased  horizontal  integration· 
because firms  will  seek to reach minimum  efficient scale by 
removing  duplication of plants and  reaping  maximum  economies 
of scale by  centralising activities. 
(ii)  The  increased division of labour which  becomes  possible 
internally can  be  expected to  lead to increased vertical 
integration.  Firms  will take the opportunity to specialise 
and  perhaps introduce component  specialisation. 
The  type of effect on  employment  is obviously very different according 
to the pressures which  integration imposes..  We  seek to identify these 
pressures by  designing  our questionnaire to account for both types of inte-
gration. 
A major factor which  complicates all the above  is the question of the 
introduction of  new  technology.  The  general  statement that  investment 
creates jobs may  be  invalidated  by  the introduction of  labour  saving tech-
nology which  reduces total direct  employment.  Such  technology may  create 
jobs elsewhere  in the economy,  however,  and  we  need  to trace this through 
the system  before  we  can  judge overall effects.  This technology  effect 
may  or may  not  be  linked to the FDI  decision. 
Technological  intensity will be  strongly related to skill levels and 
investments in technology  intensive products and  processes may  increase 
demand  for certain types of skilled labour,  possibly at the  expense  of 
unskilled workers. -3-
In addition to direct,  or internal,  employment  effects,  foreign direct 
investment  has  employment  implications external to the investing firm. 
Indirect  positive effects on  employment  in the  host  country can  arise from 
subcontracting,  transport,  demand  for services,  for marketing facilities, 
for Government  infrastructure,  from  construction expenditure and  from 
re-investment  of funds  received  as a  result of a  takeover by  a  foreign 
entrant.  Negative effects can arise from  displacement  of local  producers 
by  foreign investors.  Attempts  to quantify  such  effects pose great  problems. 
3.  Summary  of Case  Studies 
Table  1  summarises  for each  of the  eight case studies the estimated 
direct effect on  EEC  employment.  It also  shows  the relevant  host and  source 
countries of the direct  investments. 
4.  Conclusions 
Several  general  themes  are apparent  in the motivation to  invest  in other 
EEC  countries.  The  case  studies  show  that managers  consider the alternative to 
foreign direct  investment to be the loss of markets  and  of export  opportunities. 
This is reinforced  by  the more  positive desires to  provide  a  more  effective 
service to clients by  being  in  close proximity to them;  to cater for local 
purchasing  preferencess  and  to adapt  fully to  local  specifications and 
standards.  An  additional factor,  which  may  arise from  the choice of industry, 
is the high cost of transporting,  warehousing  and  insurance in relation to 
the value of the product.  Fluctuations  in foreign  exchange  rates between 
European  countries  have  also  provided an  extra  barrier to attempts to compete 
through  exports in the  EEC  market  as a  whole.  In  essence,  foreign direct 
investment  is felt to  be  necessary to effective competition in terms of price 
and  quality of  service. 
Multinational  companies  are major  vehicles for the international transfer 
of technology.  Technology  can  be  transferred internationally in various 
degrees of  "embodiment"  - via  the  export  of technology  intensive goods,  via 
licensing,  and  embodied  in the  production  process as direct foreign  investment. 
No  general  pattern  emerges  from  the case studies as  regards  the effects 
of the transfer of technology  in foreign  direct  investment.  Nevertheless,  in 
common  with many  other sectors of manufacturing  industry,  the plastics and 
synthetics sector is becoming  increasingly capital intensive,  because of the 
embodiment  of advances  in technology.  A useful  distinction can  here  be  made 
between  product  innovation and  process  innovation.  Additional  increases in 
employment  may  arise from  the  stimulus to the  level  of activity given  by  the 
introduction of  new  technology  in  (i)  increasing  demand  by  extending  the 
product  range  (product  innovation)  and  (ii)  lowering  production costs  (process 
innovation).  However,  innovation  in the  production  process may  result directly 
in a  fall  in  employment  because of substitution of capital for  labour. 
Examples  of these contradictory effects of technological  advance  evidenced  in 
the case  studies are  (i)  the  saving of jobs in the face  of  import competition 
and  (ii)  increased capital  intensity reducing  employment.  In  many  of the 
cases  studied the  "new  product  effect" is a  notio8able characteristic of 
the foreign direct  investment  in creating employment  directly,  but it is 
apparent  that  through the  impact  of new  technology,  old  products are  sometimes 
replaced with a  consequent  loss of jobs.  Such  an  effect is difficult to 
measure. • 
TABLE  1. 
Case 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
-4~. 
Estimated Direct  Employment  Effects ofSample Firms 
on  overall  EEC  Employment 
Sou rca  Subsidiary  Estimated Direct Effect 
Country  Examined  on  EEC  Employment 
UK  Germany  &  France  Positive 
___  UK  Germany  Positive,  but  small 
Ireland  UK  Negative,  but  small 
UK  Ireland & 
The  Netherlands  Positive 
Gennany  UK  Positive 
Gennany  UK  Positive 
UK  France  Overcome  by  Effects 
of Recession 
UK  The  Netherlands  Negative after UK 
entry to  EEC -s-
Our  case studies found  that  the  employment  market  situation was  a.  more 
important  influence on  investment decisions in the  larger firms  than the 
smaller ones.  Large  firms are more  sensitive to  labour cost differentials 
across the  EEC  than  are  smaller firms.  Very  few  production  jobs were  lost 
in the  source country as a  result of foreign  investment  and  suppor.ting 
technical  jobs were  often created in the  source country to service the 
foreign  investment.  In the eight case studies,  reorganisation  and  ration-
alisation have  been  introduced gradually and  there  have  been  no  significant 
wholesale transfers of production internationally. 
The  nature of integration within the firm is important  in determining 
employment  effects.  Increased  EEC  market  integration appears to  increase 
functional  or vertical  integration but to decrease  horizontal  integration. 
In  examining the evidence on  the indirect  employment  creation effects· 
of the  sample  investments,  arising from  purchases of goods  and  services in 
the host  country as input,  we  find that this effect is much  less than other 
studies  have  suggested  and  that  even  a  1:1  relationship of direct  :  indirect 
jobs created exaggerates the effect. 
In  only one  of the companies  we  studied  has  there been  complete closure 
of a  foreign  subsidiary within the  EEC.  Our  evidence  suggests that multi-
nationals make  strenuous efforts to avoid  layoffs. 
The  transfer of technology through foreign  direct  investment is a 
critical factor  in determining the structure of  employment  in the firm.  In 
common  with the experience of other industries,  there is no  evidence  from  our 
case  studies to suggest that the multinationals adapt their own  technology to 
the available  supply of labour.  But  whereas  it is the norm  for multinationals 
to train labour for the utilisation of their existing technology,  the plastics 
and  synthetics industry employs  an  above  average proportion of  semi-skilled 
and  unskilled  labour.  Consequently,  skilled employment  provision is limited 
and  systematic training of labour is restricted in  scope. 
At  managerial  level,  the tendency is to train local personnel to replace 
expatriates,  but it was  noticeable that very little transfer of management 
from  the  subsidiary to the parent  company  took place except  on  a  short term 
basis for training.  Other short term transfers  involved technical  and  super-
visory workers  and  those directly involved  in  setting up  a  new  operation 
(mainly  middle management). 
Our  interviews  showed  that,  although major decisions on  investment  flows 
an~ financing are taken  by  the parent,  local management  exercises a  large 
measure  of autonomy  in respect  of wage  bargaining and  conditions of  employment 
and  that these are significantly affected  by  local  circumstances.  Recruitment 
of management  for  subsidiaries is also the prerogative of the  parent company 
although a  definite preference for the appointment  of,  or if possible, 
promotion of,  local nationals was  apparent  in most  cases. 
Labour  turnover appears to be  primarily determined  by  local  employment 
conditions.  Generally,  labour turnover in  our  sample  of firms is low  but 
in the one  instance where  this was  definitely not  the  case,  the rate of 
turnover had  influenced the expansion  path of the firm,  by  causing it to 
subdivide its activities between  twa separate plants. -6-
The  whole  spectrum of company  attitudes to Trade  Unions  was  evidenced 
in  ou~ sample.  At  the one  extreme.  the firm  involved the Trade  Unions 
before making  a  decision to invest in a  particular  country~  with a  view  to 
securing guarantees  on  all aspects of  labour relations.  ·At  the other extreme 
the firm based its strategy on  avoiding the recruitment of organised  labour. 
In general.  the larger firms at  least prefer to work  with established Trade 
Unions.  The  attitude of multinationals towards  the recognition  of Trade 
Unions  is an  important  issue for the· Trade  Unions  themselves  and  further 
investigation of this problem  could  usefully incorporate their views  as well 
as those of the companies. 
A clear implication for Government  policy arises with regard to the 
investment  incentives offered to attract  industry in the various member 
countries.  Without  exception,  in the cases  studied,  such  incentives were 
not the overriding determinant in the  investment  decision.  Where  such 
incentives were  offered.  they were  generally regarded  as a  bonus.  Of  more 
importance  were  the need  for a  market  presence,  cost factors  and  the  local 
employment  market  conditions.  Doubts  have  been  expressed about  the permanence 
of the employment  created in response to investment  incentives alone.  Rising 
unemployment  is in danger  of causing  Governments  to adopt  Pbeggar-my-neighbour~ 
policies with regard  to  such  subsidies.  which  may  lead to only temporary 
increases in  employment. 
The  implications for competition policy appear to be  that the opportunity 
costs of preventing a  firm's  "preferred"  investment  should  be  carefully 
evaluated.  It seems  that the alternative to a  foreign  direct  investment  may 
not  be  a  home  investment  plus exports  but  in  some  cases  no  investment at all. 
In other words.  foreign direct  investment and  domestic  investment  are far 
from  being perfect  substitutes.  Our  study also indicates the need  for a  more 
detailed investigation of the relative implications of greenfield versus 
takeover investments for employment.  The  employment  creating effects of a 
takeover can  be  as significant as those of a  greenfield development,  partic-
ularly where  the  infusion  of new  technology  strengthens the taken-over 
company's  product-market  position.  A wider  investigation is necessary to 
establish the circumstances which  determine  such  an  outcome. FORSCHUNGS- UNO  ACTIONSPROGRAMM  ZUR  ENTWICKLUNG  DES  ARBEITSMARKTES 
DIE  AUSWIRKUNGEN  VON  DIREKTER~  ZWISCHENSTAATLICHER  AUSLANDS-
INVESTITIDN  IN  DER  EG  AUF  DIE  BESCH~FTIGUNGSLAGE 
von  : 
Peter J  Buckley 
Alan  G Hartley  · 
John  R Sparkes 
University  of  Br-auf:.:n:J 
Management  Centre 
ZUSAMMENFASSENDER  BERICHT 
Arbeit  Nr.  78/1 
fur 
Kommission  der 
Europ~ischen Gemeinschafter· Diese Untersuchung wurde  von  der Kommission  der .&'uropaischen  Ge-
meinschaften als Teil ihres Forschungs- und Aktionsprogrammes  zur 
Entwicklung des Arbeitsmarktes finanziert.  Die  hier aufgeftihrten 
Analysen und Ergebnisse reflekti.eren nicht unbedingt die  Ansichten 
der Komrnission  und  verpflichten sie auch nicht zu  einer bestimmten 
Interpretation des  Arbeitsmarktes  oder  anderer politischer Ange-
legenheiten. 
Der  vorliegende nericht wird nur  zu  Informationszwecken  zur Ver-
. fugung gestellt.  Er darf ohne  die Zustimmung  der Kommission  in 
Verof.fentlichungen riicht zitiert oder  verwendet  werden. 
Weitere Information zu  diesem Bericht gibt das  allgemeine  Direkto~at 
fUr  Beschafti6~ng und  soziale Aneelegenheiten  zu  Handen  von  Division 
V/B/2  Kommission  der  ~uropaischen Gemeinschaften  2C!O,  rue 
de  la Loi  - 1049  - Bruxelles. INHALT 
Seite 
1 •  Ziele  1 
2.  Methodik  1 
3.  Zusammenfassung  der Fallstudien  5 
4.  SchluBfolgerungen  5 -1-
1.  Ziele 
Das  Hauptziel  dieses Projektes ist die Untersuchung der  Auswirkunc;en 
von  auslandischer Direktinvesti  tion .(foreign direct investment  - FDI) 
innerhalb  der  EG  auf die Beschaftigungslage auf einer beschrankten 
Erhebungsbasis.  Weitere Ziele  sind Schatzungen der Auswirkungen  auf 
Fertigkei  t  und  Lohnstand in der  EG  insgesamt und  die  l~eurteilung der 
Wichtigkeit des  Technologietransfers uber  solche  auslandische Direkt-
investi  tion. 
Die Untersuchung beruht auf  8  Fallen in einem Industriezweig 
(Plastik und Kunststoffe)  und  kann  deshalb in keiner Weise  als 
definitiv betra.chtet werden.  Wir  glauben  jedoch,  daB  die Untersuchung 
einen gewissen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Methodik  leistet und  in ihrer 
Darstellung der Ergebnisse detaillierter Falluntersuchungen von 
Wichtigkei t  ist. 
2.  Methodik 
Die  durch offentliche Datenangaben  auf  einer Makroebene  aufgeworfenen 
Schwierigkeiten und  die Erkenntnis,  daB  die  anstehendcn Aufgaben  nur 
auf Firmenebene  selbst gel5st werden  konnten,  machten  es  erstrebens-
wert,  daJ3  wir unsere  Aufmerksamkei t  nicht auf die ·  .. iirtschaft dcr Hit-
gliederstaaten konzentrieFten,sondern  auf  das Verhalten der  Firmen 
innerhaib dieser Wirtschaftsordnuneen.  Die  Information  beruht  auf  einer 
8  Firmen  umfassenden  _:-..;rhebung  anhand eines  strukturierten l,ragebof$ens. 
Bei  dem  Versuch die  Auswirkungen  der  ~,DI  innerhalb  der  ~G auf  die 
Beschaftigungslage  zu  eroitteln ist die '!"elative  11Alternativposition'' 
von kritiecher  ~ichtigkeit, d.h.  die ?raee,  welche  ~ntwicklun~ statt-
gefunden hitte,  wenn  die  zur  Diskussion  stehendc  Invcstition  nic~1t -2-
eingetreten  w~re.  Es  ergeben  sich mehrere MHglichkeiten;  bei  einem 
Ausbleiben der  FDI  hatte die Firma  entweder  (i)  im  Ursprungsland 
investiert und moglicherweise  den  Zielmarkt  im  Ausland  durch  Bxporte 
beliefert,  oder  (ii) es hatte  eine Investition  auBerhalb  der  BG 
stattgefunden und  der  Zielmarkt ware  von  dort beliefert worden  oder 
(iii) es  ware  weder  im  Heimatland noch  in anderen  Landen  investiert 
worden.  Die  Alternativen  zu  der EG-Investition auOerhalb  des  Ur-
sprungslandes,  d.h.  also  die  11tatsachliche" Situation sind  deshalb 
folgende: 
(i) Investition im  Ursprungsland  (+  Exporte) 
(ii) Investition auBerhalb  der  EG 
{iii) keine  Investition,  kein Ersatz  durch  Exporte 
Es  ist offensichtlich,  daB  die  Auswirkungen  auf  den  Beschafti 6un~s-
markt in der  EG  'in  jedem  einzelnen Falle verschieden  sind: 
(i) Wenn  als Alternative  eine Investition im  Ursprungsland 
stattfindet, kann  der  arbeitsbeschaffende Effekt der 
.,tatsachlichen" Investition entweder  gro.Ber  oder  gerinGer 
sein als die  Alternative;  d.h.  die  tatsachlichen neu-
geschaffenen Arbeitsplatze  sind moglicherweise  Ersatz 
fur Beschaftigung im  Ursprungsland und  der  wirkliche 
Arbeitsbeschaffungseffekt kann  fur  die  ~G als Ganzes 
positiv oder negativ sein  •  . 
{.ii)  Wenn  als Alternative eine Investition auBerhalb  der  .SG 
ste.ttfindet,  dann  schafft die  11tatsachliche" Investition 
wahrscheinlich neue  Arbeitsplatze  fur  die  EG,  abgesehen 
von  der  extremen Situe.ticn,  in  d~r die Investition auBer-
halb  der  EG  mehr  Arbeitsplatze im  Ursprungsland  schaff~ 
als die  .. tats~chliche" EG-Investition  zur  Gesamtbeschijfti-
gung  in der  EG  als Ganzes  hinzufligt. -3-
(iii) Wenn  als Alternative keine  Investition stattfindet,  dann 
schafft die  utatsachliche" Investition eindeutig neue 
Arbei tspla  tze. 
Es  ist hochstwahrscheinlich,  daB  die  ll'irma  eher  (i) und  (iii) als 
Alternativen in  ~rwagung ziehen wlirde  als (ii), mit der  Ausnahme  von 
.. ursprungslandnaher" Investitionen,  die  speziell fiir  den Markt  des 
Ursprungslandes  aufgebracht werden. 
Alternative (i) ist von groBtem Interesse.  Die  Auswirkung  der 
Alternativposition hier steht in engem  Zusammenhang  mit einer Uber-
priifung der  P~oduktionstechnologie. 
Das  Ausmaa  an neuen Beschaftigungsmoglichkeiten,  die als Folge  einer 
bestimmten Investition geschaffen werden,  hangt von  der  Arbeitsintensi-
tat der Produktion.  oder  dem  Koeffizienten von  Kapital und  Arbeits-
kraften  ab.  Es  konnte  folglich  angenommen  werden,  daB  eine ge-
gebene Investition in einem  Land  mit billigen Arbeitskraften  (UK, 
Irland)  eine umfangreichere  Zunahme  an  Arbeitsplatzen zur  Folge 
hat als in einem  Land  mit  teuren  Arbeitskraften  (BRD),  wenn  das 
multinationale  Unternehmen  (multinational enterprise  - MNE)  auf 
Faktorkosten  anspricht.  Es  1st fiir  uns  somit  von  Interesse  zu  sehen, 
bis  zu  welchem  Grad  eine gegebene  Technologie  von  Firlllen in der  i,;G 
insgesamt  verwende~ wird,  und  inwieweit diese  als Reaktion  auf  ~
1 aktor-
1Teis-Anzeichen  (insbesonders Lohnsatze  )  modifiziert wird.  ~N'enn  ftl.NEs 
eine  Ree.ktion  zeigen,  dann  sind die  r'lazierung von  Invcsti ticnen  und 
der :ProduktionsprozeS  gegenseitig abhangig.  In der  'tlahl  der ?la3tik:-
industrie ist es  uns  mdglich  di~ses Problem in einer  2ituaticn 
wechselnder  und  ,,flexibler" Technologie,  und  tiber  ein breites  A~­
gebot von  Produkten und  Verfahren  hinweg  z~ untersuchen. -4-
Die  Integration der Wirtschaftssysteme verschiedener  L~nder liSt zwei 
einander  entgcgengesetzte  Auswirkungen  auf  die  Art  dcr  Integration von 
NNEs  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  des  ZusaiJmenschlusses  erwarten. 
(i)  Die  .Abschaffung von  Tarifen und  Schranken  fiir  Handel  und 
Investition dtirfte  zu  einer geringeren horizontalen Inte-
gration fuhren,  weil  Firmen  den minimalsten  Leistungs-
grad  zu  erreichen versuchen,  indem  eine  Duplikation von 
Fabriken aufgehoben wird und  durch die  Zentralisierung· 
von Aktivitaten maximale  Kostenersparnisse  durch  optimale 
Bet!iebsvergroBerung erzielt werden. 
(ii)  Die  zunehmende  Arbeit~teilung,  die intern moglich  wird, 
dlirfte  zu  ~~starkter vertikaler Integration ftihren. 
Firmen  werden  sich nach Moglichkeit spezialisieren und 
eventu~ll Bestandteilspezialisierung einfUhren. 
Die  Art der  Auswirkung  auf die  Beschaftigungslage ist offensichtlich 
je nach  Druck  der Integration sehr  verschieden.  •,.Jir  versuchten  diese 
Druckwirkungen  zu  identifizieren,  indem  wir unseren Fragebo5en  so  an-
legt~ daB  beiden Arten von  Integration Rechnung getragen wird. 
Ein auBerst wichtiger Faktor,  der  die  obigen  Ausflihrungen kompliziert, 
ist die mogliche  Einfti.hrung neuer  Technologie.  Die  allgemeine  i''est-
stellung,  daB  Investition neue  Arbeitsplatze  schafft,  kann  ihre 
Giiltigkeit verlieren,  wenn  durch  die  Einfiihrung von  arbeitsspa.renuer 
Technologie  eine Reduktion  der  gesrunten  direkten Beschafti6Ung  er-
reicht wird.  Einc  solche  Technologie  kann  jedoch in anderen  ~ereichen 
der ·ivirt.schaft  Arbei tspla  tze  sc:O.affen  und  diese :•Ioglichkei t  muB  inner-
halb  des  ganzen  Systems  geprlift werden,  bevor  die  Auswirkun~an als 
Ganzes  bev1ertet  werden  konnen.  Dieser Technol<?gieeffekt  ka..-rtn  mo~;licher­
t-!eise  mit  der  J.'Dl-,Entscheidung in  Zusa:nmenh~ng gebracht  werden.  :Joch 
muB  dies  nicht zutreffen. -5-
Technologische Intensitat wird in enger  Beziehung mit  dem  ~'ahigkeits-
stand der  Arbeitskrafte  stehen und  die Investitionen auf  dem  Gebiet 
technologieintensiver Produkte  und  Verfahren konnte  die  Nachfrage 
nach  bestimmten Arten  von  F'achkraften  erhohen,  moglicherweise  auch  auf 
Kosten  von ungelernten Arbeitern. 
Zusatzlich zu  direkten oder  internen Auswirkungen  auf  die Beschafti-
gungslage  hat  eine  auslandische Direktinvestition beschaftigungsbe-
zogene  Begleiterscheinungen,  die  auBerhalb  der.investierenden Firma 
liegen.  Indirekte,  positive  ,Auswirkungen  auf die Beschaftigung im 
Gastland  ergeben  sich moglicherweise  aus  Zulieferungsauftrigen, 
'l
1ransport,  Bedarf  an  Dienstleistungen und  an  ~iegierungsinfrastruktur, 
aus Konstruktionsausgaben und  aus  ',,'iederinvesti tion von  Kapi tal,  das 
ala Ergebnis  einer Firmenubernahme  durch  einen auslandischen Bewerber 
zur Verfiigung stellt.  Negative  Auswirkungen  konnen  aus  der Verdransung 
:okaler Hersteller durch  auslandische  Investoren entstehen.  Der Ver-
such  der  Q,ualifizierung solcher Ausuirkungen bringt groBe  Problema 
mit sich. 
3.  Zusammenfassung  der  lt,allstudien 
Tabelle  1  gibt flir  jede der  8  Fallstudien eine  zusammenfassende 
Darstellung der  geschatzten Direktauswirkung auf  die  aeschaftiGunes-
lage in der  EG.  Bs  werden  au~erdem die relevanten Gast- und  Jrsprun~s-
lander  der  direkten Investition  angegeben. 
Die  ~otivation in anderen EG-Landern  zu  investieren,  weist  eine  Jeihe 
allg·emeiner  i\ ennzeichen auf.  Ijie  ~"·all s t;udien  zeigen, 
/1lternative  zu  auslandischer .i1ire1ctinvestition den  T:erlust  von  ~·iart.:t-
und  i-.,xportmoglich!<eitcn  befurchten.  Dies  wird  btstatic;t durch  den 
positiveren  ~unsch,  durch  gr6Bere  U~he den  Kunden  einen  wirkun~svollere -6-
Dienst zu bieten,  den  lokalen  ~inkaufsprioritaten entgecenzukommen,  und 
sich den  lokalen Bestimmuncen und  Normen  anzupassen.  Ein  zusatzlicher 
},aktor,  der  aus  dcr ',·,'ahl  der Industrie  entstehen kann,  liegt in  den 
hohen  Kost~n fUr  Transport,  Lagerung und  Versicherung im  Verh~ltnis 
zum  Wert  des Produktes.  Die  Schwankun~en im  Wechselkurs  europ~ischer 
Wabrungen  bedeu ten ein zusa  tzliches Hindernis  fur  \r ersuche  auf  einer 
Exportgrundlage  im  gesamten EG-Narkt  zu  konkurrieren.  :s~  vrird  betont, 
daB  auslandische  Direktinvestition ftir  eine  wir~same Geschaftsftihrung 
auf  dem  Gebiet der Freise und  der  ~ualitat der  Dienstleistuneen  not-
wendig  sind. 
Multinationale Gesellschaften sind die  wichtigsten  Tr~~er bei  der 
internationalen  ·~·lei tergabe  von  Technologie.  Technoloe:ie  kann  auf  inter-
nationaler  ~bene in verschiedenartiger  .. verkorperung"  wei tergeG·eben 
werden  durch  den Export von  technolo~ieintensiven Waren,  durch 
Lizerisierung und  durch Integration im  ProduktionsprozeB  in der  Form 
von  auslandischer Direktinvestition. 
Aus  den Fallstudien er6ibt sich keine  allgemeine  Tendenz  hinsichtlich 
der  Auswirkungen  der  \·Jei tergabe  von  Technologie  in der  auslandiscnen 
Direktinvcsti  tion.  '.'lie  in vie  len anderen  Bereichen der  .Z. ertic:;uncsin-
dustrie wird  jedoch der Plastik- und Kunststoffbereich  aufgrund  des 
Einschlusses  von  technologischen :.-ortschri tten  zunehmend kapi tal-
intensiv.  Es  kann hier  eine nlitzliche  ~nterscheidung zwischen Frodukt- ~ 
neuerung und  7erfahrensneuerung gema.cht  werden.  Zine  zusatzliche  Ver-
besserung der  ~esch~ftigungslage  er~ibt sich  m6~icherweise  a~s dew 
durch die  ~inflihrung neuer  Technologie  erhohten I'!iveau  der  industriellen 
Tatiekeit und  zwar  durch  (i)  erhohte  ~iachfrage infolce  ~r·.veite:-u.ng 
des  rrodu.r( tange bo tes  (Pr·od.uk tueuerung)  und  ( ii.)  Sen,~unc der  .i  .ruli.u.t:~  ~.i.un;;;;-
ko8tcn  (Verfah:rensneuerung).  Allerdincs  konnen  :~eur::·-'-'n,::en  i.:ri  ~-rodui<:.-
tionsprozeB  aufGrund  der  ~rsetzung von  Arbeitskrliftcn durch  ;eld  dir~kt 
zu  einem  RUckgang  der  Arbeitspl~tze ftihren.  3eispiele  fUr  diese  wider--7-
sprlichlichen  Auswirkungen  technologischer  Entwicklungen,  ~ie in den 
:F'allstudien  zum  Vorschein  kommen,  sind  (i)  die  h!insparung  von  Arbei ts-
kraften angesichts  der Konkurrenz  von  Importglitern und  (ii)  erhohte 
Kapitalintensitat,  welche  das  Beschaftig~ngsniveau senkt.  In vielen 
der untersuchten li
1alle ist die  11Neuproduktauswirkung
11  ein hervor-
stechendes  Merkmal  der  auslandischen  Direktinvestition bei  einer 
unmittelbaren Schaffung neuer  Arbeitsplatze;  es  wird  j~doch deutlich, 
daB  alte Produkte  durch  den  ~ffekt neuer  Technolocie  manchmal  ersetzt 
werden,'Naseinen.  Verlust  von  ArbeitspL.itzen  zur  l:t'olge  hat.  E:in  der-
artiger  ~ffekt liiBt  sich nicht  ohne  ~chwierigKeiten messen. 
Tabelle  1.  Gescha tzter  direktt:::.c  3eschaftigu.ngseffekt von  Testfir;nen 
auf  die  Beschaftibungslage in der  EG  als Ganzes 
Fall 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
Ursprungs-
land 
UK 
UK 
Irland 
uK 
i:JRD 
BRD 
UK 
UK 
liberprlifte 
Tochtergesell-
schaft 
BRD  & Frankreich 
BRD 
UK 
Irland & 
Niederland.e 
UK 
UK 
Frankreich 
Niederlande 
geschatzter Direkteffekt 
auf Beschaftigung in EG 
positiv 
positiv aber  gerin~ 
negativ  aber  gering 
positiv 
positiv 
posi ti  v 
durch  ~ezessions-
effekte tiberwundcn 
nach  :2G-Jeitritt 
durch  uK  nezativ -8-
In unseren Fallstudien zeigte  sich,  daB  die  Lage  auf  dem  Arbeitsmarkt 
einen wichtigeren EinfluB  auf  die  Investitionsentscheidungen in 
groBeren Firmen  austibte  als in kleineren.  GroBere  l·,irwen  reagieren  " 
empfindlicher  auf  Lohnkostenunterschiede  innerhalb  der  ~G als kleinere. 
Nur  eine  sehr geringe  Zahl  von  Arbeitsstellen wurde  im  Ursprungsland  als 
lolge von  auslandischen lnvestitionen eingebiiBt und  Arbeitsstellen 
zur  technischen Unterstlitzung wurden  im  Ursprungsland oft zur  Betreuung 
der  auslandischen Investi tion neu  geschaffen.  In den  0  lt,allstudien 
wurden  Ueorganisation und Rationalisierung nach  und  nach  eingeftihrt 
und  es  kam  nicht  zu  badeutenden und umfassenden  Produktionslibertragungen 
auf internationaler  Basis. 
Die  Art der  Integration innerhalb  der  Firma ist bei  der  Bestimmung 
der  ileschaft'igungseffekte  von  Dedeutung.  Eine  zunehmende  i,!;G-Narkt-
integration scheint  ZU  einer verstarkten funktionalen oder  vertiKalen 
Integration,  aber  zu  einer geringeren horizontalen Integration  zu 
fiihren. 
Bei  einer Uberprtifung  der Beispielsinvestitionen hinsicntlich der 
Ergebnisse  der  Auswirkungen  indirekter Arbeitsbes8haffung,  die  aus 
dem  Erwerb  des  Input  von  Glitern  und  Dienstleistungen  im  Gastland hcr-
vor~chen,  kommen  wir  zu  der  Feststellung,  daB  diese  Auswirkungen  we-
sentlich geringer  sind als in anderen  Arbeiten  aneedeutet  ~~rde,  und 
daO  selbst eine  1:1-Beziehung  von  direkt:indirekt  ~eschaffenen Arb~its~ 
platzen die  Auswirkung·ubertreibt. 
Nur  in einer der  von  uns untersuchten  Gesellschaften kam  es  zur 
dauerhaften  SchlieBung  einer  auslandischen Tochtercesellschaft i._ner-
halb  der  ~G.  Unsere  Untersuchuncen  deuten  dar~uf hin,  daB  multi-
nationale  ~esellschaften jede  Anstrengung unternehmen,  um  ~ntlassun~8n 
zu  vermeiden. -9-
Die übertragung  von  l'echnoloc;ie  durch  ausländische  .Direl(tinvesti tion 
stellt einen kri ti  sehen  Faktor  bei  der  l)es tiwmung  der  Beschäfticungs-
struktur in der  }
1irma dar.  In Übereinstimmung mit  der  ;.:;rfahrunc;  an-
derer  Industrien  er()aben  sich  auch  aus  unseTen  Fallstudien keine 
Anzeichen  dafür,  daß  Iaul tina  ti  onale  Unternehmen  ihre  eigene  '1
1echnologie 
dem  verfügbaren  Angebot  an Arbeitskräften  anpassen.  \~ährend bei  mul tj,-
nationalen  Unternehme~ jedoch  die  Schulung ihrer Arbeitskräfte  zur 
Nutzung ihrer bestehenden Technologie  die  liegel ist, beschäftigt die 
Plastik- und  Kunststoffindustrie  eine überdurchschnittliche  Anzahl  an 
angelernten und ungelernten Arbeitskräften.  Als  ?olge ist das  Ansebot 
für  gelernte  Arbeitskräfte  eingeschränkt und  der  systematischen  Aus-
bildungvon Arbeitskräften  sind  enge  ürenzen  gesetzt~ 
Auf  der  ~bene des  Eanagers  besteht die  Tendenz  zur  Schu.lung örtlicher 
~,:.;. tarbei ter,  die  dann  Ausländer  ersetzen;  es  war  jedoch  erkennbar, 
daß  sehr  wenige  =·~anagement-Leute von  der  Tochtergesellschaft ins 
Stammhaus  versetzt wurden,  außer  zu  kurzfristigen  Schulungszwecken. 
Andere  kurzfristige Versetzungen  betrafen Arbeitskräfte in einer  tech-
nischenund beaufsichtieenden Lapazität und  solche,  die  direkt bei  der 
Vorbereitung  einer  neuen  Unternehmung  beschäftigt waren  (also  he.up-
sächlich mittleres  .i~Ianagemen t). 
Aus  unseren Interviews  wird.  deutlich,  daß  wichtige  Entscheidungen über 
Investitionsleistung und  l!'inunzierung  zwar  vom  3ta.mmhaus  get1'offen  , 
werden,  daß  aber  das  i'·'lanae;efilent  an  Ort  und  Stelle in :Frae;en  der  .. ohn-
Vereinbarung  und  Arbeitsbedingun~cn über  ein  beträchtlicnes  ~.aB  an 
Selbstst?-ndickei  t  verfü;·t,  da  diese  Jedin._:,un~·en  ent~~'.;hcid.;;nd  öurch 
die  drtlichen Umstände  bccinflußt  werd~n.  Die  Sinst~llufi;  v0~ 
Lanage:ilent-?ersonal  für  'l
1ochtergesellschaften ist ebenfalls  die  vor-
rane;it;e  Auf~abe der  .iausfirwa,  obwohl  in den  meisten  ~:ällen eine 
deutliche  ~jevorzub·un0 von  einheimischera  Fe1  .. sona.l  lh:i  der  lieueiustL:lli..t.ug -1.0-
oder möglicherweise  bei  der  Beförderung festzustellen war. 
Das  Phänomen  des  Arbeitsplatzwechsels  scheint in der  Hauptsache  unter 
dem  I!:influß  der  lokalen Beschäftigungsbedingungen  zu  stehen  .  In 
unseren  ~3eispielsfällen ist der Arbeitsplatzwechsel niedrig,  mit  der 
Ausnahme  einer L'irma,  für  die  dies  ganz  deutlich nicht  zu traf,  und 
in der  das  Ausmaß  des  Arbeitsplatzwechsels  den  Zxpansionskurs  der 
Firma beeinflußte,  indem ihre Aktivitäten auf  zwei  getrennte Pabrik-
anlagen aufgeteilt  wurde~ 
In unserer  Heispielsuntersuchung wurde  das  gesamte  ~:pektrurn der  Zin-
stellung der Unternehmen  den  Gewerkschaften geeenüber  aufgezei5t.  ln 
der  einen Extremsituation wurden  die  ·~:ewerkschaften von  der  ?irma vor 
der Entscheidung über  die Investition in einem  besti~~ten Land  zu 
Rate  gezogen,  wobei  man  sich  sichere Garantien in allen Aspekten  des 
Arbei teeber-Arbei  tnehmer-Verhäl tnisses erhoffte.  In der  andcr·en  ~xt!:'e~n­
situation versuchte  die Firma in ihrer Geschäftsführung eine Ein-
stellung von  g~werkschaftlich organisierten  Arbeits~räften grundu~tz­
lich zu  vermeiden.  Im  allgemeinen  ziehen  es  jedoch  wenigste~s die 
größeren t'irmen vor,  mit  etablierte~ Gewerkschaften  zu  arbeiten.  ~ie 
Haltung der  &nul tina  tionalen Gesellschaften  zu  einer lnerkeni1Ung  der 
Ge-..rerkschaften stellt auch  für  die Gewerkschaften  selbst ein  ·wi eh t.ie·es 
Thema  dar,  und  eine  weitere  Untersuchung dieses  Problems  könnte  ~"J.f 
eine  produktive  ~leise  sowohl  gewerkschaftliche  wie  auch  unterneh~a:i~2h 
Ansichten miteinbeziehen. 
Eine  klare  bolgeerscheinung  für  die  Jegierunespoliti~ entsteht  ~it 
hinsieht. auf  die  lnvesti  tionsleistungsprä~ie,  die  in  den  ver.:'~e·n.i.t:c>:rlE:!"J. 
werden.  In den  r·üer  untersilchten .:·ällen  waren  solche  .L..ei;:itun':..Js_;;:c·.:.:lj  ...  :n -11-
nicht der  bestiminende ·i•'akto:r  bei  der  . Investi tiousentscheidunt;.  ';/enn  -··--
solche  IJeistunesprämien  engeboten  wurden,  spielten sie hauptüüchlich 
die Rolle  einer zusätzlichen Vergiinstit;ung.  ""~'on  größerer  Hedeutung 
waren  die Notwendigkeit  einer Ne.rktgegenwa:et,  Kostenfaktoren und 
die  Jedingungen  auf  dern  örtlichen .Deschäftigungsmarkt.  E.s  wurde  auch 
die  Dauerhaftit;keit von  Arbeitsstellen bezweifelt,  die  nur  als Tolge 
von Investitionsleistungsprämien allein geEchaffen  \orurden.  Stej_eende 
Arbeitslosigkeit kann  zu  der  gefährlichen Situation führen,  in  der 
die Ret:-ierung  in  :Jachen  ~3ubvention eine })ettlerhaltune- einnir:1mt,  die 
jedoch nur  zu  einer vorübergehenden ·neschäftiguneszunahme  führen  kann. 
Die  Foleerungen für  eine Konkurrenzpolitik  scheinen  anzudeuten,  daß 
die m8glichen  ~osten für  eine  Verhinderung  der  bevorzugten Investition 
eindr Firma sorgfältig abgewogen  werden  sollten.  ~s  scheint,  daß  die 
Altern~tive zu  einer  ausländischen Jirektinvestition  ~icht unbed~.nct 
in einer heimischen Investition plus  Exporten besteht,  sonde~n in 
manchen  :b
1ällen in  einem  gänzlichen  Ausbleiben  von  Investitioner!  •  .Die 
ausländische  :Jirektinvesti  tion und  die  heiraische  Investition kö:1nen 
deshalb  in keiner  ~  .. feine  als  austauschbare  Nöglichkei ten  gesehen  Wf;'!.·den 
Unsere  Arbeit verdeutlicht  außerdem  die  ~~otwendigkei  t  für  eine  detui  1-
liertere Untersuchung  der relativen Begleiterscheinungen von 
11Greenfield"-Investi tionen  (völlig neue  lnvesti ti0nen)  eeeenüber  L~ber-
nahmeinvesti tionen für  die  .Jeschiiftie;une.  Die  BeschJftit;·une;se.usHir-
kungen  einer  tbernahme  können  so  bedeutend  sein wie  die  einer 
"Greenfield ''-Entwicklung,  besonders  'trenn  die  Zuflihrune- neuer  Tec!u:oic..;: 
die  Frodukt-:·~arkt-1 osi tion  der  übernehmenden  Gesellschaft  sti!  .. rkt.  ~·ü!' 
ein genaues  Verstlindnis  der  Cmstände,  die  eine  derartige  Situat:on 
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1.  Obj ecti  fs 
Le  but  principal  de  ce  proje~ est  de  rechercher,  ~ petite  ~chelle,  les 
effets de  l'Investissement  Direct  Etranger entre  pays-membres  de  la  CEE  sur 
l'emploi.  L'etude a  pour objectifs  secondaires d'estimer l'effet sur les 
niveaux  de  qualification et de  salaires dans  la  CEE  enti~re, et  d'~valuer 
!'importance du  transfert  technologique  r~sultant de  tels investissements 
directs strangers. 
L'~tude a  pour  base !'analyse de  huit cas  dans  una  industria  (les 
plastiques et synthetiques)  et,  de  ce  fait,  ne  peut  en  aucun  cas  ~tre  consider~e 
comma  definitive.  Cependant,  nous  pensons  que  l'etude aide  quelque  peu  au 
raffinement  de  la methodologie  et est  importante du  fait m@me  qu'elle presents 
des  conclusions  sur des  etudes  de  cas detaillees. 
2.  Methodologie 
Du  fait  des  difficultes rencontrees  dans  le rassemblement  de  donnees 
officielles  ~  un  niveau  global,  et de  la  conscience  de  ce  que  les questions qui 
nous  concernaient  ne  pouvaient  ~tre traitees avec  succes  qu'au  niveau  de  !'entre-
prise  m~me, il nous  a  paru  desirable de  concentrer notre attention  non  pas  sur 
les  economies  des  pays  membres,  mais  sur le comportement  des  entreprises au  sein 
m@me  de  cas  economies.  Les  informations ant  eta recueillies  ~ partir d'un 
~chantillon de  huit  entreprises  ~ l'aide d'un  questionnaire  structur~. 
La  "possibilite de  rechange"  envisages,  c'est  ~ dire  ce  qui  serait  arriv~ 
si l'investissement  ~  l'etude n'avait  pas  eu  lieu,  est d'importance  critique 
pour touts tentative de  constatation de  !'impact  sur l'emploi des  investissements 
directs strangers a l'int6rieur de  la  CEE.  Plusieurs  possibilites se  presentent: 
dans  !'absence d'investissement direct  ~ !'stranger au  bien  (1)  l'entreprise 
aurait investi dans  son  pays  d'origine et peut-@tre  touche  le marche-cible  par 
des  exportations,  au  bien  (ii)  un  investissement aurait ate entrepris  ~ 
l'exterieur de  la  CEE  et  le marche-cible desservi  depuis  1~.  au  bien  (iii)  nucun 
investissement n'aurait ete entrepris ni dans  le pays  d'origine ni ailleurs •. 
De  ce fait,  les  alternatives~ l'investissement  au  sein de  la  CEE  et en  dehors 
du  pays d'origine,  c'est  ~ dire  ~  la situation "reelle",  sont  l~s suivantes: 
(i)  Un  investissement  dans  le pays  d'origine  (+  exportations) 
(ii)  Un  investissement  en  dehors  de  la  CEE 
(iii)  Aucun  investissement,  pas de  remplacement  par des exportations 
De  toute  evidence,  l'effet sur l'emploi dans  la  CEE  est  diff~rent dans 
chaque  cas: 
(i)  Dans  le cas  aD  l'alternative est  l'investissement  dans  le  pays 
d'origine,  l'effet de  creation d'emploi  de  l'investissement 
ayant  reellement  eu  lieu peut  etre plus  important  ou  mains 
important  que  celui de  cette alternative;  c'est  ~ dire que  l8s 
emplois  "reellement"  cre~s peuvent  ne  representer qu'une 
substitution de  l'emploi dans  le pays  d'origine et,  de  ce fait. 
18  veritable 8ffel  sur l'emploi  dans  la  CEE  enti~re peut  ~tre 
positif au  negatif. (ii)  Dans  le cas  aD  !'alternative est  un  investissement  ~ l'exterieur 
de  la  CEE,  l'investissement ayant  reellement  eu  lieu risque 
d'~tre cr~ateur d'emploi  pour  la  CEE,  ~ !'exception de  la 
situation limite dans  laquelle l'investissement  ~ l'exterieur 
de  la CEE  cree  plus  d'emplois  dans  le  pays  d'origine que 
l'investissement ayant  r~ellement pris place dans  la  CEE 
n'ajoute  ~ l'emploi total  de  la  CEE  prise plans son  entier. 
(ii!) Dans  le cas  aD  !'alternative est aucun  investissement,  alors 
l'investissement ayant  reellement  eu  lieu est  nettement  createur 
d'emploi. 
Il est  plus  vraisemblable  que  l'entreprise  consid~re (i)  ou  (iii) 
comma  alternative plutOt  que  (ii)  sauf pour des  investissement  du  type 
"offshore",  realises specifiquement  dans  le but  de  servir le marche  du  pays 
d'origine. 
L'alternative  (i)  offre un  grand  inter~t.  Dans  ce  cas,  l'effet de  la 
situation alternative est  lie~ l'examen de  la technologie  de  production. 
La  quantite d'emplois  cress  par un  investissement specifique dependra 
de  la  proportion de  main  d'oeuvre utilises pour la  production  - au  du  ratio 
capital-travail.  En  consequence,  si l'entreprise multinationals  (MNE)  est 
sensible aux  coOt  des facteurs,  on  peut  s•attendre a ce  qu'un  investissement 
realise dans  un  pays a main  d'oeuvre  bon  marche  (Grande  Bretagne,  Irlande) 
cree plus  d'emplois  que  dans  un  pays a main  d'oeuvre chere  (Allemagne  de 
l'Ouest).  Ce  qui  nous  interesse done,  c'est le degre  avec  lequel  les entreprises 
utilisent une  technologie donnee  dans  toute la  CEE,  et  jusqu'~ quol  point  c8ci 
est modifie  en  reponse  aux  coOts  des  facteurs  (en  particuiier taux  de  salaire). 
51  les MNESsont  sensibles a ces  coOts,  alors  la  localisation des  investissements 
et  le processus  de  production seront  interdependants.  Le  choix  de  l'industrie 
des  plastiques  nous  permet  d'examiner cette question dans  le cas  d'une  technologj.e 
changeante et  "malleable",  ainsi que  pour  una  large gamme  de  produits et de 
methodes  de  production. 
On  peut  s'attendre  ~ ce  que  l'int~gration des  economies  nationales aie 
deux  effets opposes  sur la nature de  l'integration des  MNEs  a l'interieur des 
fronti~res de  l'Union. 
(1)  La  suppression  des tarifs et  barri~res au  commerce  at  ~ 
l'investissement  peuvent  resulter en  une  integration horizontals 
amoindrie parce que  les  entreprises vont  chercher a atteindre 
un  minimum  d'efficacite en  supprimant  la duplication d'usines 
et recueillant  le maximum  d'economies  d'echelle par  la central-
isation des activites. 
(11)  L'augmentation de  la division du  travail  qui  deviant  possible 
peut  conduire a une  integration verticals accrue.  Les  entreprises 
saisiront  l'opportunite de  se specialiser,  et,  peut-~tre, 
d'introduire une  specialisation par composants.  , 
L'effet  f't!T'  l'emploi  sera~  bien  ~videmment.  d'un genre tres different 
suivant  le type  de  contraintes  impasses  par !'integration.  Nous  avons  chercho 
a identifier ces  contraintes  en  elaborant  un  questj.onnaire de  tells sorte  qu' il 
pranne  en  compte  les deux  types  d'int~gration. 
_  .. -3-
Un  facteur d'importance  qui  complique  la discussion  ci-dessus  a  trait 
~ 1•1ntroduction d'une  nouvelle technologie.  L'affirmation  g~n~ral~ ~ savoir 
que  l'investissement est createur  d•emplois~  peut  etre  rendue  nulle  par 
l'introduction d'une technologie  ~conomisant la main  d'oeuvre et, ainsi, 
r~duisant l'emploi direct total.  Une  telle technologie  peut,  cependant,  cr~er 
des  emplois ailleurs  dans  1•economie,  il est done  necessaire  de  suivre  ce 
phenom~ne ~travers le  syst~me avant  de  pouvoir juger de  l'effet global.  Cet 
effet d'ordre technologique  peut  ~tre au  ne  pas  etre  li~  ~  la  d~cision d'investir. 
Le  degr~ d'intensit~ technologique sera fortement  li~ aux  niveaux  de 
qualification et  les investissements  dans  des  produits et  precedes··~ technologie 
poussee  peuvent  augmenter  la  demands  pour certains types  de  main  d'oeuvre 
specialis~e,  peut-~tre aux  depends  de  la main  d'oeuvre  non  specialises. 
En  plus d'effets directs,  au interieurs,  sur l'emploi,  l'investissement 
direct stranger peut  avoir des  implications  exterieures  ~  l'entreprise qui 
investit~  Des  effets positifs indirects  pour  l'emploi du  pays  hate  peuvent 
provenir d'un  besoin  de  soustraitance,  transport~ d'une demands  de  services, 
d'infrastructures de  vente ou  gouvernementales,  de  depenses  de  construction et 
du  r~investissement des  fonds  re~us  ~ la suite d•un  rachat  par un  nouvel 
investisseur stranger.  Des  effets negatifs  peuvent  provenir du  remplacement  de 
producteurs  locaux  par des  investisseurs strangers.  La  quantification de tels 
effets pose  de  serieux  probl~mes. 
3.  Resume  des  Etudes  de  Cas 
Le  tableau  1  r~sume pour chacune  des  huit  etudes de  cas l'effet direct 
sur l'emploi  dans  la  CEE.  Il montre aussi  les  pays  d'origine des  investissements 
directs ainsi que  leurs  pays  hates. 
4.  Conclusions 
Plusieurs  th~mes generaux sont apparents  dans  la motivation d'investir 
dans  d'autres  pays  de  la CEE.  Les  etudes  de  cas montrent  que  les directeurs 
consid~rent que  !'alternative  ~  l'investissement  ~tranger direc~ est  la perte de 
marches  et  d'opportunites d'exportation.  Ceci  est  renforce  par  les desirs  plus 
positifs de  fournir  un  service plus effectif aux  clients en  etant  localise pres 
d'eux~  de  pourvoir aux  pref~rences locales d'achat;  et  de  s'adapter  compl~tement 
aux  specifications et standards  locaux.  Un  facteur  supplementaire~  qui  peut 
provenir du  choix  de  l'industrie,  est le coOt  elev~ du  transport,  de  l~entre­
posage et de  !'assurance relativement  ~  la valeur du  produit.  Les  fluctuations 
dans  les  taux  du  change  entre  pays  europeans  ant  aussi  fourni  une  barriers 
supp16mentaire  aux  tentatives  de  concurrence  par !'exportation dans  !'ensemble 
de  la Communaute.  En  essence,  l'investissement direct  stranger est ressenti 
comma  una  necessite  pour  una  concurrence  effective en  fait  de  prix et  de  qualite 
du  service. 
Les  compagnies  multinationales  sont  des  vehicules majeurs  du  transfert 
international  de  technologj_e.  La  technologie  peut  ~tre transferee  interndtlorlcl8-
ment  sous  differentes formes  - sour forme  d'exportation de  biens  ~ technologie 
avanc~e~  sous  forme  de  brevets~ ainsi  qu'incorporee  aux  proced~s m~mes de 
production  en  tant  qu'investissement  stranger direct. -4-
TABLEAU  1  Effets de  la  cr~ation d'emplois  directs  sur l'emploi 
total  de  la  CEE  estimea  ~ partir d'un  echantillon d'entreprises 
Pays  Succursale  Effet  direct  estim~ sur 
Cas  d'origine  etudiee  l'emploi dans  la  CEE 
1  G.B.  Allemagne  & France  positif 
2  G.B.  Allemagne  positif,  mais  lager 
3  Irlande  G.B.  negatif,  mais  lager 
4  G.B.  Irlande & Pays  Bas  positif 
5  Allemagne  G.B.  posit if 
6  Allemagne  G.B.  positif 
7  G.B.  France  depasse  par  les  effets 
de  la recession 
8  G.B.  Pays  Bas  negatif  apr~s  l'entr~e:~ de 
la G.B.  dans  la CEE -5-
Aucun  mod~le general  n'emerge  des  etudes  de  cas  en  ce  qui  concerns  les 
effets du  transfert  de  technologie dans  l'investissement direct stranger. 
Neanmoins,  de  marne  que  beaucoup  d'autres secteurs  de  l'industrie de  produits 
manufactures,  le secteur des  plastiq~es et synthetiques utilise de  plus  en  plus 
le capital, a cause de !'incorporation d'avances  technologiques.  Il est 
possible  de  faire,  ici,  une  distinction utile entre innovation  pour  un  produit 
et innovation  pour  un  precede.  Des  augmentations  supplementaires  d'emploi 
Reuvent  resulter de  la  stimulation du  niveau d'activite provenant  de  !'intro-
duction d'une  nouvelle technologie  en  (i)  augmentant  la demands  par l'elargisse-
ment  de  la .gamma  de  produits  (innovation  pour  un  produit)  et  (ii)  en  reduisant 
les  coOts  de  production  (innovation  pour  un  precede).  Cependant,  !'innovation 
du  processus  de  production  peut  resulter directement  dans  une  chute de  l'emploi 
du  fait  de  la substitution du  capital  ~ la main  d'oeuvre.  Les  exemples  de  ces 
effets contradictoires  de  l'avance  technologique mis  en  evidence  dans  las  etudes 
de  cas  sont  (i)  la protection d'emplois  en  presence de  concurrence  de  !'import-
ation et  (ii)  une  intensite de  !'utilisation du  capital reductrice  de  l'emploi. 
Dans  beaucoup  des  cas  studies,  1'  "effet  nouveau  produit"  est una  cara"cteristique 
evidente"de  l'investissement direct stranger pour la creation directs  d'emplois, 
mais,  il apparatt  que  l'impact  de  la nouvelle technologie se traduit,  quelques 
fois,  par le remplacement  des  produits anciens  accompagne  d'une parte d'emplois. 
Un  tel effet est difficile  ~ mesurer. 
Nos  etudes  de  cas  ant  montre  que  la situation du  march~ de  l'emploi  a 
plus d'influence sur les decisions  d'investissement  des  entreprises plus grandes 
. que  sur ce1les  des  entreprisas  plus  petites.  Tres  peu  d'emplois  de  production 
ant  eta perdus  dans  le pays  d'origine du  fait  de  l'investissement  ~  l'etranger 
et des  emplois  techniques  de  soutien ant  souvent  ete cress  dans  le pays  d'origine 
pour aider l'investissement  ~ !'stranger.  Dans  les huit  etudes de  cas,  reorgan-
isation et rationalisation ant  ete introduites graduellement  et il n'y a  pas  eu 
de transferts  internationaux significatifs,·en masse,  de  production. 
La  nature  de  !'integration~ l'interieur de  l'entreprise est  importante 
pour  d~terminer las effets sur l'emploi.  L'integration accrue  du  marche  de  la 
CEE  semble  augmenter  !'integration fonctionnelle  au  verticals mais  diminuer 
!'integration horizontals. 
En  examinant  les  t~moignages sur l'effet de  creation indirecte d'emplois 
des  ~nvestissement echantillonnes,  provenant  d'achats  de  biens et de  services 
dans  le  pays  hote  comma  "inputs",  nous  trouvons  que  cat effet est  bien  moindre 
que  ne  l'avait suggere d'autres  ~tudes et que  meme  une  relation 1:1  d'emplois 
directs  1  indirects creSs  l'exag~re. 
Dans  une  seule des  entreprises etudiees,  il y  a  eu  fermeture  compl~te 
d'une succursale  etrang~re ~ l'interieur de  la  CEE.  Notre  temoignage  sugg~re 
que  les multinationales font  des  efforts acharnes  pour eviter las  licenciements. 
Le  transfert de  te~hnologie par investissement direct stranger est  un 
facteur critique pour  la determination  de  la  structure de  l'emploi dans  !'entre-
prise.  Similairement  ~ l'experience d'autres industries,  ~ucune preuve  ne 
ressort  de  nos  etudes  de  cas  pour supporter  la  suggestion  que  les multinationales 
adaptent  leur propre technologie  ~ l'offre disponible  de  main  d'oeuvre.  Mais, 
alors quela  norma  pour  las multinationales est de  former  la main  d'oeuvre~ 
!'utilisation de  leur technologie existante,  l'industrie des  plastiques et 
synthetiques  emploie  una  proportion de  main  d'oeuvre  semi-specialisee et  non 
specialises au-dessus  de  la moyenne.  En  consequence,  la  provision d'cmplois 
specinl  j  se~  E!St  1 imi  t6e et  la formation  syst~mat  ique  de  la main  d'oeuvre  r~dui  Le 
dans  sa  portee. -6-
Au  niveau  de  la direction,  la tendance  est  ~ la formation  du  personnel 
local  pour  remplacer  les  expatri~s,  mais  il est sensible que  tres  peu  de 
transfert  de  cadres  a  lieu depuis  la succursale vers  la  compagnie-mere  si 
ce n'est  ~  court-terme dans  un  but  de  formation.  D'autres transferts  ~  court 
terms  impliquent  technicians et surveillants ainsi que  ceux directement  engag~s 
dans  la realisation d'une  nouvelle  op~ration (essentiellement  cadres moyens). 
Nos  entretiens ant  montr~ que,  bien  que  les majeures  d~cisions sur les 
flu~  d'investissement  et  le financement  sent  prises  par la  compagnie-m~re,  une 
grande  parf d'autonomie est  laiss~e ~ la direction locale en  ce  qui  concerns  les 
n~gociations de  salaires et les conditions d'emploi et que  celles-ci sent signi-
ficativement  affect~es par les  circonstances. locales.  Le  recrutement  de  la 
direction des  succursales est aussi une  pr~rogative de  la  compagnie-m~re, 
quoiqu'une  pr~ference marqu~e apparaisse dans  la  plupart  des  cas  pour  la  nomination, 
au  si possible,  la  promotion  de  cadres  locaux du  pays  h8te. 
Les  mouvements  de  personnel apparaissent  essentiellement determines  par 
les conditions  locales de  l'emploi.  En  general,  les mouvements  de  personnel  dans 
notre echantillon d'entreprises  ~taient faibles,  mais,  dans  le cas  aD  ceci  ne 
s'appliquait definitivement  pas,  le niveau  de  ces mouvements  avait  influenc~ le 
chemin  d'expansion  de  l'entreprise en  la  for~ant  ~ subdiviser ses  activit~s en 
deux  usines  separees. 
Le  ~pectre entier d'attitudes  ~  l'~gard des  syndicats a  ~t~ mis  ~  l'~vidence 
dans  notre echantillon.  A une  extr@mite,  l'entreprise contactait  les  syndicats 
avant  de  prendre  la decision d'investir dans  un  pays  particulier,  dans  le  but 
d'assurer des  guaranties sur taus  les aspects des  relations du  travail. 
A l'autre  extr~mite,  l'entreprise organisait  sa  strat~gie de  fa~on  ~ 
~viter le  recruternen~ d'une main  d'oeuvre organises.  En  general,  les plus grandes 
compagnies,  au  mains,  pr~f~rent travailler avec  les syndicats  ~tablis.  L'attitude 
des  multinationales  ~ l'egard  des  syndicats est  une  question  d'importance  pour 
les syndlcats  m~mes et  une  enqu~te plus  poussee  pourrait  utilement  incorporer 
leurs  points  de  vue  aussi  bien  que  ceux des  compagnies. 
Une  implication nette  pour la politique gouvernementale  se degage  pour  ce 
qui est des  encouragements  ~ l'investissement offerts  pour attirer les industries 
dans  differents pays  membres.  Sans  exception,  dans  les cas  studies,  de  tels 
encouragements  n'etaient  pas  le  d~terminant majeur  ~ la  base  de  la  d~cision 
d'investir.  Dans  le cas  aD  ces  encouragements  etaient offerts,  ils etaient 
generalement  consideres  comma  une  gratification.  De  plus  grande  importance  ~tait 
le besoin  d'~tre present  sur un  marche,  les facteurs-coQt  et  les conditions  du 
marche  local  de  l'emploi.  Des  doutes  ant  ete emis  quant  ~  la  permanence  de 
l'emploi  ere~ en  reponse  aux  seuls  encouragements a l'investissoment.  Le  chomage 
croissant  risque de  pousser les gouvernements  ~ des  politiques  de  "mendiage" 
aupr~s de  leurs  voisins  pour:de telles succursales,  ce qui  peut  conduire  ~ des 
creations d'emploi  seulement  temporaires. 
Les  implicutions  pour  la politique concurrentielle apparaissent  dans  la 
necessite d'evaluer soigneusement  les  coOts  d'opportunite  qui surgissent si 
l'entreprise ne  p~ut realiser son  investissement  "pref~re".  Il  semble  que 
!'alternative a un  investissement  direct~ l'etranger soit  non  pas  un  investisse-
ment  dans  le  pays  d'origine accompagn6  d'cxportations mais,  dans  certains  cas, 
aucun  investissement.  En  d'autres  termes,  l'investissement direct  ~ l'etranger 
et l'investissement  domestique  sent  loin d'etre de  parfaits substituts.  NotrP. 
etude  r~tolltre  auHsi  le besoin  d' une  recherche  plus  detail  lee sur les implications 
relatives sur  l'emploi d'investissements realises a partir de  creation complete 
centro des  investissements realises  par rachat.  Les·  effets createurs d' emploi 
... -7-
d'un  rachat  peuvent  ~tre tout aussi significatifs que  ce  d'une  compl~te 
creation,  en  particulier lorsque l'introduction d'une  nouvelle technologie 
renforce la position de  la compagnie  rachetee  dans  son  marche-produit.  Une 
recherche  plus  etendue est  necessaire  pour etablir les circonstances  qui 
d~terminent un  tel resultat. MAIN  REPORT 1. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  major aim  of this project is to investigate,  on  a  small  sample 
basis,  the  employment  effects of intra-EEC foreign  direct  investment  (FOI). 
Further objectives are an  estimation  of  the effect  on  skill levels and  wage 
levels in the EEC  as  a  whole,  and  to assess the  importance of technology 
transfer via  such  FDI. 
This  Report  is made  up  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines the methodology 
used.  Section  3  gives  estimates  of  intra-EEC foreign direct  investment 
stocks  and  flows  at the macro  level.  Section 4  presents  case  studies  of 
individual  firms'  direct  investments  within the  EEC  and  Section  5  is a 
summary  and  draws  tentative conclusions. 
A study  based  on  only  8  cases  and  in only  one  industry  (plastics and 
synthetics)  cannot  be  considered in any  way  definitive.  However,  we  believe 
that this study  is important  in refining methodology  and  in the  presentation 
of a  limited  number  of actual  cases. 
2.  Methodology 
2.1.  Background 
As  unemployment  in member  countries  of the  EEC  has  risen,  so the 
question  of the possible loss of jobs resulting from  the foreign direct  invest-
ment  of multinational  companies  has  been  more  loudly voiced.  The  impact  of 
multinational  companies  on  employment  in  host  (receiving)  countries and  in 
sou~oe (uapital  exporting)  countries  has  received  scant  attention in the 
literature.  Such  studies as  there  have  been  can  be  broadly divided  between 
those  concerned  with the  impact  of multinational enterprises  (MNEs)  in 
J~veloping economies  and  those whose  focus  is the  industrialised economies. 
Of  the two,  the latter has  attracted far  less  interest than  the  former~  not-
withstanding the fact  that a  United  Nations  report  in 1973  estimated that  in 
1970  MNEs  contributed to  employment  by  creating or maintaining  some  13  to  14 
million jobs  in all market  economy  countries~  and  that  11  to  12  million of 
these were  in industrialised  economies. 1 
Many  studies  have  been  conducted  into the  effect of FDI  on  individual 
host  countries  - both  Governmental2  and  Private  studies3. 
2.1.1.  Host  Country  Studies 
From  the point  of view  of the  host  country,  the  impact  of foreign 
investment  is generally considered  beneficial to  employment.  The  opening 
of ~ew factories  (a  "greenfield"  development)  creates employment  and  evidence 
suggests that the  labour force  expands  rapidly in  the  early years  of  such  a 
development  before  levelling off.  If,  alternatively,  the  investment  takes 
the form  of a  takeover of  a  local firm,  employment  will at first  be  likely 
lunited  Nations:  Multinational  corporations  in  world  development, 
ST/ECA/190  New  York,  1973. 
2 
See  (90)  and  (102)  in  Annotated  Bibliography 
3UK:  Hodges  (47),  France:  Johnstone  (61),  Ireland:  Buckley  (15),  McAleese  (72,73), 
W~1es:  Davies  and  Thomas  (27),  Scotland:  Forsyth  (38),  Hood  and  Young  (48), 
West  Germany:  Jungnickel  (62),  Netherlands:  Stubenitsky  (93),  Belgium:  Thoman(94). -2-
to remain  stable~  or even fall  slightly~  most  probably at management  level; 
but  in the  longer term it is likely to rise as  the firm taken  over is 
strengthened.  The  diversification of a  local  economy  which  often accompanies 
a  foreign  investment  is also beneficial to  employment. 
All  such  arguments  are  commonly  advanced  in  support  of foreign  invest-
ment.  But  there are also opinions  expressed  to the contrary.  For example, 
the stability of the  employment  created  by  multinational  companies  is called 
into question  by  the vagaries  of the  business cycle.  In times  of recession, 
particularly when  the phases  of the cycle are  synchronised  between  countries 
as  they  are increasingly within the  EEC~  a  foreign  investor is more  likely 
to effect cuts  in  employment  in a  subsidiary than  in the  parent  company.  In 
fact the evidence for such  a  view is mixed.  A French  study on  the  impact  of 
foreign  investment  on  unemploymenti~ admittedly concerned  with a  period when 
"recession"  was  nothing  more  than  a  slow  down  in  the rate of  growth,  found 
that  in  some  regions  of France  no  foreign  enterprise established  between  1962 
and  1971  had  closed  by  the  end  of 1971,  and  in the  country as  a  whole,  few 
foreign  subsidiaries  had  shut  down.  This  apparent  stability is no  less 
significant  because of  reductions  in the  labour force  in times  of  slack,  which 
is equally a  feature of  indigenous  companies.  Indeed  the report  suggested 
that national  companies  were  more  prone to  shed  labour than  foreign  companies, 
for a  number  of  reasons.  (i)  Foreign  companies  invest  usually  on  a  long-term 
basis.  (ii)  The  timing of the  investment is frequently made  to coincide with 
the trough  in the  business cycle.  (iii)  The  companies  usually  belong  to 
expanding  industries  supplying the world,  rather than  the  national,  market. 
(iv)  The  scale of the  investment  and  the diversified product  range of many 
large  MNEs  gives  added  security to  employment. 
Similarly,  a  study  on  foreign  firms  in the Republic of Ireland2  found 
that employment  loss from  foreign  owned  firms  was  not  noticeably different 
from  that  of  indigenous  enterprises.  The  reasons  adduced  were  (i)  the greater 
effort  MNEs  put  into  planning  investment~  (ii)  MNEs  are sensitive to their 
"host"  country  image,  (iii)  MNEs  are  more  adept  at  adapting  both  production 
processes  and  the type of output  produced  in response  to  changing  domestic 
costs and  world  demand,  (iv)  multi-plant  economies  confer advantages  in the 
form  of  risk-spreading~  capital raising,  R & 0  and  sales  promotion,  which 
leave  MNEs  in  a  stronger position to take a  longer-run  view  of a  plant's 
operation  than  a  national  firm.  This final  point is strongly  supported  by 
Scherer et  a13~  who  present  evidence which  suggests that there are  several 
very real  economies  available from  multi-plant  operation. 
The  generally favourable  light in which  the  employment  effects of 
foreign  investments are seen  in  industrialised host  countries is tempered  by 
observations  on  the  skill-levels of the  employment  created.  For it has  been 
suggested  that  only  "lesser-order" activities will  be  allocated to  subsid-
iaries~ all skilled,  technical  and  planning  work  being  concentrated  in  the 
loel~gation  ~  l'am~nagement du  territoire et  ~  l'action  r~gionale firmes  multi-
nationales:  Investissements  strangers et  amenagement  du  territoire,  Livre  blanc, 
Paris,  1973, 
20.  McAleese  and  M.  Counahan  "Stickersor Snatchers?  Employment  in Transnational 
Corporations during  the  recession", International  Economics  Study  Group~  LSE#  1978. 
3F.M.  Scherer et al  "The  Economics  of Multi-plant  Operation:  An  International 
Comparisons  Study",  Harvard  U.P.,  1975. -3-
source country.1  Here  again the specific impact  of an  investment  is likely to 
depend  very  much  on  the  industry  (particularly the  kinds  of goods  produced), 
and  the size of the  company.  The  French  study  referred to  above  found  little 
difference  between  the training programmes  of multinational  and  local  comp-
anies.  An  equally important  issue here  is the  number  of  employees  (partic-
ularly management)  coming  from  the parent  company;  and  the  promotion  prospects 
from  within the subsidiary company. 
2.1.2.  Source  Country  Studies 
When  we  turn to studies which  examine  the  impact  of FDI  on  source 
countries,  then far less information is available.  The  Reddaway  Reports2  are 
the exception to the  predominantly  US  bias  of official information  on  outward 
FDI.  The  US  reports were  a  reaction  to  labour criticism that outward  FDI 
substitutes for domestic  employment.  The  American  Federation of  Labor-Congress 
of Industrial  Organizations  (AFL-CIO)  has  criticised  US  multinational  enter-
prises  on  two  grounds:  (i)  that they  have  directly,  and  adversely,  affected 
job creation  in the  USA;  and  (ii) that they  have  reduced  American  competitive-
ness  abroad,  particularly through the export  of  technology  and  through  reduced 
opportunities for  US  exports.  This latter concern also relates to  a  more 
widely  studied aspect  of the  impact  of multinational  enterprises,  viz.  the 
balance  of  payments  effect.  The  focus  of our concern is the  impact  of  MNEs 
on  employment.  On  that score a  number  of arguments  have  been  put  forward  to 
counter the  views  of the AFL-CIO. 
The  US  Chamber  of  Commerce,  for example,  showed  that  the multinational 
corporatio~s increased their employment  in the  USA  by  31.1%  between  1960  and 
197U  compared  with an  average  of  12.3%  for the industrial  sector taken  as  a 
whole. 3  The  Emergency  Committee  for American  Trade4  showed  that  US  multi-
nationals during the  1960~ had  a  rate of job creation  75%  above  that of other 
.ndustrial corporations.  A study  by  R.  Stobaugh  et als estimated that  in 
1970  US  foreign direct  investment  in  manufacturing  resulted  in  perhaps 
600,000  US  jobs.  R.G.  Hawkins,  however,  showed  that  the results  of  such 
studies as  those  mentioned  above  depend  crucially on  the methods  of  estim-
ation and  assumptions  used.  Hawkins'  analysis attributes the  net  effect  on 
employment  to the aggregate of several  opposing factors  which  he  summarised 
as  "local  production displacement  effect;  export  stimulation effect;  home 
office employment  effect;  supporting firm  employment  effect".G  He  was  unable 
to  show  conclusively one  way  or the other that multinationals  have  either a 
positive or negative  impact  on  employment  in the  USA  and  considered that  job 
creation and  job loss  largely cancelled  each  other out. 
1S.H.  Hymer  "The  Multinational  Corporation  and  the  law  of  uneven  development" 
in  H.  Radice  (Ed.)  "International Firms  and  Modern  Imperialism",  Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, .1975.  · 
~~.8.  Reddaway  et al  "Effects of  UK  Direct  Investment  Overseas"  Cambridge  U.P., 196e 
Theimpact  of  US  Foreign  Investment  on  US  Employment  and  Trade"  New  York,  1971. 
4"The  role of multinational corporations  in the  USA  and  World  Economies",Washington, 
.1972.  5R.B.  Stobaugh  "Nine  Investments  Abroad  and  their Impact  at  Home",Harvard  U.P., 1976 
6R.G.  Hawkins  "Job  Displacement  and  the Multinational  Firm;  a  Methodological 
Review",  New  York,  1972. -4-
What  few  of these studies considered  was  whether  domestic  investment 
was  a  valid alternative to foreign  investment.  Does~  for  example~  the  export 
of part of a  company's  production facility in  increasingly competitive 
markets  provide a  better foothold  than the  export  of goods  manufactured in 
the  home  market?  Such  a  consideration is important  for the viability of the 
parent  company.  Expansion to cater for  exports  may  be  short-lived if the 
company  is unable  to  compete. 
Most  studies of outward  FDI  have  concentrated  on  the balance of  payments 
impact  of  FDI  (e.g.  Reddaway  considers the  pay  off in terms  of  "recoupment 
periods"  - the time  taken to  pay  back the original capital outlay),  not  the 
employment  impact.  The  "Tariff Commission  Report"  considered  employment  and 
wage  levels of  US  industry abroad  but  its results are  suspect. 1 
These  large  sample  surveys  are  not  as appropriate  as  in-depth case 
studies of  individual  foreign  investment  decisionsfor measuring  the  employment 
effects of  FDI. 
2.1.3.  Studies at  Firm  Level 
A major  previous  study at individual  firm  level is that  by  Stobaugh  and 
others  on  "Nine  US  Investments Abroad"1  The  concern of Stobaugh's  study was 
the effects of  US  FDI  on  the balance  of  payments  and· employment  level of the 
USA.  The  study  concentrated  on  nine  investments in nine  major  US  industries. 
An  interview study  of  UK  direct  investment  abroad  (including the  EEC)  by 
smaller firms,  was  conducted  by  Newbould,  Buckley  and  Thurwell,  but  its concern 
was  managerial  processes,  not  employment  effects. 3 
2.1.4.  Studies of Intra  EEC  Direct  Investment  at  Firm  Level 
Concern  with  progress~  or lack of  progress,  towards  European  integr-
ation  has  led to intra EEC  FDI  being  seen as  a  major  integrating  process. 
It has  been  said~  however,  that the firms  which  have  taken most  advantage  of 
integration are  subsidiaries of  US  firms within the  EEC.  Recent  studies have 
shed  more  light  on  investment  (and  divestment)  policies of  MNEs  within the 
EEC,  but this  has  often been  of  US  firms. 4 
2.1.5.  Macro-information 
Macro  information  on  stocks and  flows  of  FDI  is woefully  inadequate 
as Section  3  below  shows.  It is virtually impossible to derive expectations 
on  the basis of  such  information. 
1"Implications of multinational  firms  for world  trade and  investment  and  for 
US  Trade  and  Labor",  Washington,  1973. 
2stobaugh  et al op.cit. 
3G.D.  Newbould,  P.J.  Buckley  and  J.  Thurwell  "Going  International  -The 
Experience  of Smaller Companies  Overseas",  Associated Business Press,  1978. 
~Van den  Bulke  (105),  Hood  and  Young  (48),  Dunning  (32). -5-
2.2.  Formul~tion of Methodology 
2.2.1.  Preliminary 
The  difficulties encountered  with official data,  and  recognition that 
the issues which  concerned  us  could  only  be  successfully dealt  with  at the  . 
level of the firm  itself,  made  it desirable that we  concentrate our attention 
not  on  the  economies  of the countries to be  included  in the  study,  but  on  the 
behaviour of firms  within those  economies,  even  though the firms'  impact  on 
employment  in the countries where  they  invest was  our  prime  concern.  Further, 
a  decision was  taken  to  limit our enquiry to  only  one  industry and  the  plastics 
and  synthetics  industry was  chosen  because of the diversity of  product  range 
associated with manufacturing  in that  industry,  together with the  continuing 
development  of  new  technology  which  typifies the recent  growth  of the  industry. 
It was  felt that differences  between  industries might  influence the results 
and  investigation of a  single  industry removes  this bias. 
Further,  we  hoped  to  limit the analysis to a  sub-section of the  nine 
member  countries.  This  proved  to be  difficult to control  because of lack of 
prior knowledge  of the  location of  manufacturing  subsidiaries. 
Our  final  sample  includes  the  UK,  Republic  of  Ireland,  West  Germany,  France 
and  the  Netherlands as either host  or source  countries. 
2.2.2.  Data  Collection Methodology 
Infor~~tion was  gathered  by  a  structured questionnaire.  It was 
important  that  we  apply what,  in  another context,  Yves  Sabala and  Raul 
Trajtenbp:·g1  refer to as  "a  uniform  scheme  of analysis",  to each  of the 
investments chosen  for study.  This is relevant  because  our report  is not  a 
comparison  of different  cases  but a  "synthesis",  intended to draw  out  the 
~ammon threads  in the  impact  of the multinational  enterprises on  employment 
in the member  countries.  To  this end  we  used  the questionnaire  in  appendix  1. 
The  questions  move  from  general  motivation to the  impact  of  labour 
matters  and  precise details on  employment.  We  tried to  avoid  forcing  the 
labour issue on  the  interviewee  by  asking about  general  motivation.  In all 
cases,  a  senior representative of the firm was  interviewed  and  subsequent 
telephone calls or letters were  exchanged  to clarify points at  issue. 
2.2.3.  The  Alternative Position 
Of  critical importance  in  an  attempt  to ascertain the  impact  of  intra-
EEC  FDI  on  employment  is the relevant  "alternative position",  i.e.  what  would 
have  happened  if the  investment  under  investigation  had  not  taken  place. 
Several  possibilities arise;  in  the absence  of the FOI  either  (i)  the firm 
would  have  invested at  home  and  possibly  serviced the target  market  via 
exports,  or  (ii)  an  investment  outside the  EEC  would  have  been  undertaken 
and  the target market  supplied from  there,  or  (iii)  no  investment  at  home  or 
in other  locations would  have  been  undertaken.  The  alternatives to the  EEC 
investment  outside the  source country,  i.e.  the  'actual'  situation,  are 
therefore: 
1"The  impact  of Multinational  Firms  on  Employment  .:md  Incomes  in the 
Developing  Countries.  Methodological  Note",  ILO,  Geneva,  1975. case: 
-6-
(1)  An  investment  in the  source  country  (+  exports) 
(ii)  An  investment  outside the  EEC 
(iii)  No  investment,  no  replacement  by  exports 
~ 
Clearly,  the effect  on  employment  in the  EEC  is different  in  each 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
If the alternative is  home  investment,  the  employment-creating 
effect  of the  'actual'  investment  may  be  either greater or  less 
than  the alternative;  i.e.  the actual  jobs created  may  merely 
substitute for  'home'  employment  and  therefore the real  employ-
ment  effect  can  be  positive or  negative for the  EEC  as  a  whole. 
If the alternative is an  investment  outside the  EEC,  then the 
'actual'  investment  is likely to  be  job-creating for the  EEC, 
except  in the  extreme  situation where  the  investment  outside 
the  EEC  creates more  jobs in the  source  country than  the 
'actual'  EEC  investment  adds  to total  employment  in the  EEC 
as a  whole. 
If the alternative is  no  investment,  then the  'actual'  invest-
ment  is clearly employment-creating. 
It is most  likely that the firm would  consider  (i)  and  (iii)  as 
alternatives rather than  (iil  except  for  "offshore"  type  investments,  set  up 
specifically to  service  the  source  country market. 
The  motivation  of the firm  is clearly very  relevant  and  so  is its view 
of the alternative.  However,  it is important  to try to  back  up  the  subject-
ive judgements of the  interviewee  by  reference  to objective data.  An  example 
is where  the  interviewee  claims that it would  have  been  impossible to  service 
a  particular host  market  by  exports.  It is possible to  examine  the  size of 
imports  of the  product  in  question  and  more  technically to estimate the 
propensity to import  of the country and  product  in  question. 
2.2.4.  Capital:Labour Ratios  and  Technology 
Alternative  (i)  is of great  interest.  The  effect of the alternativ8 
position here  is bound  up  with an  examination  of the technology  of  production. 
The  amount  of  employment  created  by  a  particular investment  will  depend 
on  the  labour intensity of production- or on  the capital:labour ratio.  Con-
sequently it might  be  expected  thata given investment  in  a  cheap  labour  country 
(UK,  Ireland)  will  yield a  greater employment  return than  in  a  dear  labour 
country  (West  Germany).  if the  MNE  is  responsive to factor costs.  We  are  thus 
interested  in  the  degree  to which  firms  utilise a  given  technology throughout 
the  EEC,  and  how  far this is modified  in  response to factor price signals 
(particularly wage  rates).  If MNEs  are  responsive then the  location of 
investments  and  the production  process will  be  interdependent.  The  choice  of 
the· plastics  industry allows  us  to  examine this issue  in  a  situation of 
changing  and  "malleable"  technology,  and  across  a  wide  product  and  process 
range. -7-
2.2.5  Nature of  Integration 
The  integration of national  economies  can  be  expected to  have  two 
opposing  effects on  the nature  of  integration of  MNEs  within the  boundaries 
of the union. 
(i)  The  removal  of tariffs and  barriers to trade and  investment 
may  be  expected  to result  in  decreased  horizontal  integration 
because  firms  will  seek to reach  minimum  efficient  scale  by 
removing  duplication of  plants and  reaping  maximum  economies 
of  scale  by  centralising activities. 
(ii)  The  increased division  of  labour which  becomes  possible 
internally can  be  expected  to  lead to  increased vertical 
integration.  Firms will  take the  opportunity to specialise 
and  perhaps  introduce  comp~nent specialisation. 1 
The  type of effect  on  employment  is obviously  very  different  according 
to the pressures which  integration  imposes.  We  seek to identify these 
pressures  by  designing  our questionnaire to account  for  both  types  of inte-
gration.  A separate questionnaire  was  used  for vertical and  horizontal 
direct  investments. 
2.2.6.  Greenfield Ventures  versus  Takeovers 
It may  be that the difference  in the  employment  creating effect of 
Greenfield Ventures  versus  Takeovers is not  as  great as a  priori thought 
would  SUf~est.  The  capital  which  the taken-over firm acquires  may  be  used 
to invest  in further  employment-creating activities.  This  is difficult to 
trace and  to estimate but  conceptually should  not  be  ignored.  We  can  of 
·-ourse obtain exact  information  on  the direct  employment  effects of both 
kinds  of venture. 
2.2.7.  Full  Employment  Assumption 
Many  studies  (balance  of  payments  etc.)  are carried out  using the 
assumption that  Governmental  policies will  ensure full  employment.  It is 
doubtful if this assumption  is still tenable.  Consequently direct  employment 
creation  (or reduction)  will  have  "multiplier"  effects  on  demand  and  on 
secondary  employment  creation.  Such  secondary  employment  creation may  well 
be  adduced  to  vary  according  to  the  particular  EEC  economy  under  consider-
ation.  Employment  effects may  also  be  generated  by  the contributions of 
MNEs  via  taxes  etc.  to  public  funds,  used  for  employment  purposes.  Member 
nations are,  however,  likely to differ little in this respect. 
2.2.8.  Sourcing  Policy 
The  "sourcing  policy"  or market  servicing arrangements  of the firm 
under investigation will  have  employment  implications.  It is therefore of 
interest which  markets  are  served  from  which  production  plants and  which 
markets  are  intended  to  be  served from  particular foreign  investments at 
the outset.  The  division of  exports  between  plants clearly determines  the 
amount  of  employment  at  each  location. 
1J.H.  Dunning  "The  Location  of  International firms  in an  Enlarged  EEC", 
Manchester Statistical Society,  1972. -8-
This factor  may  well  be  linked to the size of the firm  making  the 
investment.  It is more  likely that  larger and  more  sophisticated firms 
will  have  a  coherent  sourcing  policy,  whilst  smaller firms  use  ad  hoc 
decision making  to determine market  servicing.  Research  also  indicates 
wide  differences  between  nationalities of  ownership  of firms  and  industries 
in sourcing decisions.l 
2.2.9.  Differences  in  Host  Country  Environment 
It is possible that differences  in the  environment rif  EEC  countries 
may  result  in the  employment  effects  being  different  according to the 
countries of origin and  destination of the  investment. 2  Particularly 
important  might  be the  laws  and  customs  related to  employment  practices 
such  as  regulation of overtime,  ease  of dismissal  of  workers  and  trade  union 
regulations.  Effects  on  the costs of  labour to  investors arise from  social 
security  payments  and  other  non  wage  costs met  by  the  investor. 3 
2.2.10.  Technology 
A major factor which  complicates all the above  is the question of the 
introduction of  new  technology.  The  general  statement that  investment 
creates  jobs may  be  invalidated  by  the  introduction of  labour  saving tech-
nology which  reduces  total  direct  employment.  Such  technology  may  create 
jobs  elsewhere in the  economy,  however,  and  we  need  to trace this through 
the system  before  we  can  judge overall  effects.  This  technology  effect 
may  or may  not  be  linked to the FDI  decision. 
Technological  intensity will  be  strongly related to  skill levels and 
investments  in technology  intensive  products  and  processes may  increase 
demand  for certain types  of  skilled  labour,  possibly at the  expense  of 
unskilled workers. 
2.3.  Summary 
We  hypothesise that the effects of  intra-EEC  FDI  on  employment  will 
fall  into four categories:-
(i)  industry  specific  influences 
(ii)  region  specific influences 
(iii)  nation  specific influences 
(iv)  firm  specific influences4 
We  have  attempted  to reduce  industry· specific variations  by  looking 
only at  one  particular industry,  plastics  and  synthetics.  Nation  specific 
variations are  reduced  by  examining  only a  subgroup  of  source  (UK,  Germany, 
1P.J.  Buckley  and  R.D.  Pearce  (19) 
2H.  Voogd  and  H.  Van  Steeten  (107) 
3ILD  (54) 
4P.J.  Buckley  and  M.  Casson  (16) -9-
Ireland)  and  host  (UK,  Germany,  Ireland,  France,  Holland)  nations.  Our 
questionnaire is designed  to pick  up  differences  in  employment  effects 
arising from  firm  specific and  region  specific factors. 
In  a  short,  pilot,  project  s~ch as this it will  not  be  possible to 
answer all the  questions  posed  (some,  such  as  industry variation  in  employment 
effect,-are specifically ruled out),  but  we  hope  to go  some  way  towards 
refining the methodology  and,  on  the basis of  a  small  sample,  giving  some 
extremely tentative conclusions. -10-
3.  Macro  Data 
The  inadequacy  of statistical data at  a  macro-level  for dealing  with 
certain issues  we  would  have  wished to  investigate  (e.g.  the  share of 
foreign  d~rect investment  in  total· investment;  estimates of capital-labour 
ratios,  etc.)  means  that this section is largely concerned  with  data  on 
direct  investment.  Even  here  the degree  of  harmonisation  in the data  is 
minimal,  so  that  the  problem of making  legitimate comparisons  between 
countries still exists and  demands  suitable caution  in  interpreting the 
information  supplied. 
3.1  Foreign  Participation in  Member  Countries 
Table  3.1.1  provides  a  breakdown  by  country of or1g1n  of foreign 
participation,  measured  in  the different  ways  shown  in  the  footnotes  to 
the  table,  in certain of the  member  countries of the  EEC.  It is readily 
apparent  from  the table that the  USA  is the major  source  of direct  investment 
in most  countries. 
The  member  countries of the  EEC  have  established particularly strong 
intra-Community  flows  of direct  investment,  all,  except  the  UK  (which  still 
has  a  very  high  proportion  of  investment  originating in the USA),  receiving 
between  one  quarter  (Italy)  and  two-fifths  (Belgium,  France  and  Ireland)  of 
total foreign  investment  from  their partners.  The  UK  itself attracts a 
relatively smaller percentage of foreign  investment  from  the other EEC 
countries than  other member  countries  do,  but  the table  shows  how  this invest-
ment  has  increased  between  1962  and  1974. 
The  manufacturing sector is still,  in  most  host  countries,  the major 
recipient  of foreign  direct  investment.  Within  manufacturing,  the  share  of 
output  accounted  for by  multinational  enterprises varies from  country to 
country  and  according to the  yardstick  used.  As  a  percentage of the turnover 
of all manufacturing  enterprises,  the  share  of MNE's  within  the  EEC  ranges 
from  33  per cent  in  Belgium,  which,  like France  and  Germany  can  be  classed 
as  heavily  penetrated,  to  14.2  per  cent  in the  UK  (moderately  penetrated) 
and  8  per  cent  in  Denmark  (slightly penetrated).  These figures,  together 
with estimates of the  share of foreign-owned  firms  in  manufacturing  employ-
ment,  are  shown  in Table  3.1.2. 
The  difference  between  the figures  for the share of  employment  and  the 
share of turnover accounted  for  by  multinational  enterprises,  which  is  low 
in  Germany  but  high  in  Belgium,  may  be  accounted  for  by  the different  sectors 
of manufacturing  in  which  MNE's  are  established,  (e.g.  labour-intensive as 
opposed  to  capital-intensive sectors)  and  their scope for  economies  of  scale. 
But it may  also reflect a  difference  in  productivity  between  MNE's  and 
domestic  companies. 
We  have  been  unable  to find  reliable statistics to  compare  the  percent-
age multinational  enterprises  provide  of total  employment  with their percent-
age  share of the total wages  and  salaries bill.  In  those  countries for which 
such  data  are available,  such  as Austria,  Norway,  Sweden  and  the  UK.  the 
evidence  suggests that multinational  enterprises  pay  a  higher  share of the 
wages  bill than  the  share  they  provide  of total  employment.  In  the  case  of 
the  UK,  the  corresponding  figure  to the  10.3  per·  cent  share  of  employment  is 
11.8 per cent  of  wages  and  salaries,  still comfortably  below  value  added. TABLE  3.1.1  Breakdown  of Foreign Participation in  Certain  Member  Countries~  by  Country  of Origin  (%) 
Country of Origin 
u.s.A. 
Canada 
U.K. 
Germany 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Other European 
Australia 
Japan 
OtherS 
Total  intra-EEC6 
To-tal 
Germany1 
1965  1974 
44.7 
3.5 
9.8 
5.0 
3.9 
2.5 
8.8 
0.3 
2.3 
17.5 
0.3 
0.1 
1.  3 
30.3 
100.0 
44.1 
1.  2 
10.2 
5.5 
5.3 
1 .1 
12.8 
0.3 
1.8 
15.4 
1 . 1 
1.  7 
2.2 
35.2 
100.0 
1cumulative  flow  of direct  investment 
Belgiuml 
1965-71 
39.5 
0.3 
7.5 
33.2 
0.8 
18.7 
40.7 
100.0 
France2 
1973 
37.2 
1 .1 
8.2 
8.7 
9.6 
9.1 
8.5 
3.4 
13.7 
0.5 
44.1 
100.0 
Ireland3 
1960-75 
43.2 
20~1 
9.0 
12.7 
15.0 
41 .8 
100.0 
Italy4 
1974 
24.3 
1.  7 
6.2 
3.3 
7.2 
3.8 
3.4 
35.1 
12.2 
0.2 
2.6 
23.9 
100.0 
Netherlands1 
1962-71 
45.2 
1.5 
14.5 
23.0 
0.1 
37.5 
100.0 
not  available 
U.K. 4 
1962 --1974 
64.1 
11.8 
55.6 
6.4 
2.6 
3.2 
2.5 
1.7 
5.1 
1.0 
I 
0.4 
0.6 
2.2 
1.0 
5.2 
0.5 
1.7 
8.6 
2. 5  :: 
0.6 
3.3 
9.9 
100.0 
7.5 
2.0 
1.  0 
0.3 
9 .. 2 
16.1 
100.0 
I 
2Persons  employed  in  enterprises with  foreign  participation  (Industry only)  - nil or negligible  l
in all 
-::.ables 
3capital  investment:cumulative total 
4stbck of direct  investment 
5Including above  countries for which  data  are  not available 
~Excludes Ireland as  a  country of origin 
Source:  DECO  Penetration of multinational enter-
prises in manufacturing  industry  in member 
countries.P.57  Paris,  1977. -12-
TABLE  3.1.2  Employment  in  Foreign  Owned  Firms:  % of Total 
Manufacturing  Workforce  and  Turnover 
Definition  Number  Employed 
of Foreign  (%)  of total workforce 
Country  Control  in manufacturing 
Germany  (1972)  20%  22.4 
Belgium  (1968)  20%  18.3 
Denmark  (1971)  ..  .  . 
France  (1973)  20%  19.4 
50%  14.9 
U.K.  (1971)  50%  10.3 
Source  DECO  op.cit.  p.11. 
Turnover 
% 
25.1 
33.0 
8.0 
27.1 
21.0 
14.2 
This tendency is again attributable mainly  to the sectoral differences 
in the activities of multinational  enterprises,  and  in particular to the  degree 
of  technological  progressiveness which  is reflected in the skill-levels of the 
labour force. 
Table  3.1.3 shows,  for the United  Kingdom,  the  percentage  share  of 
foreign  establishments in wages  and  salaries.  value  added  and  investment  for 
the sectors of manufacturing  industry.  The  variation  between  sectors is 
readily apparent  from  the table. 
A profile of the sectoral  penetration  of  foreign-owned  compan~es in 
manufacturing  industry is shown  for Germany,  France  and  the  UK  in Table 
3.1.4.  The  table  shows  the  share of multinational  enterprises in  each  major 
sector of  industry according  to the  number  of  persons  employed.  Sub-sector 
35,  the manufacture  of  chemicals,  plastic products  etc.,  is,  across all 
three  countries,  the most  highly  penetrated  by  foreign  enterprises.  although 
in Germany  it comes  second  in  terms  of  employment  percentage to the  basic 
metals  industry.  The  extent  of foreign  penetration  in  Italy,  as measured 
by  the  percentage of total  capital of a  sample  of  large  companies  held  by 
non-residents,  is  shown  in Table 3.1.5  by  sector of manufacturing  industry. 
3.2.  Trends  in Direct  Investment  Flows 
The  size and  rate of  increase of  inflows  and  outflows  of direct  invest-
ment  have  varied  appreciably  between  member  countries.  Table  3.2.1  shows 
net  direct  investment  flows  for  Belgium-Luxembourg,  Denmark,  France.  Germany, 
Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  over the  periods  1961-65, -13-
1966-70 and  1971-74.  While  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  have 
improved  their creditor position over that time,  the other countries  have 
remained  structurally net  debtors.  The  percentage  increases of  average 
annual  outflows for the  period  1971/74  compared  with 1966/70 were,  in the 
order in which  the countries are  listed in the table,  2.94,  8.39,  2.46, 
2.78,  1.36,  2.23  and  3.37.  The  corresponding  increases  of inflows  were 
2.13,  2.34,  2.74,  2.69,  1.54,  2.20  and  2.45. 
Tables  3.2.2,  3.2.3 and  3.2.4  show  that foreign-owned  firms  in manufact-
uring are,  on  the  whole,  larger than  domestic enterprises.  In Belgium,  for 
exampl8,  (Table  3.2.2)  36  per cent  of firms  with  over  1000  employees  are 
foreign-owned,  whereas  only 0.6  per cent of firms  with  less than  20  employees 
are  foreign-owned.  In  France  (Table 3.2.3)  22.5  per cent  of firms  employing 
more  than  2000  are foreign-owned  (although this rises to  31.7  per cent  for 
firms  between  1000  and  1999);  but  only  2  per cent  of firms  employing  between 
20  and  49  are foreign-owned.  In the  UK  (Table 3.2.4),  for  manufacturing 
industry as  a  whole,  the average  size by  number  of  persons  employed  is 477 
for foreign-owned  establishments,  but  only  80  for-domestic  establishments. 
By  contrast,  in Mining  and  Quarrying,  domestic  establishments are  bigger than 
foreign-owned  ones. 
TABLE  3.1.3  Percentage Share of foreign  establishments*  in wages  and 
salaries,  value  added  and  investment  in manufacturing 
industries,  UK  1971 
!SIC Code  Wages  &  Salaries  Value  Added  Investment 
3  Manufacturing  11.8  13.3  16.2 
31  Food,  Drink, 
Tobacco  9.5  12.2  9.8 
32  Textiles  2.6  4.1  12.9 
33  Wood  1  I  0  1.1  0.8 
34  Paper  2.7  3.4  2.7 
35  Chemicals  & 
Plastics  23.8  27.2  21.4 
36  Non-metallic  . 
minerals  5.0  6.9  5.5 
37  Basic  metals  6.2  6.0  10.5 
38  Machinery  & 
Equipment  16.2  16.6  24.9 
39  Other  6.9  9.2  7.4 
•over  50%  participation 
Source:  DECO  op.cit.  p.51 TABLE  3.1.4  Share of employment  represented  by  enterprises with foreign  participation in 
the main  industrial sectors 
Germany  ( 19 72)  France  ( 197 3) 
(>20%  Foreign participat- (>50%  Participation)  (Between  20- 50%) 
ion) 
!SIC  Code  %  ODD's  %  ODD's  % 
2  r·lining  & 
Quarrying  12.5  34.7  .  .  .  .  .  . 
3  Manufacturing  22.4  1854.2  14.9  661.5  4.5 
31  Food.  Drink. 
Tobacco  26.2  139.1  ..  .  .  .  . 
32  Textiles  .  .  ..  6.D  45.4  1.6 
33  Wood  .  .  ..  4.3  7.4  1.0 
34  Paper  ..  .  .  7.3  21 .8  2.7 
35  Chemicals  & 
Plastics  26.9  258.7  28.2  155.6  3.8 
36  Non-metallic 
minerals  .  .  ..  10.4  23.3  3.2 
37  Basic metals  30.8  235.3  9.1  37.8  5.8 
38  Machinery  & 
Equipment  25.9  977.8  17.6  341.D  6.4 
39  Other  ..  .  .  12.4  9.2  0.5 
6  Wholesale  & 
Retail  etc.  6.4  208.1  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Source:  DECO  op.clt.  p.15.  16.  38  & 42. 
U.K. (1971) 
(>SO%  Participaf-
ion 
ODD's  %  DOD's 
..  D.3  1.1 
198.9  1D.3  804.1 
.  .  8.5  67.3 
12.0  2.1  23.0 
1.7  0.9  2.3 
8.1  2.6  15.6 
21.3  23.0  132.5 
7.3  4.6  13.2 
24.0  5.3  29.D 
124.1  14.7  509.0 
0.4  5.9  12.2 
.  .  .  .  .. -15-
TABLE  3.1.5  Italy:  Foreign Penetration  by  Sector in  "Large  Companies" 
1973 
Capital  held  by  non-residents as 
% of total  capital  of  large 
Sector  companies 
Food  21.6 
Textiles  21 .1 
Metallurgy  - 8.6 
Mechanical 
Engineering  24.8 
Chemicals  23.1 
Paper & 
Cardboard  18.9 
Others  26.0 
Total  Manufacturing  21.3 
Source:  DECO  op.cit.  p.49 TABLE  3.2.1  Direct  investment  flows  - value of net  investments at current  prices  (millions  $US) 
1961-65  1966-70 
Total  Average  Total  Average  Total  Average  Total  Average  Total  Average 
net  annual  net  annual  net  annual  net  annual  net  annual 
inflow  inflow  outflow  outflow  flow  net  flow  inflow  inflow  outflow  outflow 
Belgium  I  .. 
_Luxembourg:.  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  1214  242.8  282  56.4 
Denmark1  341  62.8  44  8.8  297  59.4  357  71.4  59  11.8 
France  1108  221.6  1289  257.8  -181  -36.2  1696  339.2  1352  270.4 
Germany  2746  549.2  1315  263  1431  286.2  3519  703.8  2772  554.4 
Italy  1703  340.6  680  136  1023  204.6  1933  386.6  986  197.2 
Netherlands  605  121  702  140.4  -97  -19.4  1687  337.4  1923  384.6 
United  Kingdom·  1406  281.2  1795  359  -389  -78.8  1586  317.2  1910  382 
.. 
Total  Average 
net  annual 
flow  net  flow 
932  186.4 
298  59;6 
344  68.8 
747  149.4 
947  189.4 
-236  -47.2 
-324  -64.8 
Contd ••••••••••••••• 
I 
~ 
en 
I I 
TABLE  3.2.1  Continued 
Total  Average 
net  annual 
inflow  inflow 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg1  1551  517 
Denmark1  502  167.3 
France  3720  930 
Germany  7579  1894.75 
Italy  2377  594.25 
Netherlands  2973  743.25 
United  Kingdom2  3121  780.25 
lro  1973  only 
2Inflows:  excluding oil and  insurance 
Outflows:  excluding oil 
Source:  DECO  op.c!t.  p.38 
1971-74 
Total  Average 
net  annual 
outflow  outflow 
498  166 
297  99 
2665  666.25 
6163  1540.75 
1070  267.5 
3433  858.25 
5158  1289.5 
Total 
net 
flow 
1053 
205 
1055 
1416 
1307 
-460 
-2037 
Average 
annual 
net  flow 
351 
68.3 
263.7 
354 
326.7 
-115 
-509.2 
.. 
I 
~ 
"""J 
I TABLE  3.2.2  Share of enter rises with forei  n  articipation in total labour force 
by  size  grouping~  by manufacturing  sectors  (1968)  ~  - BELGIUM 
ISIC  TOTAL  SIZE  GROlJPS  OF  EMPLOYMENT 
1-19  20-49  50-99  100-199  200-499 
1  2  "3  4  5  6  7 
3 ................  18.3  0.6  3.1  6.9  12.2  19.4 
31 •..•...•..•..•..  13.2  0.2  3.3  3.4  13.8  19.7 
32 ................  9.2  0.4  1.7  6.1  9.6  9.0 
33  ~ ........  0  •••••  l 
0.1  1.6  2.6  6.7  16.7 
34 
8.4 
35 •..••.•....•...•  45.3  5.4  15.1  29.1  12.2  42.4 
36 ...............  I[  14.6- 1.3  3.2  3.7  5.1  13.5 
37  j  ..............  l20.1  0.7  3.3  8.2  16.7  22.0 
38 
39  a  a  1  e  1  1  I  a  a  I  1  I  I  I  I  I  14.9 
Source:  DECO  op.cit.  p.70 
500-999 
8 
30.0 
33.5 
19.4 
4.3 
50.1 
28.2 
32.8 
1000+ 
9 
36.0 
24.4 
33.5 
85.2 
35.6 
23.2 
32.1 
I 
~ 
CD 
I TABLE  3.2.3  FRANCE  - Bre~kdown of enterprises with foreign participation 
in industry as  a  wrole  by  size groups  (1973)  (%) 
Size group  of  Percentage of Firms 
firm  by  Foreign  Domestic 
employment  Enterprises  Enterprises  TOTAL 
20  - 49  2.0  98.0  100 
50  - 99  6.4  93.6  100 
100  - 199  9.0  91.0  100 
200  - 499  15.5  84.5  100 
SOD  - 999  22.7  77.3  100 
1000  - 1999  31.7  68.3  100 
2000  and  over  22.5  77.5  100 
Overall  percentage  18.1  81.9  100 
Source:  DECO  op.cit.  p.71. 
I 
~ 
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I TABLE  3.2.4 
ISIC 
2 .••..... 
3 •••••••• 
31 ........ 
32 .•...... 
33 ..•....• 
34 .••...•. 
35 •••••••• 
36 a  a  a  a  •  •  a  r 
37 •••••••• 
38 •••..•.• 
39 .••..••. 
Source: 
UNITED  KINGDOM  - Average  size of Establishment  by  number  of 
persons  employed  (1971) 
Foreign  Owned  Establishments  Domestic  Establishments 
(50%  share) 
55  156 
477  80 
477  125 
271  80 
128  29 
125  56 
434  133 
293  60 
690  188 
601  85 
156  48 
DECO  op.cit.  p.75 
I 
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3.3  Intra-EEC  Foreign  Direct  Investment:  The  Case  of the  UK 
Tables  3.3.1  to 3.3.4  show  direct  investment  relationships  between  the 
UK  and  the rest of  the  EEC  in both  flow  and  stock terms.  Attempts to 
produce  comparable  tables  showing  the relationships  between  other member 
countries  and  the rest of  the  EEC  were  thwarted  by  lack of available infor-
mation.  The  need  for  harmonisation of data  on  foreign  direct  investment 
amongst  member  countries is clear;  and  an  area to which  attention might 
usefully  be directed. 
In  examining  the  flow  data  in Tables3.3.1  and  3.3.2,  it can  be  seen 
that both  inflows  and  outflows  increased fairly  steadily,  although 
cyclically throughout  the  period  1963  to  1977.  A more  consistent  picture 
is given  by  the stock figures  in Tables  3.3.3 and  3.3.4.  Over  the period 
1963  to  1974,  UK  investment  in  every other member  country  has  increased 
significantly,  to  stand at  a  total  of  £2,196.5  million in  1974.  Similarly, 
investment  into the  UK  by  other member  countries  has  grown,  in  some  cases 
dramaticall~ reaching  a  total of  £1,084.2 million  in  1974.  The  UK's 
largest foreign  investment  stake is in  W.  Germany,  followed  by  France. 
The  largest  investor in the  UK  is the  Netherlands,  followed  by  Belgium/ 
Luxembourg. 
3.4  Intra-EEC  Direct  Investment:  Major  Investors 
Table  3.4.1  shows  intra-EEC direct  investment  for the year  1971  (figures 
are available for  UK,  Germany,  France  and  the  Netherlands  only).  The  UK  is 
the largest  single source of  intra-EEC direct  investment,  Germany  the 
largest rscipient.  In  1971,  British investment  in Germany  was  the largest 
single component  of  the .stock of  intra-EEC foreign direct  investment. 
A comparison with Table  3.4.2  shows  that there is great  scope for 
increase in the scale of  intra  EEC  direct  investment  (c.f.  the  scale of 
US  and  UK  investment  abroad). 
3.5  Conclusion 
The  macro  data  are  sparse and  unreliable.  It is difficult to draw  any 
firm conclusions  from  these data.  However,  they  do  show  that the  role of 
multinational  firms  is an  important  one;  worldwide,  within the  EEC  and  in 
individual  member  countries.  Investment  flows  of the magnitude illustrated 
will  have  important  employment  implications.  However,  it is at the micro 
level that such  effects can  best  be  studied  and  to  which  we  now  turn.  It 
will  be  appreciated that  in the interests of confidentiality,  the anonymity 
of companies  collaborating in the study  has  to  be  preserved. TABLE  3.3.1 
~-
INTRA-EEC  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT:  FROM  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  TO  OTHER  EEC  COUNTRIES 
(FLOW  FIGURES  IN  £  MILLION  STERLING) 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
----.~  Country 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
(2) 
France 
Ireland 
(3) 
Italy 
Netherlands 
West  Germar:y 
TOTAL 
Notes:  ( 1) 
(2) 
(3} 
( 1) 
3.5  -3.1  1.5  5.8  5.4  24.9  22.5  13.3  57.7 
1.3  1.8  2.6  -0.1  1.6  1 .1  0.8  1.7  3.8 
12.3  15.6  4.0  16.5  11.2  8.5  18.0  26.5  34.9 
9.4  3.6  12.0  -3.0  6.8  2.4  20.2  13.7  20.7 
3.1  3.1  1.2  2.3  2.4  2.6  8.9  8.1  13.9 
7.5  5.4  9.4  9.3  9.8  14.6  14.0  9.8  52.9 
13.5  15.7  16.0  16.6  1.2  22.2  41.0  20.1  103.1 
39.9  36.7  32.1  50.5  29.9  72.8  104.5  77.8  262.5 
A minus  figure  denotes  net  disinvestment. 
Denmark  was  a  member  of  E.F.T.A.,  and  not  the  EEC,  until  1973. 
Ireland was  not  a  member  of  the  EEC  until  1973. 
30.8  64.2  49.0 
9.2  9.2  23.2 
61.7  118.7  73.4 
11.8  46.2  49.5 
24.4  26.5  25.4 
42.3  104.9  35.1 
64.1  149.2  103.3 
223.3  519.0  364.0 
1975  1976  1977 
31.6  84.9  62.8 
8.8  4.7  12.8 
68.1  78.6  98.0 
24.2  40.0  59.4 
·. 
-20.4  38.6  42.6 
-14.4  66.3  -56.1 
53.2  176.4  154.4 
151.0  489.5  373.7 
These figures  include unremitted  profits.  They  do  not  include oil companies.  The  sources of the figures  in Tables 
3.3.1  to 3.3.4 are:  BUSINESS  MONITOR  M4  Overseas  Transactions:  Tables  16,  17  and  3.1.  1969,  1972  ff.  and  1976; 
1977  figures  from  Trade  and  Industry,  23  March  1979. 
.. 
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I TABLE  3.3.2  INTRA-EEC  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT:  INTL  UNITED  KINGDOM  FROM  OTHER  EEC  COUNTRIES 
(FLOW  FIGL~ES IN  £  MILLION  STERLING) 
.. L 
~ 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  12691  1970 
y 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  0.8  2.3  0.9  0.5  1.3  1.  2  0.6  6.4 
(2)  (1) 
Denmark  0.3  -0.3  -0.9  2.0  1.3  0.7  -3.0  2.6 
. 
France  2.6  5.3  2.3  3.2  2.4  5. 2  I  3.8  0.9 
Ireland 
(3) 
0.7  0.7  - - - - - -
Italy  1.3  0.7  1.4  3.1  2.6  1. 7  5.5  4.3 
Netherlands  2.7  8.5  8.5  1 .4  37.0  11. 5  12.5  24.6 
West  Germany  2.2  2.5  1.  8  0.7  3.3  5.8  12.7  14.5 
TOTAL  9.7  19.3  14.8  8.9  46.7  25.3  35.1  50.6 
Notes:  A minus  figure denotes  net disinvestment.  ( 1) 
[2) 
[ 3) 
Denmark  was  a  member  of  E.F.T.A.6  not  the  EEC6  until  1973. 
Ireland was  not  a  member  of  EEC  until  1973. 
1977  figures  from  Trade and  Industry6  23  March  1979. 
1971  1972  1973 
19.9  3.0  25.1 
2.4  3.5  3.2 
0.9  16.6  27.1 
- 1.3  4.7 
-11.4  7.7  16.8 
20.5  6.3  16.6 
5.2  4.5  16.7 
35.1  38.1  110.4 
1974  1975 
5.1  13.3 
1. 6  8.0 
23.7  36.8 
-6.8  32.6 
5.5  1 .1 
10.0  -1.3 
33.3  11.4 
72.2  101.8 
1976 
11.6 
18.2 
78.2 
37.5 
10.9 
-31.0 
33.2 
156.7 
1977 
28.2 
-0.5 
127.9 
24.6 
12.9 
56.2 
36.4 
285.6 
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I TABLE  3.3.3  INTRA-EEC  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT:  FROM  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  TO  OTHER  EEC  COUNTRIES 
(STOCK  FIGURES  IN  £  MILLION  STERLING) 
~ 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
y 
:Belgium/ 
~Luxembourg  66.5  64.6  67.7  72.7  88.0  112.3  143.7  156.2 
.  ( 1) 
12.4  14.2  17.0  18.5  24.6  27.4  28.2  29.7  1  Denmark 
I 
!france  97'.1  114.0  117.6  135.6  169.1  180.5  197.2  220.7 
Ireland  (z)  76.6  80.1  93.0  105.1  114.4  119.0  138.9  142.4 
Italy  36.1  38.0  39.8  43.8  55.9  60.3  69.1  76.7 
i 
!  Net her  lands  36.9  43.4  56.3  64.1  82.9  96.5  110.4  119.0 
! 
:west  Germany  78.9  95.7  110.8  129.5  154.8  ·179. 3  217.9  235.4 
: 
I 
iTOTAL  315.5  355.7  392.2  445.7  550.7  628.9  738.3  808.0 
Notes:  ( 1) 
(2) 
Danmark  was  a  member  of  E.F.T.A.,  not the  EEC,  until  1973. 
The  Republic  of  Ireland  did  nbt  join the  EEC  until  1973. 
The  figu~es do  not  include oil,  insurance or bankingw 
1971  1972  1973  1974 
149.7  181. 8  239.5  290.2 
26.9  37.2  47.0  72.2 
247.5  302.5  395.7  459.5 
179.6  205.9  262.5  312.1 
93.0  128.2  164.9  198.6 
189.3  208.8  220.9  237.3 
305.7  370.1  527.9  626.6 
985.2  1191 • 4  1858.4  2196.5 
I 
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I TABLE  3.3.4  INTRA-EEC  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT:  I~~TO  UNITED  KINGDOM  FROM  OTHER  EEC  COUNTRIES 
(STOCK  FIGURES  IN  f  MILLION  STERLING) 
~ 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
y 
Belgium/ 
( 1) 
Luxembourg  9.7  12.0  12.9  13.2  13.9  14.7  15.8  22.4  40.4  61.8  134.2 
Denmark 
(2) 
7.7  7.4  6.4  9.1  11.7  13.1  12.4  13.8  21.9  37.1  51.8 
France  34.4  38.3  40.2  43.8  45.9  51.0  62.9  71.9  80.4  110.4  134.1 
Ireland 
( 3) 
2.3  1.  6  2.3  2.4  1.9  1.2  0.4  3.9  3.6  11.5  19.4 
Italy  15.2  15.9  17.3  18.0  18.4  17.7  23.9  28.6  74.0  87.0  108.8 
Netherlands  77.0  86.4  95.2  102.3  151.0  168.2  179.4  201.1  218.3  256.3  304.6 
West  Germany  8.3  11.0  12.8  15.0  19.3  26.8  40.0  55.9  59.8  61 .4  83.6 
1974 
209.7 
64.4 
162.8 
27.7 
114.4 
337.1 
168.2 
TOTAL  144.6  163.6  178.4  192.3  248.5  278.2  322.0  379.9  472.9  576.9  836.5  1084.2 
Notes:  (1)  Figures for  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  not  given separately. 
(2)  Denmark  was  a  member  of E.F.T.A.,  not the  EEC,  until  1973. 
(3)  Ireland was  not  a  member  of the  EEC  until  1973. 
The  figures  do  not  include oil,  insurance and  banking. 
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I TABLE  3.4.1 
Investor 
U.K. 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
TOTALS 
Intra-EEC  Direct Foreign  Investment  Matrix: 
4  major  EEC  investors  (1971)  ($US  millions) 
Investee 
U.K.  France  Germany 
X  797  2567 
210  X  448 
221  771  X 
569  n.a.  735 
1000  1568  3750  . 
n.a.  - not available 
Source:  Derived  from  sources  in Table 3.4.2. 
Net her  lands 
493 
16 
408 
X 
917 
Sum  of 
Investee 
Countries 
3857 
674 
1400 
1304 
X 
I 
N 
m 
I TABLE  3.4.2  Direct  Foreign  Investment  Matrix of the Eight  Largest  Investor Countries  (1971)  ($US  millions) 
~nvestor  Investee 
Switz- Nether- Sum  of  8  World-
u.s.  U.K.  erland  france  Germany  Ca.1ada  Japan  Lands  Investee  wide 
Countries 
u.s.  X  9.007  1  .. 888  3.,020  5.,209  24 .. 105  1 .. 821  1.,679  46,729  86,198 
U.K.  2,071  X  144  797  2,567  1,748  41  493  7,861  24,510 
Switzerland  1,537  198  X  2,000  1,110  n.a.  n.a.  n.a .  4,845  9, 895 
.. 
France  315  210  773  X  448  592  38  16  2,392  9,540 
Germany  650  221  810  771  X  606  40  408  3,506  7,380 
. 
Canada  3,339  705  20  71  133  X  n.a.  21  4,289  5,916 
Japan  1,1421  35  3  n.a.  33  1,1421  X  n.a.  1. 213  4,471 
Netherlands  2,220  569  78  n.a.  735  n.a.  n.a.  X  3,602  3,5802 
TOTAL  74,437  151.490 
1Japanese  investments  in the  United  States  and  Canada  combined 
2The  amount  disclosed in the  U.N.  statistics  (Multinational  Corporations,  op.cit.)  is probably too  low 
Source:  Henry  Kragenau.  "Umfang  der multinationalen  Investitionen"  in Kebschull  and  Mayer  (eds.)  Multinationalen 
~nternehmen.  frankfurt:  Athen~um Fischer Taschenbuch  Verlag,  1974.  Translation in  Konrad  W.  Kubin  "German 
Direct  Investments  in  the  US  and  American  Direct  Investments  in the Federal  Republic  of  Germany"  German  Studies 
Notes,  Indiana  University  1978.  p.18. 
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4.  The  Case Studies 
4.1.  Case  Study  1 
Case  Study  1  has as its subject  a  large  UK  based  company  with over 
sixty operating  subsidiaries  in the United  Kingdom,  continental  Europe, 
Australia and  North  America.  The  firm's activities are divided  into five 
main  areas;  Packaging,  Capseals,  Engineering,  Fashion  and  Leisure. 
The  total  number  employed,  as at the  end  of the  1978  financial  year, 
was  9,976,  2,G55  of these  being  employed  in overseas  subsidiaries.  Fixed 
assets  stood at approximately  £33  million and  with  a  net  working  capital 
figure of  £33  million plus a  further  £1  million  invested  in  companies  the 
Group  did  not  own,  the total assets  employed  in  1978  were  £67  million. 
The  Group's  turnover at the  end  of  1978  was  £158.9 million;  materials  and 
services cost  £92.1  million  leaving a  Value  Added  figure of  £66.8 million. 
Of  this Value  Added  figure,  £49  million was  distributed in wages  and 
salaries.  This  meant  that  each  employee  contributed approximately  £6,680 
to Value  Added  at  an  average wage  of  £4,900  per annum.  Although this rep-
resented  an  increase of more  than  12%  in terms  of Value  Added  per  employee 
over the  previous  year,  the Value  Added  for  each  £ of  employment  cost  dropped 
by  around  3%.  In  other words,  wages  increased at  a  greater rate than Value 
Added  in  1978.  Capital  investment  is  seen  as the means  to reverse this 
tendency,  and  there  has  been  a  significant increase  in capital  expenditure 
over the last two  years,  particularly on  plant  and  machinery  for  new  products 
and  increased productivity.  In  1978,  investment  expenditure totalled over 
£13  million,  £3  million of this being  used  to move  into the American  plastics 
market. 
Whilst  capital  investment  is seen as a  necessary  part  of the  company's 
drive  for  increased  productivity,  there is also a  commitment  to  close or sell 
those  companies  within the Group  which  remain  unprofitable.  In  1978  two 
businesses were  sold,  one  in the  engineering  division which  had  made  losses 
totalling  £145,000  over the year,  and  one  in the  Packaging division which 
lost  £40,000. 
Given  our interest in the plastics  industry,  our main  concern  here  is 
with the  Packaging division of this International  company.  In  terms of  fixed 
assets,  numbers  employed  and total sales,  this is without  doubt  the  largest 
division within  the United  Kingdom  as  Table  4.1 .1  shows.  However,  taking  the 
ratio of capital  employed  to  sales achieved  we  find  that the  packaging  sector 
is the least  productive. (Table  4~t.2)  This finding  is clearly borne  out  if 
we  look at  the  labour/capital  ratio and  labour/sales ratio for  each  divisjon 
(Table  4.1.3).  The  division is the most  highly  capitalised in the  Group,  yet 
it shows  the  lowest  rate of  return  on  capital at  £1  capital to  £2.6  sales 
within the  U.K.  Even  so,  the  packaging  division as  a  whole  contributed 
£64.4  million  to  a  total worldwide  Group  sales figure of  £158.9  million,  and 
this represented  40.5%  of total sales.  In  terms  of  size then,  the  packaging 
division  is clearly the most  important  division within the  Group. 
The  Packaging  division  has  plants  jn Canada,  Australia,  France, 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom.  The  main  area of activity,  and  the  one 
with which  we  are concerned,  is within the European  Community.  Out  of total 
sales for the division of  £64.4  million only  £2  million was  generated  by 
non-EEC  subsidiaries.  Approximately  £22.4  million was  turned  over  by  the 
United  Kingdom  subsidiaries which  means  that the  bulk of sales,  £40  million, 
was  achieved  by  subsidiaries within continental  Europe. Table 4.1.1  Numbers  employed,  total  plant  ~~d machinery  involved  and  total  sales 
achieved for  each  division of Company  within the  United  Kingdom 
DIVISION  Nl IMBER  EMPLOYED  PLANT  AND  MACHINERY  (f) 
Packaging  2,349  8.695.998 
Capseals  1,175  3.193,650 
.Engineering  1.555  5.055,305 
' 
Fashion  501  841,179 
Leisure  1,671  2.558,301 
.. 
TOTAL  SALES  (f) 
22,393,017 
16,297.250 
16,711,585 
17,425.782 
20,376,174 
.  . 
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I Table  4.1.2  Return  on  Capital  Employed  in  UK 
DIVISION  SALES  PLANT/MACHINERY  AS 
PLANT/MACHINERY  % OF  SALES 
Packaging  22.,393  .. 017  38.3 
8.,695.,998 
Capseals  16  .. 297 .. 250  19.59 
3  .. 193  .. 650 
Engineering  16)1711 .. 585  30.25 
5.,055.,305 
Fashion  17 .. 425  .. 782  4.82 
841  .. 179 
Leisure  20  .. 376 .. 174  12.55 
2.,558.,301 
RATIO:  £  PLANT  TO 
(APPROX.) 
1  :  2.6 
1  :  5 
1  :  3.3 
1  :  20.7 
1  :  8 
SALES 
I  • 
I 
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I TABLE  4.1.3  LABOUR-CAPITAL  RATIOS  AND  SALES  (£)  PER  EMPLOYEE  IN  UK 
DIVISION  L/K  RATIO  LABOUR/SALES  RATIO 
Packaging  1  :  3~702  1  :  9~533 
Capseals  1  :  2~718  1  :  13~870 
Engineering  1  :  3~ 251  1  :  10,747 
Fashion  1  :  1~679  1  :  34,782 
Leisure  1  :  1  ~ 531  1  :  12,194 
I 
w 
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There are five subsidiaries in Europe,  three in France  and  two  in 
Germany.  The  French subsidiaries are  located in the  North,  in Paris,  and 
in the South.  They  all represent  'Horizontal takeovers'  and  were  acquired 
by  the Group  in the  early 1960's.  They  service the French  market  basically~ 
but they also manufacture for export to  ~umania,  USSR,  Austria  and  the Far 
East.  The  major  items that are  produced are plastic jars for  cosmetics, 
lipstick holders  and  aerosol  valves and  pumps. 
TABLE  4.1.4  Breakdown  of  numbers  employed  and  sales achieved 
in France,  1978 
Subsidiary  Number  Employed  Sales(£m) 
North  670  12 
Paris  360  13.3 
South  432  7 
TOTAL  1,462  32.3 
Table 4.1.4  shows  the  numbers  employed  and  the sales achieved in France 
in 1978.  The  labour to sales ratio for the total French  operation works  out 
at approximately  one  employee  to  £22,000  of  sales,  a  figure vastly  superior 
to that  in the  United  Kingdom. 
One  reason for this is that more  modern  technology  has  been  introduced 
into France recently,  although the workforce  has  not  expanded.  The  K/L  ratio 
is higher in France  than  the  United  Kingdom,  and,  according to the  interviewee, 
the workforce is more  productive.  There  have  been  no  industrial  disputes 
since the  Group  took over the French companies. 
There  has  been  a  substantial  expansion  in the  French operations  since 
the Group  acquired  them  and  it was  estimated that,  along  with the massive 
capital  investment,  the workforce  had  grown  by  about  15%  between  the  years 
1962-63  and  1977.  This means  that  approximately  91  jobs were  created  in that 
time.  Of  course~  in  terms  of total  EEC  employment  figures,  it-cannot  be 
concluded  that  the  Group's  investments  were  job creating.  It may  be that 
the export  substitution effect  of the investments  robbed  the  UK  of jobs,  or 
even that those  employed  came  from  factories  elsewhere  in france,  thus  having 
no  overall  effect·on employment  whatsoever.  The  director interviewed felt 
that both of these  possibilities were  unlikely.  First,  this was  basically 
the Group's  first  real  move  into the French  plastics market  and  it was 
carried out  because they  had  to  be  in the market  to  compete;  this ruled out 
exporting  and  there was,  he  claimed,  no  loss of  exports  from  the  UK  in 
consequence of the move.  Secondly,  unemployment,  at  least in Southern  France~ 
was  high  and  most  of the  labour came  from  this pool. -33-
A detailed analysis to substantiate such  a  claim was  not  possible in the 
case of  France~  but  we  were  able to  undertake  such  an  analysis  on  the German 
subsidiaries.  Given  the Group's awareness  of the  need  for a  logical  corporate 
policy,  the rationale behind  each  and  every  investment  is similar.  Therefore~ 
it is reasonable to project the findings  from  a  detailed  study of one  invest-
ment,  albeit cautiously,  on  to  those of another. 
The  Group  has  three sites in  a  city in the Eastern  region of West 
Germany.  Its first move  was  to take  over an  existing company.  This  company 
had  not  been  a  competitor but  was  an  ailing producer of goods  totally un-
related to  any  in  which  the Group  had  an  interest.  It was  the site,  and  the 
need  to  produce  in the  German  market,  that  made  the  takeover  an  attractive 
proposition.  This  need  was  felt  because  a  high  percentage of the  Group's 
customers  are multinational  companies  and,  as  a  supplier,  the  Group  was  aware 
of the  importance  of operating  near these concerns.  As  the interviewee  said 
"If we  (the  Group)  had  not  done  so  our competitors  would  have".  The  possib-
ility of  servicing the  German  market  through  exports  from  other of the  Group's 
plants was  ruled  out  because,  we  were  told,  the Germans  are very  "chauvinistic" 
and  tend to  purchase  German  produced  goods  where  possible.  One  other factor 
was  mentioned  as  being  very  important  in the decision to  invest  in Germany, 
and  this was  the· fact  that  Germany  was  considered to  be  a  country where  high 
profitability could  almost  be  guaranteed. 
The  takeover  presented  no  problems  whatsoever.  The  possibility of 
labour  problems  was  gone  into  extensively and  the results of this investigation 
were  attract~ve to the  Group.  It was  found  that there was  a  good  industrial 
environment  in  which  the  labour  laws  were  firm  but  in  no  way  inhibitive to 
mana~emen~ decision making.  The  productivity of  labour  was  thought  to  be 
"very good"  whereas  turnover of  labour was  low.  Again,  the  industrial 
relations  record  was  "very good"  whilst  the degree  of  unionisation was 
·· ~ttractively low".  (A  common  theme  - good  industrial relations  seems,  in the 
eyes of  employers,  to  be  a  function  of weak  unionisation).  Unionisation was 
so  low  in fact,  that the  need  to consult  with the  unions  did  not  exist and 
hence  was  not  carried out.  However~  the  labour force  was  ·considered  to  be 
very  co-operative. 
To  sum  up,  the Group's motives for  investing directly into Germany  were 
(i)  the  need  to  be  near its customers,  (ii)  the difficulty of  servicing the 
market  through  exports,  (iii)  the attractive  level  of profits to  be  made  in 
Germany,  and  (iv)  the productivity and  co-operation  provided  by  a  German 
labour force. 
When  production  began  in this unit,  a  total  labour force  of  25  was 
employed.  Of  these,  thirteen were  male  and  twelve  were  female.  They  were 
entirely local  and  none,  it was  claimed,  would  have  had  jobs  had  the invest-
ment  not  been  made.  The  city is an  old  one  and  not  predominantly  industrial. 
Even  now  it has  a  high  unemployment  rate,  and  all the  evidence  suggests  that 
the investment  was  employment  creating rather than  employment  diverting. 
Within  the  EEC  as  a  whole  this must  be true of the  investment,  given  the 
validity of the  claim that  servicing of the market  from  outside  Germany  was 
not  a  possibility. 
Roughly  10%  of the workforce  was  highly  skilledl  (as it still is)  and 
this  labour~  though  local~  was  trained in Franca or the  United  Kingdom  before 
returning to  Germany  to work.  Another  20%  were  semi-skilled and  were trained 
within the factory.  70%~  mainly  female,  were  unskilled. 
Throughout  the  case  studies the  interpretation of  "skilled"  is apprenticeship 
or  equivalent. -34-
Initially three managers  were  employed.  All  of them  were  local although 
they received their training  in France or the  United  Kingdom.  It was,  and  is, 
the Group's  policy to enlist  local  management  whenever  possible. 
This initial  investment  employed,  at the  end  of 1978,  152  people.  As 
was  the case originally this can  be  broken  down  into  approximately  10%  skilled 
(trained  locally under  an  ongoing apprentice  scheme);  20%  semi-skilled and 
70%  unskilled,  the unskilled  bei~g made  up  largely of  female  staff.  There 
are  now  6  managers,  again all of  them  local.  The  investment  has  therefore 
increased  employment  by  over four-fold  in thirteen years.  Table  4.1.5, 
below,  summarises this increase. 
Table 4.1.5  Increase in  numbers  employed  broken  down  into  sex  and 
skill  levels, ,between  1965  and  1978 
Total  employed  when  Total  employed  end  1978  Increase 
production  started 
I 
Male  13  58  45 
Female  12  88  76 
Managerial  3  6  3 
TOTAL  28  152  124 
Skilled 
(incl.  managerial)  5  15  10 
Semi-skilled  5  31  26 
Unskilled  18  106  88 
The  Group  was  so  pleased with the  success  of this investment  that  they 
made  a  second  one  in the  same  city shortly afterwards.  This  second  investment 
was  a  'Greenfield'  move,  a  new  plant  being  erected  on  an  industrial  estate. 
Although this plant  was  not  producing  the  same  type of goods  as the initial 
investment,  the co-operation  and  productivity of labour was  so  attractive 
as  to induce the Group  to  base  a  diverse  sample  of operations  in the area  • 
. The  first  investment  produced  finished  goods  from  raw  materials  (aerosol 
spray  valves  etc.  from  granules)  whereas  the  second  investment  bought  in  goods 
from  other plants within  the Group  and  modified  them  for the  local  market; 
thus a  pharmaceutical  bottle would  have  a  special  cap  fitted to comply  with 
national  regulations. 
The  second  investment  employs  (end  1978)  80  people  and  is  highly capital 
intensive,  with  a  turnover of  £5.4/m.  at  the  end  of  1978  compared  with  a 
turnover of  £2.67m.  in plant  one.  Bought-in  goods  cost well  over  £3m.  in -35-
plant  two.  Even  so,  value added  works  out at  approximately  £30,000  per 
employee  in plant  two,  whereas  in  plant one,  even  disregarding  bought  in 
cost of  raw  materials,  value added  was  only about  £15,000. 
TABLE  4.1.6  Total  employed,  skill levels and  sex,  end  1978 
in  investment  2. 
Male  36 
Female  42 
Managerial  2 
TOTAL  80 
Skilled 
(incl.  managerial)  10 
Semi-skilled 
~  20 
Unskilled  50 
The  higher value added  achieved  by  the  more  capital  intensive plant 
has  been  noted  by  the Group  and  they  intend to  expand  plant one  on  a  capital 
-r.~ensive pasis.  This  expansion will  entail  a  move,  as  the  present  plant  is 
sited in the old  city and  there have  been  complaints  from  residents about  the 
noise level  generated  by  the plant.  When  the move  is made  advantage will  be 
taken of the opportunity to  invest  in .new  capital  equipment.  This will  mean 
that,  in  spite of the fact  that an  expansion  of  production is envisaged, 
there will  be  no  expansion  in the labour force,  indeed it is felt  that capital 
will  replace  some  female  labour.  At  the  same  time,  it is likely that skill 
levels will  improve  as  men  are trained to  set  and  maintain the  new  equipment. 
At  present  no  estimates  have  been  made  as  to  how  many  jobs will  be  lost  nor 
as  to  how  many  of the semi-skilled men  will  be  trained to a  higher  level. 
The  Group  now  has  another operation in the  same  area.  This  is a  sales 
operation which  at  present  employs  5  German  warehousemen,  who  at  present  turn 
over about  £~m.  of  sales  per annum  within  Germany.  This  operation is expected 
to  expand,  with  a  figure  of  £2m.  turnover being.envisaged.  It is not  known 
just  how  many  more  people the operation will  employ,  but  something  like treble 
the existing  number  is thought  probable. 
We  are  now  in a  position to  draw  conclusions  on  the German  investment. 
From  the  evidence  in other case investigations the  claim that it is difficult 
to  compete  through  exports to the  German  market  has  some  substance.  That 
being  so,  it is not  likely that  the  employment  created  in Germany  was  merely 
a  substitution for  employment  in other countries  where  the Group  has  manuf-
acturing operations.  Add  to this the fact  that the goods  are relatively 
cheap to  produce,  and  therefore that transport  costs would  be totally dis-
proportionate to  the finished article,  and  we  must  agree that  exporting was -36-
not an'attractive proposition.  Another point to  note is that the  investment 
was  made  in  an  area of  high  unemployment  and  therefore most  of the workforce 
come  from  a  pool  of  unemployed  - they were  not  simply  transferred  from  one 
company  to another. 
From  all of this it is safe to conclude that the Group's  investment  in 
Germany  was  employment  creating,  adding  to the aggregate of employed  within 
the  EEC  as a  whole. 
It is true that the move  now  is towards  capital  intensive production 
and  in  some  ways  this could  be  inimical  for job prospects.  However,  the  new 
technology  embodied  in  such  a  move  should  lead  to an  increase  in skill levels, 
and  it is considered  unlikely that the  expansion  of  output  through  more 
capital-intensive methods  of  production will  significantly reduce  existing 
employment  levels.  On  the  evidence  to  date,  it is clear from  this case  study 
that,  in this instance,  foreign direct  investment  has  been  employment 
creating. 
Earlier the Group's  French  investments  were  mentioned.  There  we  said 
that it should  be  possible to  project  from  one  detailed analysis  of an  invest-
ment  evidence to  suggest  whether  or· not,  under  similar circumstances,  the 
effects in  one  case  would  be  likely to  follow  in another. 
As  with the German  investment,  the French  ones  were  seen as  necessary 
if the Group  was  to  compete  effectively in  the market.  Thus  servicing them 
from  elsewhere was  ruled  out  on  the grounds  that it was  easier to  sell to 
the French if the firm was  producing  in  France,  and  that  anyway  the transport 
costs of doing  otherwise would  be  disproportionately large.  If this is so 
then the jobs created in France  could  not  have  been  created elsewhere.  The 
investment  was  also in a  high  unemployment  area  and  so  again it is unlikely 
that the jobs were  simply shifted from  one  factory  in the area  to another. 
The  pattern then is  very  similar to the one  in  Germany  and  we  would 
conclude that the foreign direct  investments of this Group  have  been  quite 
clearly employment  creating,  adding  to  the  aggregate  of  jobs within the 
European  Community.  Although  the development  of  new  technology will  increase 
the capital/labour ratio  in future  expansion  of activity,  this is thought 
unlikely seriously to threaten existing jobs  and  will  be beneficial to skill 
levels  among  those  currently employed.  Expansion of the overall  European 
market  in the firm's  major  product  lines  has  reinforced  our view  that this 
employment  was  provided  in additional  capacity,  i.e.  employment  in this firm 
did  not  reduce  employment  in its competitors  within the  European  Community. • 
-37-
4.2.  Case  Study  2 
Our  second case  study,  in contrast to the first,  was  carried out  on  a 
small  UK  company  based  in the Midlands.  Early  in the 1960's it was  under 
different  ownership  and  struggling to  survive.  At  that  time it was  manuf-
acturing  solder and  lead  products for the  building  industry.  It is  now  a 
thriving  small  business,  employing  some  fifty people,  with  a  turnover of 
f800,000  per annum,  and  producing  such  diverse  goods  as  moulded  display 
products,  building  and  plumbing  materials,  toy  products,  and  a  variety of 
goods  used  in other industries  (e.g.  spools for textile machinery,  top  pieces 
for heels  in the  shoe trade),  all of which  are  produced  in plastic  by  the 
process of  injection moulding. 
The  company  has  had  European  connections for some  considerable time. 
Indeed it was  as  long  ago  as  1910  that the company's  founder first set  up 
operations  in Cologne.  A typical  entrepreneur of the  period,  he  was  in fact 
a  Frenchman  who  first  began  his  business operations in  some  derelict  London 
warehouses.  It was  here that the  lead  and  solder business  was  started.  On 
a  trip to  Germany  he  decided  that  here too  there  was  scope for  his ambitions 
and  he  set  up  a  factory  in Cologne.  Germany  was  the  country of  his major 
expansions  from  then  on,  and  by  1948  he  had  another plant  in Berlin.  The 
German  and  British concerns  were  not  very closely reiated and  by  1948  the 
German  companies,  foreseeing  the move  away  from  lead  in the  plumbing  business, 
had  already  made  the  switch to  plastic fittings.  The  British concern,  however, 
was  still pr(ducing  lead  products for  which  it found  that the demand  was 
falling.  By  1960 it was  in  serious trouble. 
One  of the company's  suppliers  of  specialised machinery  had  noted  this 
decline whilst  being  aware  of the potential  market  for  plumbing  goods  in  the 
. Jilding trade.  This  supplier finally  took the  company  over whilst  retaining 
the original  name.  A quick change to plastics was  essential  and  the first 
and  most  important  move  was  to strike up  a  much  closer relationship with  the 
Cologne  company  to take  advantage  of its technical  know-how  and  strong 
financial  position.  There  is  no  doubt  that the survival  of  the British side 
of the business at that time  was  owed  completely  to the German  concern. 
Early  in the sixties the move  from  London  to the Midlands  took  place. 
This  move  meant  that the plant  could  be  organised  from  scratch and,  with  the 
backing  of  Cologne,  money  could  be  spent  on  developing  the most  modern  and 
efficient specialised  e~uipment. 
The  Midlands  factory,  with its modern  plant and  innovatory  products, 
took the  company  from  strength to  strength and  its share of the market  rose 
considerably. 
Geographically,  the markets  of the separate  concerns  tend to  be  mainly 
local.  The  UK  plant  has  continued to  service  the  UK  market  and  its share of 
the market  has  increased.  There  has  also  been  a  growth  in exports  from  the  UK 
to the Middle  East,  the Far East  and  Ireland.  Cologne  services the Ruhr  and 
Dusseldorf whilst  the Berlin operation concentrates  upon  Northern  Germany. 
In  1967  it was  felt that,  if the  share of the German  market  was  to  be  held  and 
improved,  then  there would  be  a  need  for the  introduction of efficient  new 
technology.  This  is where  the  help that  Cologne  gave to  the  UK  plant  had  its 
payoff.  Now  that the  UK  plant  was  efficient and  profitable the techniques 
.used  there and  the machinery  employed  could  bo  used  as  a  model  for a  new -38-
investment  into  Germany.  This  investment  in Frankfurt  took  place  in the 
period  1967-1968.  Although  a  factory  was  already  in  existence at this 
time it was  not  empty1  it had  been  used  for a  purpose other than that for 
which  it was  now  to  be  used.  The  investment  therefore  can  be  classified as 
'Greenfield Horizontal'  -that is~·it was  the setting  up  of a  totally new 
operation for the  production  of  the types  of goods  that  the  company  was 
already  producing  elsewhere.  This  investment  in fact  represented the 
company's  first consciously strategic foreign  direct  investment in the  sense 
that it was  part of a  corporate  plan,  whereas  the  previous  move  into  Germany 
was  the  product  of entrepreneurial  impulse. 
By  the  end  of  1980  the Frankfurt  plant will  have  been  closed  and 
production moved  to  a  new  factory  in Hanover.  The  reasons for this move 
will  be  considered  shortly. 
There  may  of  course  be  many  reasons for  investing  in  a  foreign  country 
- proximity to  market,  cheap  labour,  government  grants are  some  obvious 
examples  - and it may  well  be that  some  decisions are consciously affected 
by  all of these  considerations.  Very often it is the  "unconscious"  elements 
in the decision  which  have  the greatest bearing  upon  the  problem with which 
we  are mainly  concerned;  the effects of foreign  direct  investment  on  employ-
ment.  We  start,  therefore,  by  discussing this company's  conscious  motives 
for investment  and  then go  on  to consider the conclusions that  can  be  drawn 
from  answers  given to other guestions. 
There was  never any  question as to the country of destination of the 
investment.  The  company  had  had  German  connections  since  1910  and  the 
ensuing operations followed  ~f6r no  other reason  than  that they  were  already 
in  Germany",  in other words,  "history rather than  economics  was  the  reason 
the  company  invested further in  Germany".  History may  have  dictated  the fact 
that the company  was  servicing the German  market~  but  sound  economics  dictated 
the fact  that  in  order to  service this market  they  should  be  in it,  partic-
ularly given  the view  held  by  the  Managing  Director that  "exporting to  Germany 
would  not  have  been  successful,  as  Germans  prefer German  goods;  hence  direct 
investment  under the auspices of a  German  name  was  the only possibility". 
This is a  view  that  has  been  endorsed  by  several  companies  and it was 
certainly a  strong motivating factor  in the  case of this company  when 
deciding to  make  its  inves~ment in Frankfurt. 
Not  only was  it a  question  of identity.  Although  the  production costs 
in the  UK  would  have  been  cheaper  than they were  in  Germany,  the cost of 
transportation  and  warehousing  necessarily  incurred  by  an  exporting  policy 
would  have  forced  up  the pries of the goods  to a  completely  uncompetitive 
level.  The  transportation and  warehousing  costs  would  have  been  out  of all 
proportion to other costs  given the  low  price of the product  and  its compar-
ative bulk. 
There were  two  other important  reasons for  investing  in Frankfurt.  One 
was  the  need to  achieve continuity of  product  in  Germany.  The  Cologne 
operation was  still producing  substantial  quantities of  solder and  lead 
products  and  it was  important to  exploit fully the  expertise  in  plastics 
production  developed  in the  UK  if advantage was  to  be  taken  of  the  growing 
demand  for plastic  plumbing  materials  in the  German  market.  The  German 
conuern  had  a  good  share of the market  and if this market  share was  to  be 
increased,  or even  maintained~ then they  had  to  produce  the more  modern 
materials then  being  demanded.  This,  of course,  required  the necessary -39-
equipment  for  producing these  goods  and  the most  advanced  technology for this 
was  in operation at the  UK  plant.  Thus  the  second  of the reasons  for the 
investment  mentioned  above  was  to  inject the advanced  UK  technology  into 
Germany. 
This modern  technology  meant,  of course,  that  the production  process was 
highly capital  intensive,  and  this made  it doubly attractive as  a  necessary 
part of the company's  operations in  Germany,  for  not  only  did it mean  that 
the most  up-to-date  goods  could  be  produced,  it also meant  that  the  number  of 
employees  required  to  operate it would  be  small.  This,  the managing  director 
said,  was  a  very  important  consideration given the  cost of  labour  in  Germany. 
It is not  clear why  this  should  have  been  such  an  important  consideration  in 
view  of the type  of  labour  (mainly  unskilled)  that the  company  employed  else-
where  in  Germany  and  intended to  employ  in Frankfurt. 
90%  of all the  labour  employed  in Frankfurt  is  'guest'  labour,  that is, 
it is made  up  of  non-EEC  nationals.  It is also  female;  indeed all the 
unskilled  labour is female  'guest'  labour  - the only  Germany  employees  being 
the small  core of skilled  labour essential to the  smooth  running  of the 
factory  and  the machinery. 
This  •guest'  labour is considerably cheaper than  German  labour,  and  this 
was  a  point  of which  the  company  was  aware  before  deciding to make  the  invest-
ment.  The  managing  director estimated that,  because  of this availability of 
cheap  labour,  labour costs  in  Germany  represented  tha  same  proportion of 
turnover,  aoproximately  20%,  as they  did  in the  UK. 
ThP  managing  director told us that.they were  aware  of the  labour 
legislation  in  Germany  but  that  such  legislation played  no  part  in the 
investment  decision.  He  pointed  out that the "social costs"1  per employee 
were  very  high  and  almost  doubled  the monetary  wage  paid  to  each  individual, 
hence  the  need  to  employ  sophisticated  capital  to reduce  the dependence  on 
labour.  These  "social costs"  are  embodied  in  national  labour legislation and 
cannot  be  avoided.  An  important  point that  he  made,  however,  was  that this 
legislation does  not  cover  'guest'  workers.  They  do  not  have  security of 
empl8yment;  they  have  no  legal  rights of redress;  they are  not  organised, 
nor do  they  belong to  a  trade  union.  An  awareness  of these facts,  it would 
seem,  is  useful  in deciding  on  an  investment,  and  although it was  said that 
the labour  laws  played  no  part  in motivating  the firm to  carry  out  the 
investment,  clearly the  possibility of a cheap, malleable  and  easily dispensed-
with  labour force  could  be  an  attractive pr9position.  As  only  a  very  small 
number  of skilled men  would  be  required  to maintain  production  then  the 
"social costs"  and  high wages  required  to attract these  men  only  constituted 
a  relatively  small  cost.  There  was  no  need  to consult  a  trade  union.  There 
was  no  need  to worry  about  the rights  conveyed  upon  the workforce  by  law; 
they  had  no  such rights.  Nor  was  there  any  need  to  worry  about  the  cost  of 
redundancy  should  redundancy  be  required;  there would  be  no  such  costs. 
Clearly then,  this state of affairs could  prove  a  very  strong motivating 
force,  even  if not  consciously stated as  such,  in making  an  investment, 
particularly given that  such  a  pool  of labour existed and  was  readily 
available. 
l"social  costs"  are  such things  as  insurance  cover,  safety regulations. 
sports facilities,  security of tenure etc.,  which  increase the  "direct" 
costs  of  labour. -40-
Such  considerations are about  to  prove  useful  to the  company.  By  1980 
it is expected that the Frankfurt  plant will  have  closed  down  completely and 
all operations will  have  moved  to  Hanover.  The  present  workforce  will  be 
laid off  (except  the skilled workers  who  have  an  important  part  to  play  in 
setting  up  the Hanover  operation)  at  no  cost to the  company.  Of  course it 
could  be argued  that~  as  there is not  the  'guest'  labour available in  Hanover. 
the cost  of  cheap  labour is  not  a  prime  consideration  in the  company's 
decisions.  It can  be  noted  however,  that there is a  good  deal  of  unemployed 
rural  labour in  Hanover;  labour that is cheaper than the national  average. 
On  the other hand,  as this  is  German  labour.  it will  be  covered  by  the 
national  legislation and  the  company  will face  the  "social  costs"  of  employing 
this labour.  This  particular investment  is to  be  highly capital  intensive 
and  although it represents  an  expansion  in  terms  of  size of factory  and 
production,  it will  not  employ  any  more  people than  were  employed  in Frankfurt. 
This fact  certainly lends  more  weight  to the managing  director's  point  that 
capital  intensity is essential  in  such  a  high-wage  country and  gives it more 
relevance  in the light of this  new  investment  decision. 
There is another  point to make  about  the  proposed  Hanover  investment. 
Because  of the  high  level  of  unemployment  in this area the West  German 
Government  provides assistance to firms  investing  in the  region.  The  company 
which  is the  subject  of this case  study  is making  its Hanover  investment  as 
a  direct  response to this Government  inducement.  This  is slightly surprising 
when  this decision is seen  in the  light of the answer  given  by  the managing 
director to the  question  "Did  you  investigate the possibility of  Government 
inducements  to  invest  in  Frankfurt?".  The  gist of the  reply was  as follows: 
."No,  but  we  would  take them if they  were  offered- they would  not  be  of  such 
importance  as  to  lead  us to make  an  investment  unless  we  felt that that 
investment  made  sense  on  economic  grounds  regardless  of any  inducements.  In 
fact,  we  are rather reluctant  to deal  with  Governments  at all". 
Again,  it seems  that there are motivating factors  which  are not  seen  as 
such  by  a  company.  or at least they are  not  openly admitted  to  have  been  of 
any  real  significance. 
The  investment  in Frankfurt  was  a  success.  The  only real  problem the 
company  encountered  was  the  expected  one  of  cash  flow.  This  problem was 
overcome  because  the  UK  plant  was  in  a  position to be  able to  support  the 
new  operation until  ~hat operation  became  self-suppo~ting.  just as  the  UK 
plant  itself had  been  supported  by  the Cologne  concern  whilst  it  broke 
into the plastics market. 
There  were  no  problems  with  unions,  no  problens acquiring  labour,  and 
no  problems  in  securing  the  co-operation of the  labour force.  This  may  have 
been  due  to  amicable  industrial relations or to the weakness  of the  labour 
force.  The  company's  decision to  invest  in Frankfurt  seems,  at  least 
commercially,  to  have  been  vindicated. 
We  turn  now  to an  assessment  of the  net  employemnt  effects of this 
investment.  We  are concerned  here with  the  question  ~f the overall  effects 
that this investment  had  on  employment  within  the EEC.  If it led to a  total 
increase  in  jobs within  the  community  then the  investment  can  be  said to 
have  been  employment  creating;  if there  was~  ovorall,  no  such  increase,  a 
situation that  would  arise if jobs were  provided  in  the  host  country  al  the 
expense  of jobs  in the  source  country,  then the  investment  can  be classified 
as  employment  substituting. -41-
Whilst  we  accept  that the  creation of jobs per  se  may  be  desirable,  the 
quality of those jobs,  and  the opportunities for raising skill levels  provided 
by  an  investment  are  important,  not  only for the individuals  employed  in those 
jobs,  but  for  the  area  in  which  the  investment  has  been  made.  Thus,  when 
assessing  net  employment  effects,  such considerations  should  be  included. 
The  investment  under consideration  has  been  classified as  'Greenfield 
Horizontal'.  This is an  important  consideration  because it means  that the 
venture  was  a  totally new  operation  bringing  into  existence  capacity that  had 
not  existed before.  Compare  this situation with  a  'takeover',  which  may  simply 
mean  a  transference of  ownership  and  have  no  material  effects whatsoever, 
unless the capital  acquired  in the sale is put  to further  productive  use,  and 
the nature of the investment  clearly becomes  a  factor of considerable  import-
ance.  Prima  facie,  a  'Greenfield Horizontal'  venture  seems  logically to  imply 
employment  creation.  However,  as  we  are concerned  with  overall effects within 
the  EEC,  this proposition is by  no  means  self-evident.  If,  for  example,  the 
market  to  be  supplied  by  the  new  investment  could  have  been  supplied  by 
exporting  from  the  source  country,  then the  investment  may  rob  the  source 
country of those jobs  necessary  to manufacture the  goods  for export. 
One  question we  put  to the Managing  Director was  this:  "Had  you  previou~y 
supplied  this market  through  exports?"  His  answer  was  an  unequivocal  "No", 
on  the grounds  that this would  have  been  impossible for the reasons  we 
mentioned  earlier,  i.e.  Germans  will  "only"  buy  goods  they believe to  have 
been  made  in  Germany  by  a  German  company.  If this is true,  then  it is clear 
that jobs wore  not  transferred from  the source  to the host  country  in the 
manner  mentioned  above.  Nor  was  there any  evidence  to  suggest that  the 
effect on  ·~ompeting firms  in Germany  was  to  reduce their employment.  We  must 
thus  conclude that the  investment  was  employment  creating,  but  to what  extent? · 
Table  4.2.1  gives  the total  numbers  employed  by  the  company  when  the  company 
~tarted production  in  1968,  broken  down  into skill levels and  sex. 
Table 4.2.1  Number  Employed  when  production  started  (1968) 
with  skill levels and  sex 
Male  2 
Female  3 
Total  employed  5 
Skilled  (Male)  2 
Skilled  (Female) 
Semi-skilled  (Male) 
Semi-skilled  (Female) 
Unskilled  (Male) 
Unskilled  (Female)  3 -42-
Table 4.2.2 gives the  same  information as  at the  end  of  1978. 
Table 4.2.2  Number  employed  at  the  end  of  1978 
with  skill  levels and  sex 
Male 
Female 
Total  employed 
Skilled  (Male) 
Skilled  (Female) 
Semi-skilled  (Male) 
Semi-skilled  (Female) 
Unskilled  (Male) 
Unskilled  (female) 
6 
15 
21 
2 
4 
15 
It would  appear then,  that,  from  its inception  in  1967  to  the  er.d  of 
1978,  this investment  had  led  to the creation of  21  jobs.  In  terms  of  creating 
jobs for  EEC  nationals the benefits  seem  to  have  been  very  small,  as  most  of 
the unskilled  labour were  'guest'  workers. 
In  terms  of quality the  standard of the  jobs provided  was  extremely  poor. 
The  high-level  technology  employed  required  only two  skilled men  to maintain 
it and  for  the rest  the cheapest  possible  labour  (female  'guest')  was  all that 
was  required.  Admittedly,  the  two  skilled workers  were  local  Germans  and  were 
trained  by  the  company,  but  there is no  on-going  training  scheme. 
The  company  prefers to  use  local  management  and,  if more  were  needed  they 
would  always  use  Germans  if they were  available.  Much  of the  company's  success 
was  attributed to  the  quality  of management  and  the fact  that this management 
was  local  and  therefore  "au  fait"  with  local  economic,  industrial  and  labour 
practices.  The  company  prefers  to  bring  local  young  men  up  through  the 
company  rather than  recruit  experienced  personnel  from  elsewhere,  although 
one  of the chief  reasons  for this is that it believes that if a  man  would 
move  to it for more  money,  then  he  would  leave for more  money  just as  readily. 
Within  the  EEC,  this small  company  essentially supplies  unrelated  local 
markets.  Local  production  is thought  to  be  essential  because of  high trans-
port  and  warehousing  costs for a  low-value  product  and  (in Germeny)  customer 
desire to  have  a  home  produced  product.  The  employment  effect  of the Frank-
furt  investment  was  minimal.  However,  this case  illustrates the  value  of 
foreign  investment  in allowing the internal transfer of  knowledge  and  skill, 
which  maintains  viability in  adverse conditions,  and  therefore maintains 
employment.  The  early  (1910)  investment  in Cologne  provided the expertise 
to enable the parent  UK  firm to  switch  to  plastics when  faced  with  a  decline -43-
in the market  for its traditional  products and  a  reverse transfer of the 
innovations  in the  UK  with capital  from  Cologne  established the  new 
(Frankfurt)  plant  in Germany.  Without  these international  links it is 
unlikely that the firm would  have  survived. 
Although  the  employment  created  by  the Frankfurt  investment  was  small 
and  the  quality of  jobs  poor~ it is perhaps  worthwhile  to generalise  from 
this  single  small  company  to  small  firms  in general.  Individually~  the 
effect  of any  single  small  firm will  be  small~  but  collectively small  firms 
may  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  level  of  employment  in the  aggregate. -44-
4.3.  Case  Study  3 
The  third  case  study  is a  large  company  based  in  the  Irish Republic with 
subsidiaries throughout  the  world~  It is established  in  four continents. 
producing  in  Europe,  Africa,  North  America  and  Australia.  A major  part  of 
the Group's activities consists of the  production  of  packaging materials. 
The  range  of products  includes corrugated  paper.  labels.  polythene  bags 
and  polyethylene film.  The  Group  also  has  interests in the print industry. 
Table 4.3.1  gives  a  breakdown  of principal activities and  turnover from 
each of these  in  1978. 
Table  4.3.1  Principal activities and  turnover of the  Group  in  1978 
Principal activities  Turnover [000)  1978 
Print and  Packaging  69,286 
Corrugated  paper  and  board  69,902 
Print related  16,591 
Distributing  15,618 
Other Activities  4,289 
TOTAL  ~175.686 
In  Table  4.3.2 turnover is broken  down  geographically.  showing  the  United 
Kingdom  to  be  the principal centre of the Group's activities.  The  United 
Kingdom  is also the area  of most  efficient and  profitable activity for the 
Group,  due  mainly  to the flexible packaging  division.  This  division  produced 
Table 4.3.2  Turnover for  1978  by  Geographical  Area 
Geographical  Area  (by  market)  Turnover  t£000) 1978 
Republic  of  Ireland  49,019 
United  Kingdom  87,396 
United States of America  23,471 
Nigeria  14,009 
Other Territories  1,791 
TOTAL  ~175,686 -45-
profits in  1977  almost  double  those  of the previous  year,  despite the fact 
that one particular unit  made  substantial  losses.  The  best  performer in 
the  packaging field was  a  North-West  England  based  factory  which  forms  the 
subject  of our  study.  The  Group  is  keen  to make  further  investments within 
the  UK,  particularly in  the  packaging  and  paper industries. 
At  January  1978,  the Group  employed  a  total of 8,810  people,  a  marginal 
increase over the  previous  year,  The  aggregate  remuneration of these 
employees  amounted  to  £37  million,  which  gives  and  average  salary/wage of 
£4,199  per employee  per annum.  On  a  turnover of  £175,686  million Value 
Added  represented  £57,795  million.  Each  employee  thus  contributed,  on 
average,  approximately  £6,560  to  Value  Added.  In  1977  Volue  Added  amounted 
to  £45,791  million with  an  average contribution per  employee  of  £5,213. 
The  difference between  Value  Added  per  employee  and  remuneration  per employee 
in  1977  was  £1,767  whereas  the difference  in  1978  was  £2,361  which  clearly 
indicates that  productivity  increased  substantially over the year,  facilit-
ating  higher profits as well  as an  increase in earnings.  It also reflects 
the  "pruning"  policy of the Group,  whose  aim  is to  reduce  manning  levels 
to  a  figure  commensurate  with the more  sophisticated technology  which  is 
being  introduced.  Thus,  although it is true that the  number  of  employees 
increased  between  1977  and  1978,  on  a  strictly comparable  basis there were 
some  plant  by  plant  reductions,  "reflecting our  need  to  be  always  compet-
itive,  with  appropriate establishment  levAls at  each of our  locations". 
The  Group's attitude towards  legislation within  the  labour relations 
field is positive and  every attempt  is made  to translate  such  legislation 
into  practiGe as  quickly as  possible.  Throughout  the  Group  labour  stoppages 
between  J~nuary 1977  and  January.1978  were  non-existent.  One  problem facing 
the Group,  however,  is that of absenteeism which,  they claim,  is as  high  as 
15%  in  some  plants. 
The  company  in  question dates  back  to the  1920's and  was  actually 
started  by  a  Lancashire tailor,  who  required  boxes  in  which  to  pack  his 
products.  Following  delays  in  delivery  he  acquired  the  Irish company  who 
had  previously been  his  supplier.  The  company  expanded  and  by  the  1960's 
was  turning  over  £1  million and  considering  international  expansion.  They 
acquired three plants  in  North  West  England,  one  of which  is the  subject  of 
our  study.  All  were  Horizontal  Takeovers. 
The  Irish plants service  Ireland,  the United  Kingdom  and  Continental 
Europe.  The  UK  plants  service the  United  Kingdom,  Continental  Europe,  the 
Middle  East,  Canada,  North  Africa,  Singapore  and  Ceylon. 
All  three investments  made  in  the  1960's  in  the  United  Kingdom  are still 
in operation and  have  been  followed  by  others.  Until  the  investments  in  the 
UK  the  market  had  not  been  exploited  by  the  Group.  Indeed,  as  a  supplier 
of other firms'  packaging  requirements,  the  Group  became  aware  of the  need 
to  locate its packaging  division in a  market  if they  were  to make  any  real 
impact  on  it.  This  provides the first real  motive for foreign  direct 
investment. 
The  Group  had  decided  upon  a  strategy whereby  they would  eventually 
produce  in the North  American  market  and,  if possible,  the Australian 
market.  It was  felt that the logical  route to  taka  ~as via  the  United 
Kingdom.  This,  plus the fact  that they  required  a  plant for converting 
plastic film  into  packaging  for  sale in the  UK  ma~ket,  meant  that the -46-
availability of  such  a  plant  in  North  West  England  almost  dictated the 
decision to carry out  the takeover.  Although  other countries  had  been 
considered as  investment possibilities, this opportunity was  taken  because 
it fitted nicely into the  Ireland-UK-USA  expansion  route. 
The  question  of  Government  inducements  was·  never explicitly considered, 
but  had  they  been  offered they  would  have  been  considered as  no  more  than  a 
bonus.  As  far as  the Group  was  concerned  the viability of the  prospective 
investment  was  the only  important  consideration.  In  the case  of the invest-
ment  which  is the  subject  of this  study,  no  Government  inducements  were, 
in fact,  offered. 
The  major  problem,  according to the  interviewee,  was  that of change. 
As  he  put  it,  "Assimilating change  is never  easy",  and  the plant  in  question 
had  to move  from  the  production of paper to the production  of  packaging  made 
from  plastic film.  Another  problem  which  arose  in the mid-1970's  was  caused 
by  the  changing  nature  of  demand  for  wrapping.  In  addition,  from  being  one 
of the  few  producers  of  polythene  wrapping  the  Group  found  itself in  compet-
ition with all the  major  packaging  producers,  who  themselves  had  made  the 
switch to this type  of wrapping.  This  led  to  a  very  interesting move  by  the 
company.  In  effect,  a  backward  integration took place.  A £t million invest-
ment  was  undertaken  in  Ireland  (with  help  from  the Irish Government),  the 
rationale  behind  which  was  the  need  to  produce  blown  film within the Group 
to  provide  the  UK  plant with  a  secure  supply  of the  input  needed  to  remain 
competitive within  the market.  Thus  the  UK  investment  induced  a  further 
investment  in the  home  country  which  increased vertical  integration within 
the Group. 
The  Group  as  a  whole  is very  sensitive to tre question  of  labour  problems. 
The  major  reason  for this is that  the main  unions  with which  it deals  are 
the  powerful  print  unions.  With  this in mind  the  company  has  prepared  a  very 
comprehensive  checklist which  is consulted  before an  investment  is made.  It 
was  made  clear to  us that there have  been  occasions  when,  as the  interviewee 
put it,  "because  of  unions'  intransigence  investments  have  been  shelved with 
a  consequent  loss of jobs". 
Labour  costs are  high  (approximately  60%  of operating costs)  and  there-
fore  the  company  needs  to  be  sure that this labour is efficient and  co-
operative.  As  we  were  told,  "If material  costs are  high then  labour costs 
must  be  controlled",  the  implication  being that  unless  unionB  would  co-
operate on  manning  levels  then  an  investment  would  not  be  made. 
From  all this it follows  that  productivity of  labour was  investigated, 
as was  labour turnover,  industriel relations,  degree  of  unionisation and 
the likely response  of the  unions.  In  the  case of this takeover  the  unions' 
response  was  'positive'  as  was  the  company's  attitude towards  the  unions. 
That  the Group's  approach to  the  investigation of the  labour situation is 
thorough  is exemplified  by  the fact  that they are  proposing to  invest  in 
France  and  they  have  already  screened forty to fifty companies  using their 
checklist of  possible areas  of difficulty with  labour. 
When  the  company  took over the plant  in  N.W.  England  there were  310 
employees.  Of  these,  250  were  male  and  60  were  female.  In  terms  of skill 
the figures  break  down  as  follows:  34%  were  skilled;  there were  no  semi-
skilled workers,  and  66%  were  unskilled.  The  skilled workers  were  all male. 
(Table  4.3.3) Table 4.3.3 
-47-
Number  employed  in  1965  in terms  of  sex 
and  skill levels 
Male  250 
Female  60 
Total  employed  310 
Skilled  (Male)  105 
Skilled  (Female) 
Semi-skilled  (Male) 
Semi-skilled  (female) 
Unskilled  (Male)  145 
Unskilled  (female)  60 
By  the  end  of  1978  the  number  employed  had  fallen to 274,  a  loss  of  36, 
the majority  of  them  mal8  employees.  The  figures at the  end  of  1978  were: 
malq  22C.  female  54.  The  percentage of skilled to  unskilled  remained  the 
same,  with all the skilled jobs  being  in the  hands  of men.  By  the  end  of 
1980 it is expected  that  the figures will  be  atout  the  same,  although 
Jroduction  is expected  to  increase with  expanded  output  being facilitated 
through  increased  capital  investment.  £12m.  is to  be  invested  in  the  plant 
in the near future  to  enable  plastiss conversion to  be  carried out  more 
efficiently.  This  capital  investment will  not  involve  any  labour expansion 
although  the  company  foresees  problems  with the  unions  over this.  The 
company  feels that  over-manning is obvious at  the  moment  and  thus there is 
enough  'slack'  in the  labour fares  to  be  taken  up  to man  the additional 
machinery.  Union  leaders  have  bAen  flown  to Germany  to  see the  proposed 
technology  in action,  but  as  yet  remain  unconvinced.  This worries  the 
company  for they  have  had  similar problems  in  the  past  ar:d  on  these 
occasions  have  refused  to  invest  where  the  unions  have  stood  firm  in their 
refusal  to accept  cuts  i~ manning  levels.  Indeed  the  dissemination  of  new 
technology  throughout  the  Group's  compar.ies  will  result  in  an  overall  loss 
of jobs. 
The  company's  corporate  policy  towards  the type  of management  it requires 
is clear - to  employ  local management  where  possible.  The  North  West  plant 
was  taken  over as  a  going  concarn  with the management  force  being  100%  UK 
nationals.  However,  since  then  the management  structure  has  been  totally 
overhauled  and  all  but  one  of the original  management  have  been  replaced. 
The  new  management  is still 100%  local  in  line with  stated policy.  There 
is an  on-going  management  training  scheme  and  the  company  prefers to  promote 
from  within,  although,  naturally,  if the right material  is  not  available 
they will  buy  in  suitably qualified personnel. -48-
This  backward  vertical  takeover slightly reduced  employment  in the 
host  country  (UK)  because  production was  rationalised after the takeover 
in accordance with the  Group's  needs.  In the  period  1965  to  1978  approx-
imately 40  jobs were  lost.  Future  expansion  in  the  level  of  output will 
be  based  on  more  capital-intensive technology  which  is unlikely to  increase 
employment  in the  UK.  There  was  no  adverse effect  on  source country  (Irish 
Republic)  employment.  There  may  have  been  a  secondary  effect  on  employment 
in the  host  country arising from  the  possible re-investment  of the  income 
from  the  takeover;  we  have  been  unable to quantify this effect. 
A further  interesting point  to  emerge  from  this case is the  importance 
attached  by  the  Group  to  the  investigation of  labour market  conditions  prior 
to a  foreign direct  investment.  This requires  a  willingness  on  the  part  of 
trade  unions to  co-operate with the group  in  setting appropriate manning 
levels for a  given  technology. -49-
4.4.  Case  Study  4 
Case  Study  4  represents an  interesting example  of  a  foreign  direct 
investment  which  was  originally made  by  an  Irish firm  in the  United  Kingdom 
stemming  from  an  altruistic motive  on  the part  of the  Irish company  towards 
its Dublin-based workforce.  This  resulted  in  the  formation  of an  autonomous 
United  Kingdom  company  which  then  invested  back  into  Ireland  and  further 
afield. 
A large Irish company,  with operations throughout  the world,  employed 
a  considerable  number  of tradesmen  in the  packaging  of its major  commodity. 
The  packaging they ~roduced was  becoming  obsolete  ar1d  the  compdny  was 
importing a  more  modern  type  of  packaging  from  a  company  in  vJarwick,  England. 
As  these  imports  grew  and  the original  packaging  represented  less and  less 
of the  Irish concern's requirements,  the possibility of mass  redundancies 
for the  skilled  tradesmen  in  Dublin  became  a  real  one.  Consequently,  it was 
decided  to  set  up  at  the  head  office plant  in  Dublin  the technology  required 
to  produce  the materials  being  imported  from  Warwick,  using  the  Dublin 
tradesmen  whose  jobs  were  in  danger to manufacture  the  new  product.  Initially 
then,  the  company  we  are  now  investigating  stemmed  from  a  vertical  investment 
at  home  (Dublin)  which  saved  the jobs of  some  100  skilled workers. 
It was  not  long  before the facilities  in  Dublin  were  found  to  be  inade-
quate to  produce  the desired  quantities.  The  Irish company  then  made  a  bid 
for the Warwick  firm  and  carried out  a  takeover  (vertical)  of this  concern. 
Thus  the  gro'lP  we  are  considering  started out  life as  a  peripheral  concern  of 
the  large  company  who  needed  packaging  for its products,  and  the  concept  of 
a  worldwj~d plastics  company  had  not  been  considered at this stage.  Also 
at this stage,  the  investment  was  Irish,  the  country of  investment  being 
Britain.  Eventually the  large plastics concern  was  to  become  United  Kingdom 
~ased and  its investments were  to  be  worldwide. 
Let  us  look at the motivation for the initial Irish investment  and  the 
subsequent  developments  before  we  trace the  growth  of the  large  UK  company. 
Obviously  no  other countries were  considered  for the  investment  because  the 
aim  was  to service the  main  product's requirements  and  the  workforce  which 
would  otherwise  have  been  made  redundant  was  at the main  site anyway.  Nor 
were  any  Government  inducements  considered 6r offered.  No  subsidiary factors 
were  involved  in the decision to  invest. 
The  most  pressing  problem  involved  in  the  new  production facility was 
that of training the  workforce  to their new  task.  They  were  skilled men  and 
proud  of their trade  and  to  some  extent were  indignant  at  the thought  of 
becoming  machine  operatives. instead of  men  in  charge  of  a  whole  and  unique 
manual  operation. 
Obviously  the  usual  considerations  of industrial  relations  problems, 
absenteeism,  laws  and  regulations concerning contracts of  employment  and  so 
on  which  an  investing  company  usually  has  to consider,  did  not  figure  largely 
in the  company's  thoughts  in this case as  they  already  knew  the workforce 
and all the regulations  governing  them.  Although  labour costs were  some  60% 
of total costs the  new  products,  being  small  and  lightweight,  were  expensive 
to transport,  and  as  long  as  labo~r costs  were  rea~onable it was  considered 
cheaper to  produce  the  goods  in  situ rather than  to  impnrt  them. -so-
As  we  have  seen~  as the  demand  for the plastic packaging  products grew, 
the importation  of  extra numbers  from  Warwick  became  essential.  Finally, 
the Irish company  took over the Warwick  firm  and  on  this basis it can  be 
concluded  that initially the  investment  was  a  vertical  takeover by  an  Irish 
parent  in the  United  Kingdom.  As  demand  grew  the  Dublin  operation  ceased 
and  moved  to the outskirts of the city to  a  new  industrial  estate.  Here  then, 
we  had  a  Greenfield Vertical  operation,  but  as  the  plastics operation grew  it 
became  a  subsidiary  in  its own  right and  further  investments must  be  designated 
'horizontal'  as  plastics  became  a  major part of the  company's  operation. 
It was  at this point  that  the plastics side  of the  business  became 
autonomous  and  broke off from  the  Irish headquarters to  set  up  its H.Q.  in 
the  UK.  From  now  on  each  investment  is designated  as  being  made  by  a  United 
Kingdom  parent.  Figure 4.4.1  sets out  the  path of the  investments. 
Figure  4.4.1  Investment  Path:  Ireland +  UK;  UK  +  Ireland,  Holland,  Singapore 
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The  company  is now  one  c ~  Europe's  largest  processors  of plastic 
materials,  with  a  total  producl:ion  capability in the moulding  and  injection 
processes  and  post-moulding  sE  ~vices.  The  products  include  a  wide  range 
of industrial containers as  WE  Ll  as  custom  moulded  components  for  use  in 
every  kind  of  commercial  and  111dustrial  application.  With  a  wide  spread  of 
factories  in  Europe  and  the  Nel
1 ~r  East  the company  has  produc~ion capability 
in machine  sizes of  up  to 2,5[) tonnes  and  is able to  produce  articles from 
the  smallest  and  most  delicate1 to  large articles such  as  chairs.  The  list 
of  commodities  the  company  pro\uces  is a  long  one  and  contains such  items  as 
telephone  cases,  bottle crates;. plastic drums  and  barrels,  boxes  and  trays, 
tubs for  storing and  transporting bulk commodities,  tough  corrosion-free 
tanks for  handling  liquids and  ~1e  'squeezy'  type bottles which  contain 
washing  up  liquid. 
Apart  from  the  Dublin  concern,  the  Group  now  has  another plant  in the 
Republic  of  Ireland.  This  plant was  acquired  in  1973.  It is 35,000 sq.ft. 
in  size and  specialises in  blow  moulding,  producing  containers from  one  pint 
to  45  gallons  in  size.  Approximately  90%  of the  output  is for the  home 
market  (the plant's products  hold  75%  of the Irish market  for plastic cont-
ainers),  and  the rest is  exported  to the  United  Kingdom.  This  investment  was 
a  horizontal  takeover although it did  represent  an  extension to the  company's 
range  of  products.  The  firm  nad  not  previously  produced  the type  of  goods 
that it now  produces  and  so it was  not  a  competitor  of  the  new  controlling 
company.  When  it was  taken  over there  were  only  20  employees  there,  now 
there are  90.  All  of these are local  people  including the five managers  (two 
of whom  were  there before the takeover).  All  of the employees were  trained 
in Warwick  at  some  stage in their employ,  indeed  the company  is very  keen  on 
training  aGd  ~ach of their managers  attends  in-course training at  least  once 
per year,  receiving  lectures and  instruction in  new  manufacturing  techniques. 
Many  of the  employees  were  previously  unemployed.  Indeed,  the  company  is 
vRry  concerned  about  the  problems  of rural  poverty  in  Ireland  and  always 
condiders this in its investment  decisions. 
Naturally the  economic  factor was  very  important  in motivating it to 
invest  in the  Irish Republic  and  the  company  saw  that  labour would  be  readily 
available and  that the  area  offered  a  strategic position from  which  to  exploit 
the Irish market  for plastic containers.  Ho~ever,  they created  70  jobs  in 
five years  and  the  prospect  is that  more  will  b3  needed  as the  com~any plans 
to  expand  on  this site in  1980. 
There  were  no  problems  - and  none  was  anticipated  - in  terms  of  labour 
relations;  there is no  union  and  people were  glad  of jobs.  The  labour  laws 
and  statutory regulations  in  Ireland are  by  no  means  restrictive and  the 
workforce  depends  upon  a  company's  conscience  rather than its legal  obligations 
for decent facilities and  treatment.  The  only  problem  the  company  did  have 
was  absenteeism,  which  was  commonplace  at first.  This  problem  has  now  been 
largely  overcome. 
In  January  1972,  the  company  made  its first move  into Continental 
Europe.  A Dutch  company  was  acquired.  Situated  a  few  miles  north  of the 
German  border and  adjoining the autobahn  from  the  Dutch  coast  to  industrial 
Germany,  this moulding  company  provided  a  strategic~lly excellent  site in 
which  to exploit the  Northern  European  market.  Unable  to  expand  physically 
tho  cxint1ng  injection moulding  factory,  it wws  decj_d8d  to  build  a  spBciully 
designed  plastics  conversion  plant  on  the outskirts of  town  on  a  20,000  square 
metre  site.  When  officially opened  in  September  1974  this factory  was 
considered to  be  the most  sophisticated  in the  European  plastics  industry. 
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Materials-handling containers are one of the  strengths of the plant 
which  includes  a  range of moulded  shipping  pails from  1  to  25  litre capacity 
for products  ranging  from  cream  to  paint,  salted herring  to  chemicals.  Other 
containers,  trays,  crates,  baskets  and  tubs are  produced  for the  horticultural, 
food,  fishing,  drink and  tobacco  industries.  Custom  mouldings  to  exacting 
technical  specifications are also  produced  for Dutch  industry plus a  varied 
range of domestic  products. 
The  motivation for this  investment  was  to enter the European  market. 
It was  felt  to  be  essential to  be  near prospective  customers.  (They  now  have 
a  45%  share of the Continental  European  market.)  No  government  inducements 
were  offered,  or rather,  none  was  sought  as the  sole criterion was  economic 
viability. 
A thorough  investigation of the labour  laws  was  carried out,  as was 
negotiation  with  the  only  union  involved.  Labour  turnover,  absenteeism and 
industrial  conflict  were  found  to  be  almost  non-existent,  and  the  union  was 
very  encouraging  in its attitude. 
The  plant  employed  approximately  100  people when  it was  taken  over;  by 
the  time the  new  development  was  completed  250  employees  were  required.  Of 
these  200  were  male  and  50  female  and  approximately  20%  were  skilled tool-
fitters  - all male.  All  the other employees are classed  as  semi-skilled. 
The  workforce is  100%  local,  as are the ten managers.  Three  managers  were 
originally from  the  plant  which  was  taken  over,  the other  seven  coming  from 
firms  within the area.  The  majority of the workforce  was  unemployed  prior 
to  the  investment,  although  a  small  number  moved  from  other firms.  As  with 
the  Irish workforce,  all of the  Dutch  employees  received training,  and  all 
new  employees  receive initial training prior to taking their place  on  the 
machines.  As  with  the  Irish investment,  the Dutch  one  was  undoubtedly 
employment  creating.  Table  4.4.1  summarises  these  effects in terms  of skill 
and  sex for  both  Ireland and  Holland. 
This  unique. investment  path,  which  startsd in  Dublin  from  a  desire to 
preserve  jobs and  resulted  in  the setting up  of a  new  company  with  backward 
linkages  into  Ireland and  new  interests throughout  the world,  can  quite 
definitely be  designated  employment  creating  ~n the  evidence  of  the  invest-
ments  we  have  examined. 
If we  include the  one  hundred  jobs that  were  preserved  - which  indeed 
we  should  - we  can  state categorically that within the  EEC  330  jobs were 
directly created  through  foreign  direct  investment  in the period  1973-9. 
Competitors  were  not  replaced,  at  least initially,  as the  demand  was  internal 
to the firm  and  the older trade  replaced  was  not  allowed  by  the firm to  have 
employment  reducing  effects.  Again  expansion  in  product  demand  led  to  an 
increase in market  size and  the innovations  introduced  by  the  company  in 
effect created  a  new  product.  Other  producers  of the old  product  may  have  been 
replaced  but  we  believe  such  employment  displacement  to  be  small,  and  not  only 
due  to the  switch to  plastics but to an  exogenous  decline  in  demand  for the 
old product. TABLE  4.4.1  Employment  increase by  sex  and skill levels  in  Ireland and  Holland 
IRELAND  HOLLAND 
)I  1973  1979  1972  1979 
pre-investment)  (pre-investment) 
Managers  2  5  3  10 
Male  12  70  80  200 
Female  8  20  20  50 
Skilled  (Male)  4  20  16  40 
Skilled  (Female)  - - -
Semi-skilled  (Male)  8  40  64  160 
Semi-skilled  (Female)  - - 20  50 
Unskilled  (Male)  - 10  - -
Unskilled  (Female)  8  20  - -
TOTAL  EMPLOYED  22  95  103  260 
INCREASE  THROUGH 
INVESTMENT  73  157 
-
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4.5.  Case  Study  5 
Case  Study  5  concerns  a  large German  based  plastics company  with 
operations in  Germany,  France,  Austria,  the  United  Kingdom  (Wales),  America 
end  Canada. 
Some  of  these  concerns  serve only their own  domestic  market,  e.g.  the 
French  concern  serves the  French market  and  the  United  Kingdom  operations 
service the United  Kingdom  market,  although  the  German  operation still 
exports  a  considerable amount  of its output  to the  UK.  The  French  investment 
was  made  in the 1960's and  the two  United  Kingdom  investments,  both  in  Wales, 
were  made  in  1974  and  1978,  All  of these operations are still functioning. 
The  company  specialises in  the  production  of  goods  for  use  as  inputs 
by  other firms;  the plastic extrusion  process  is the major technique  employed 
by  the  company. 
The  range  of  products manufactured  includes refrigerator gaskets, 
bumper  bar  pads,  hose-pipe  and  'edge-lipping'  (used  by  furniture manufacturers 
on  table edges  etc.).  The  major  consumer  product  of the  company  is a  plastic 
clothes line. 
The  interviewee cited three main  factors  in motivating the  German 
company  to  invest  in  the  United  Kingdom.  First,  the constantly,  and  wildly, 
fluctuating  exchange  rate  between  the German  Mark  and  the  Pound  Sterling, 
which  made  exporting difficult.  Secondly,  the  high transportaticn costs of 
the products  meant  that  competition with United  Kingdom  manufacturers  through 
exports  from  Germany  was  not  realistic.  Thirdly,  the  United  Kingdom  govern-
ment  was  offering selective regional  investment  grants.  Wales  was  one  of  the 
regions  where  the  Government  wanted  to establish industry,  hence  the company 
chose  to  take  up  the grant  offered and  invest  in Wales.  Another factor, 
closely related to the  second  one  mentioned  above,  played  an  important  part 
in the decision  to  undertake foreign  direct  investment.  This was  the  need  to 
be  in the market  that the  company  wished  to  servicE. 
Given  this necessity and  the lucrative grants on  offer the decision to 
invest  was  not  a  difficult one  to  make.  Indeed,  as  the  interviewee  stated, 
it did  to  some  extent  blind the  company  to  some  other considerations it now 
feels  might  have  been  usefully  undertaken. 
These  relate mainly  to the industrial  relations situation in the  United 
Kingdom.  Whilst it is true that the  labour  laws  and  statutory conditions of 
employment  were  looked at,  and  found  to  be  not  unduly  onerous,  such  questions 
as  the  productivity of  labour,  labour  turnover and  the  industrial relations 
record in the area  were  ignored.  One  reason  for this failure was  the 
difficulty involved  in actually assessing the  likely industrial  problems, 
given that  the area of the  proposed  investment  was  not  industrialised to  any 
great extent.  There  was  therefore little to  use as a  yardstick.  One 
advantage,  so  far as  the  company  was  concerned,  was  the fact  that  there  were 
no  unions  involved,  which  meant  of  course,  that none had  to  be  consulted. 
Since  the  investment  the  company  has  found  that  productivity is  low, 
far  lower  in fact  than  the equivalent  amount  of  labour  can  produce  in  Germany 
in the  same  time  and  with the  sdme  type of technology.  This  fact  must  be 
seen  in the  light  of the equally  important  fact  that wage  rates are  low  at 
the Welsh  plant,  not  only  in  comparison  with  those  in  Germany,  but  with 
those  in  other areas  of the  United  Kingdom. -55-
Although  the  labour  force  was  said to  be  'reasonably co-operative', 
a  major  complaint  the  company  has  concerns  labour turnover and  absenteeism, 
which  is very  high at  one  of the plants. 
The  major  problem that  was  encountered  on  setting  up  the  new  plant  was 
that  of finding  skilled  labour.  In  an  attempt  to  solve this  problem  local 
labour was  trained  in  the  necessary skills by  experienced  Germans.  Another 
problem  was  that of  persuading  women  to  undertake  shift  work.  This  problem 
has  not  yet  been  solved  and  the turnover of female  labour is very  high. 
One  important  decision that was  made  as  a  result of the industrial 
relations  problems  in the  United  Kingdom  was  to  break the  investment.into 
two  smaller,  separate units,  in the belief that a  small  plant  was  more 
conducive to good  industrial relations than  was  a  large one..  Thus  instead 
of  expanding the first  plant,  established  in  1974,  a  new  plant  was  built on 
another site in  Wales  in  1978. 
The  turnover  (end  1978)  at the first  plant is  £1.1m.  with  a  labour 
force  of  130  people.  The  number  employed  when  the  plant  was  first operational 
in  1974  was  50  plus  four  managers  brought  in  from  Germany.  We  can  break 
the  labour force  down  in terms  of skill levels and  sex as  shown  in  Table 4.5.1. 
Table  4.5.1  Number  employed  in  1974  and  1978  in first  UK  plant 
in terms  of sex  and skill levels 
1974  1978 
Managers  (German)  4  4 
Managers  (Local)  - 4 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Male  30  65 
Female  20  65 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.  - - - - - - - ~ 
Total  employed  50  130 
Skilled  (Male)  4  8 
Skilled  (female)  - -
Semi-skilled  (Male)  21  48 
Semi-skilled  (Female)  - -
Unskilled  (Male)  5  9 
Unskilled  (Female)  20  65 
The  second  plant  started in  1978  with  a  labour force  of  55,  which  is 
projected to rise to  over  100  by  1982. -56-
All  of the management  that  came  from  Germany  was  replaced  there,  thus 
no  loss of  employment  was  suffered  in  Germany  to  offset that  created  in Wales. 
The  labour force  was  all local  and  many  of them  were  trained  in Germany, 
before working  back at  home.  There  is  no  formal  training  scheme  at  the Welsh 
plant,  although those  who  are thought  to  be  foreman  material  are taught  as 
they  go  along  and  are  introduced  to the  processes  of  every  department. 
Much  of the  labour  had  been  unemployed  prior to this  investment,  but 
the  company  were  very  wary  of the  unemployed  and  even  now  claim,  in the 
light of the rate of turnover,  that many  of these  people  were  unemployable. 
However,  the majority  of  the  workforce at  the first  plant  were  previously 
unemployed  and  clearly the  investment  did  create  jobs in this area  of  Wales. 
The  plant is technologically advanced,  just as are  the factories  in 
Germany,and  capital intensity is considered to  be  essential if the  company 
is to  be  competitive.  Any  further  expansion will  be  in terms  of capital 
expansion at the first  plant  and  should  there  be  a  need  for area  expansion, 
this will  take  place at the  second plant.  Even  this is likely to  increase 
labour at  no  more  than  a  ratio of  one  to three  in  terms  of  output  per 
machine/man.  Eventually the  company  intends to  reduce its total  labour force 
as capital  intensity increases with the introduction of  German  technology. 
(Technological  progressiveness  is crucial  in Germany  and  the  company  considers 
that this type of  knowledge  is essential within  the  company  and  can  be  trans-
ferred  across  national  boundaries as  easily as  any  other asset  that  the firm 
possesses.)  It is clear that as  technology  advances  jobs will  be  lost and 
this,  the  interviewee  suggested,  was  a  fact  of life that all  industrial 
nations  must  face  up  to. 
We  can  thus  say that the  investment  in the  United  Kingdom  has  created 
approximately  one  hundred  and  eighty jobs  (end  1978).  We  now  turn to the 
overall  effect  on  EEC  employment. 
If,  for  instance,  the jobs created  in  Wales  were  created at  the  expense 
of jobs  lost  in  Germany,  then  the  investment  would  have  been  employment 
diverting  rather than  employment  creating.  Was  this the  case? 
The  investment  was  of the Greenfield  Horizontal  type.  Prima  facie this 
would  seem  to  imply  employment  creation,  but,  of course,  such  an  investment 
may,  as  has  been  said,  have  been  made  at the expense  of  labour in  the  home 
country.  In  this instance this was  not  the case.  It  was  necessary to  enter 
the  United  Kingdom  market  in  order to  compete  realistically with  those  firms 
already  in it. 
The  company  had,  however,  been  exporting to the  United  Kingdom  market 
from  its plants in  Germany,  France  and  Austria.  On  setting  up  the Welsh 
plant  some  twenty five  to thirty per  cent  of this export  trade was  replaced 
by  production  from  direct  investment.  Even  now  some  sixty to  seventy  per  cent 
of the market  is serviced  via  exports  and  the aim  is to  reduce  the  proportion 
of exports to forty  per cent. 
The  question  now  is:  if exports are to  be  cut  by  sixty per cent,  what 
effect is this  likely to  have  on  the  employment  level  in  those factories  in 
Continental  Europe  which  had  been  producing  the  goods  for  export?  The 
interviewee  said that  no  redundancies  had  been  caused,  nor  were  likely to  be, 
and  the plants  in  question  had  switched  to the  production of alternative 
products. 
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The  market  had  been  serviced only  from  member  countries of the  European 
Economic  Community.  The  company  in  question  had  a  market  share  in the  UK  of· 
approximately fifty per cent  prior to making  the  investment  and  now  has  a 
market  share of eighty to  ninety  per cent.  It was  suggested  that this  increase 
in market  share was  at the expense·of the  company's  competitors,  but  the 
employment  effects on  the other companies  in the market  could  not  be  assessed 
by  the  interviewee.  It is clear that the  company's  increase  in market  share 
was  a  result  of direct  investment  and  could  not  have  occurred without  it. 
To  conclude,  it seems  that the  investment  was  employment  creating, 
though  by  just  how  much  it is difficult to  say.  Approximately  180  jobs  seem 
to  have  been  directly created,  although  job creation will  not  in  future  be 
so  rapid.as the firm  moves  to a  more  capital  intensive technology.  Like  many 
of the case  studies we  have  considered  so  far,  it seems  that  the greatest 
threat to  employment  is technology.  In  addition,  some  jobs  in competing 
firms  in  the  UK  seem  likely to  have  been  replaced. -58-
4.6.  Case  Study  6 
Case  Study  6  concerns  a  large West  German  multinational  company  with 
a  worldwide  network  of  subsidiaries.  It has  a  range  of  products  which  include 
synthetic  leather,  oil seals,  coated fabrics  and  non-woven  textiles.  This 
case  study  relates to  a  subsidiary producing  non-woven  textiles in  Yorkshire. 
The  company's  involvement  in  this market  is considerable  and  in  1978  it 
achieved  a  worldwide  turnover of  528  million  Deutschmarks  from  this operation 
alone,  employing  a  total  of  3,500  people  in its various  subsidiaries. 
In the  subsidiary with  which  we  are concerned,  the turnover at  the  end 
of  1978  was  £15m.  and  the workforce  numbered  730  people. 
The  German  company  first  became  involved  with this  Yorkshire  subsidiary 
in  1954.  The  best  techniques  yet  available for the  production  of  non-woven 
textiles  had  been  developed  in  Germany,  but  even  so  they  found  it difficult 
to  penetrate the British market  because of the  geographical  divide  between 
production  base and  market.  They  discovered  a  company  - the  one  under 
discussion  - with  expert  knowledge  of,  and  an  established reputation  in,  the 
non-woven  textile market.  They  decided  to offer their technical  expertise to 
this company  in  return  for  a  50%  shareholding  in it.  This  infusion of  tech-
nology  led  to  an  increase  in  the  UK  market  share of the  company  to  around  65%. 
Markets  in Japan,  Australia  and  Continental  Europe  were  (and  still are)  also 
serviced  from  the  United  Kingdom. 
In  1963,  the  Group  to which  the original  UK  concern  belonged  was  taken 
over by  a  large British concern  and  the German  company  found  itself in  partner-
ship with  a  United  Kingdom  giant.  Things  never went  smoothly  in this relation-
ship,  with  each  partner finding  its own  plans frustrated  by  those  of  the  other. 
Furthermore,  the  United  Kingdom  company  in question  had  a  reputation for asset 
stripping and  not  only did this  cause  problems  and  uncertainty in  Germany,  but 
also amongst  the workforce  in the  Yorkshire  subsidiary.  In  1966  the  German 
concern  decided  to take  over the  plant  completely and  bought  out  the  United 
Kingdom  company's.  50%  shareholding.  The  subsidiary  now  produces  a  variety 
of  non-woven  textile goods. 
The  major motivating factors that  led  to the  investment  being  made  were 
the availability of factory  space  on  the  site in  question;  the desire to  have 
an  experienced manufacturer as  a  partner;  the fact  that  the area  was  a  good 
centre for the distribution of its output;  the desire to  be  in a  market  which 
was  expanding,  particularly as the  techniques available to the firm  were 
sufficiently advanced  to  ensure  success;  and  finally,  the fact  that  in  1954 
the German  firm  could  not  hope  to take  a  large  UK  market  share without  direct 
investment  because  of the  existence of tariff barriers.  No  other countries 
were  considered for this  investment  as the  potential  in the  UK  was  considered 
to  exceed  any  alternatives. 
The  investment  went  smoothly  from  the  beginning  and  there were  no 
problems  involved  in  setting  up  the  production facilities.  A break-even 
position was  achieved within  18  months  of the  plant  starting production. 
The  question  of labour difficulties,  laws,  obligations and  so  on  caused 
no  problems  because all of  these matters were  well  understood  by  the  firm  wjth 
whom  the  German  company  went  into  partnership.  Thus  the  Germans  took the 
advice of the  host  concern  in these matters and  left  labour relations to the 
UK  firm.  Labour  costs  represent  about  40%  of total costs,  which  in  turn -59-
represent  85%  of turnover.  The  question  of  labour costs did  not  worry  the 
Germans  in the  least  (particularly given  the  high  cost  of  labour in Germany) 
and  they  were  (and  are)  highly  satisfied with the productivity of their 
British labour force.  It compares  favourably  with that of any  of the 
companys  labour forces  anywhere  in the world  and  was  quoted  by  the  interviewee 
as  being  "high". 
Labour  turnover is low  (around  6%)  and  the  industrial relations record 
is "excellent"  - indeed  there  has  never  been  a  stoppage  caused  by  an  industrial 
dispute at the plant.  There is one  union  in the plant  and it is a  closed  shopJ 
this condition was  imposed  upon  the German  concern  from  the  start  by  their 
prospective partner,  but,  as  they  were  assured,  "this made  for  better,  not 
worse,  labour relations and  everyone  knew  where  they  stood".  The  unions were 
happy  to  work  with a  strong  company,  as  they  saw  this as  a  route to  expansion 
and  a  guarantee  of security. 
The  information  so  far relates to the initial  50%  investment  of  the 
German  company.  As  we  have  said,  in  1963  the  position changed.  The  Germans' 
partner was  now  a  large  UK  concern,  and  one  which  made  the  unions  uneasy,  as 
they  had  seen this company  acquire  and  sell off other firms  and  the work-
forces  become  redundant.  When,  in  1966,  the  German  company  decided  to take 
over the firm  completely the  plan  was  welcomed  with  relief by  the  unions, 
who  were  becoming  convinced  that their jobs were  in  danger.  Consequently 
the workforce  co-operated fully with  the  German  parent  and  relationships were, 
and  remain,  amicable.  The  firm  provides  security,  soci~l and  sporting 
facilities aqd  channels  of  communication  which  are easily accessible to 
everyone.  If we  accept  that the jobs of the  workforce  would  have  been  lost 
had  the  r3rman  company  not  taken  over,  then  these  jobs  can  be counted  as 
being  preserved  by  the  assumption  of total control  in  1966.  If we  look at 
the current  level  of  employment,  we  can  see that,  leaving aside the possib-
~lity of jobs  saved,  this foreign direct  investment  has  been  job  creating. 
The  possibility of exporting  to  the  UK  from  Germany  was  ruled  out  by  tariff 
barriers.  Thus  there was  little scope  for  job creation through  increasing 
exports  from  Germany.  \Ale  can  thus  rule out  the possibility that  the  invest-
ment  was  merely  employment  diverting. 
If we  look at Table  4.6.1  we  can  see  how  the  labour force  has  expanded 
since the  company  invested  in the  UK  in  1954,  broken  down  by  skill  levels and 
sex.  All  of this  labour is,  and  always  has  been,  local,  and  no  labour 
imported at any  stage,  even  when  introducing  new  technology  from  Germany. 
All  management  is local;  indeed  one  reason  the  investment  was  made  was  to 
draw  on  Yorkshire  experience  in  the textiles field.  If possible,  the  company 
will  continue  to recruit  local  personnel. 
At  the time  of the  100%  takeover  (1966)  the total  labour force was 
approximately  500,  so  that  in  addition to the  jobs preserved,  approximately 
230 further jobs  have  been  created  in  the  firm. 
Every  member  of the  labour force  undergoes  some  training and  those  who 
come  in as  unskilled  labourers  are given the opportunity to train for  semi-
skilled work.  The  firm  has  training instructors,  training operatives,  and 
at a higher level, skilled men  and  managerial  staff are  sent  on  external  courses 
to  update their skills.  The  comrany  prefers to recruit  from  within where 
possible.  It is felt  very  strongly that all members  of the  wor~forc8 should 
be  kept  informed  as to  the  impact  and  potential  of  new  technology,  both  in 
its favqurable  aspects  of widening skills,  and  its potentially  unfavourable 
effect on  employment. -60-
Table  4.6.1  Increase  in  labour force  and  manqgerial  staff since  1954 
1954  End  1978 
Male  (app.)  200  490 
Female  (app.)  100  240 
Total  (app. )  300  730 
Skilled  90  200 
Semi-skilled  180  400 
Unskilled  30  130 
Plus:  Managers  18  30 
Increase  442  --
When  the future  prospects for  employment  are  examined,  the  company 
intends to  expand  in  the  near future,  but this expanaion will  be  capital 
intensive.  The  new  technology  which  is to  be  introduced will affect total 
employment  in the  long  run,  making  some  jobs unnecessary.  However,  the 
company  intends  to  ensure that no  redundancies  occur  by  shifting the 
"displaced"  labour force  into a  new  operation  in  the  same  plant. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that thia particular foreign direct  investment 
was  in itself employment  creating and  did  not  substitute for  jobs  in the 
source  country  (Germany).  It is clear that  the great majority of  those 
taken  into  employment  came  from  a  regional  pool  of  unemployed  textile workers. 
However,  employment  has  increased  in this firm  because its shar8  of the  UK 
market  has  risen;  therefore its output  must  have  substituted to  some  extent 
for that  of  indigenous  UK  firms.  On  the other  hand,  the advanced  technology 
imported  from  the  German  parent  company  has  almost certainly  meant  that  the 
share  of the  UK  market  accounted for  by  imports  has  not  increased as  much  as 
it would  otherwise  have  done.  In  other words,  in this instance  technology 
has  had  the beneficial effect  of maintaining  employment  in the face  of  severe 
non-EEC  import  competition. -61-
4.7.  Case  Study  7 
The  seventh  Case  Study  concerns  a  company  which  manufactures  a 
specialised  product  for  industry,  .using  plastic as  an  important  input.  The 
Headquarters  of the  company  is in South  East  England.  There it employs  150 
people  and  has  a  turnover  approaching  £2  million.  It has  a  subsidiary  in 
France which  has  a  turnover  between  £~  and  £~  million. 
In  1969,  the  UK  company  set this  up  as  a  sales  subsidiary which  began 
production- or more  accurately finishing  and  installation - in  1977. 
Also  in  1069  the  company  took over its former  agent  in  Belgium,  first as 
a  sales subsidiary,which it converted  to  a  production  subsidiary in  1974. 
The  Belgian  company  was  closed  in  1978.  The  company  also closed its Dutch 
subsidiary  in  1978,  which  had  been  operating  only  a  short time. 
The  company  intended  to  become  more  competitive  by  investing  in  its 
main  market  - the  EEC.  The  product  is  one  with  a  large  "service"  element 
and  management  felt that  (i)  there were  large  barriers to export,  "too 
many  things to  go  wrong",  (ii)  they  needed  to  give  quick  service,  and 
(iii) the cost  of.exporting increased the  .,delivered  site"  price. 
A further motive was  the desire to achieve an  integrated  cross-EEC 
network  of  production  and  service  companies.  T8is  aim  was  destroyed  by  the 
recession  following  the  "oil crisis" of  1973.  Plants  in Holland  and  Belgium 
were  closed with  the  loss of  over forty  jobs  in the two,  and  production  and 
service was  concentrated  on  France.  Belgium  and  Holland  are  now  serviced  by 
licensin~ local  companies.  Ironically,  the French unit was  set  up  to  comp-
lement  the  (now  defunct)  Belgian  unit. 
A further pressure for closure  came  because the  company  found  that 
'the  Common  Market  is not  so  common"  for it was  found  that  centralising  EEC 
facilities would  not  be  successful  because  of the  desire for  local  (i.e. 
national)  facilities.  In  addition,  currency fluctuations  and  language 
difficulties  put  pressure  on  this plan  to centralise activities. 
At  the  peak  of its employment  (1977)  the  French  company  employed  30. 
Currently  15  are  employed:  10  male,  5  female,  all of  whom  are at  least  semi-
skilled installation and  service workers.  The  company  project that  employ-
mment  in the French  unit will  increase,  beginning  in  1980.  Turnover  1978-9 
in France is up  on  the previous  year,  on  a  smaller workforce. 
All  labour currently employed  was  recruited  locally and  trained  by  the 
firm.  All  management  except  the  Chief  Executive is French.  The  firm  now 
say that their policy is to  employ  entirely local managers  and to take more 
care with  labour training  - they made  some  mistakes  in  Belgium  on  this,  and 
have  revised their policy. 
The  investment  was  a  Greenfield  ventur8  (after a  sales  subsidiary  had 
been  established)  and  was  intended to  supply the  EEC  market  on  an  integrated 
basis with other units.  No  replacement  of British or other  EEC  units' 
output was  envisqged.  However,  recession  and  closure meant  that all units 
shed  labour.  It is notable that this retrenchment  was  less  severe  in the 
parent  country  (UK)  than  in the foreign  subsidiaries. -62-
Had  the  plan  been  carried through,  the  employment  effects  in  the  EEC 
would  have  been  positive,  for the firm  had  only a  small  market  share and  was 
hoping  to  improve this by  a  more  extensive  network  of  local  production and 
servicing facilities.  This  would  not  have  replaced  exports  and  employment 
from  the  UK  and  would  indeed  have .increased  UK  employment  because  components 
and finished  product  would  have  been  needed  to  supply  the other  EEC  units. 
The  effects of  recession  on  this firm  caused  retrenchment  and  reduction 
of  employment  in  the  EEC,  including  two  plant  closures.  This  has  overriden 
the  employment  creating effects of the  planned  growth,  so  that  employment 
outside  the  UK  is  now  (1979)  below  what  it was  in  1974. 
An  employment  creating plan  based  on  extension  of  production  and  service 
units in the  EEC  to  increase the firm's  small  EEC  market  share was  destroyed 
by  the  recession of the mid  1970's.  The  products  of the firm  rely on  demand 
from  factory building,  extension  and  renovation.  Their market  was  destroyed 
and  the firm  retrenched  by  closing  two  of its three foreign  units.  Possibly 
a  factor in this was  the  over ambitious  nature  of the  plan  and  the  lack of 
awareness  of the firm  that  the  EEC  is not  completely  homogeneous.  Particular 
difficulty was  encountered  in  adapting to  differences in the  laws  and  customs 
of individual  countries. -63-
4.8.  Case  Study  8 
Case  Study  8  concerns  a  UK  firm with  a  production  subsidiary set  up  in 
1962  in the Netherlands  and  sales offices  in  Belgium  and  Germany.  It manuf-
actures cooling units,  of which  a  major  part is plastic.  Its 1978  turnover 
in the  UK  was  £3  million and  the  number  employed  450;  in the  Netherlands 
70  were  employed  and  turnover was  £1.2  million.  Each  of the  non-UK  sales 
and  production  units  service only their national  markets.  Nearly all prod-
uction is sold within the  EEC. 
The  firm  invested  in the Netherlands  in  1962,  leasing a  small  factory. 
In  1964  it moved  to  a  larger factory  nearby.  The  major motivations  for 
investing in the  Netherlands  were  (i)  that the firm then  faced  a  17~% duty 
on  its products,  and  (ii)  the  "irritations of  exporting",  e.g.  damage  in 
transit and  missing  delivery dates.  In  addition,  the  sales staff in the 
Netherlands  wanted  the firm to manufacture  there  and  the  labour costs at  the 
time  (including  social  security costs)  were  low.  The  investment  was  of the 
Greenfield  Horizontal  type,  although the full  process  of  production  was  not 
carried out  in the  Netherlands  for all products.  There  was  therefore a 
vertical  "finishing"  element  also,  with  components  supplied  from  the  UK. 
The  firm  paid  a  high  investment  premium  onthe  foreign  exchange required 
for the  investment  in accordance with British exchange  control  practice at 
the time. 
The  investment  was  not  as  successful  as  had  been  hoped  - the  Dutch  unit 
did not  generate  sufficient business.  Rising  labour costs and  social  costs 
(estimat'3d  at  over two  thirds of the wage  rate  by  the firm)  plus difficulties 
in attracting skilled  labour made  the  plant  less  competitive than  had  been 
hoped.  The  decision was  therefore taken  to  contract  operations  in  the 
Netherlands  gradually.  Total  labour costs  were  a  vital  element  in this 
decision.  The  firm felt that the general  productivity  of  labour was  lower 
in  the  Netherlands  than  in the  UK:  "the British workforce  knocks  spots off 
our  Dutch  people".  The  firm  had  to  double its direct  labour costs to cover 
the other costs of  employment  in the Netherlands. 
The  employment  in the Netherlands  is shown  in  Figure 4.8.1. 
Figure 4.8.1.  Employment  in  the  Netherlands 
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From  a  peak of over  80  in  1968~  the employment  has  fallen  to  70  (end 
1978)  and  is projected to decline further. 
Local  labour was  trained  internally~  but  this training  programme  has 
been  abandoned  with the  reduction  in  the  workforce.  All  local  management 
(2  people)  were  recruited  locally ·and  the firm felt that this was  a  mistake 
- they felt that  local  management  had  not  represented their interests at 
all well  and  that they  should  have  employed  a  Briton  as  General  Manager  with 
a  local  man  assisting  him. 
The  plant  in the Netherlands  replaced  very little of the  previous 
exports to that  country.  The  firm is mainly  a  contract  supplier.  The  UK 
firm's  plan  for the  Dutch  unit is to convert it into a  sales  unit  (like 
Germany  and  Belgium).  The  entry of Britain  into the  EEC  is a  major factor 
in this decision.  As  the  product  is labour intensive,  rising  labour costs 
in  the  Netherlands  have  made  production  uneconomic  (when  compared  to the  UK). 
The  firm is gradually replacing  labour with  capital as  an  intermediate  stage 
in its long-term plan  to move  to  sales  only. 
This  investment,  to  manufacture  behind  a  tariff wall,  with  comparatively 
cheap  labour,  was  undermined  by  Britain's entry into the  EEC  and  the relative 
rates  of  change  in  labour costs.  The  firm  would  not  now  manufacture  in  the 
EEC  outside its home  base  but  would  prefer to  have  sales units  plus exports 
from  the  UK.  The  effect  of the  investment  on  EEC  employment  was  at first 
positive  (1962-1968/9)  but  the  increased costs  in  the Netherlands  and 
expansion  of the  EEC  have  reduced  the viability of this  employment,  which 
has  been  falling  since its peak of 1968/9.  Some  employment  in the  UK  will 
be  substituted for the future fall  in  Dutch  employment  but  the overall 
employment  in the  EEC  by  this firm will  decline as it is moving  over to 
more  capital  intensive techniques  and  to the centralisation of  production 
in the  UK,  supported  by  sales units  in  other  EEC  countries. 
The  employment  effects observed  in this case were  the result of two 
important  pressures  - (i)  the  need  to  substitute capital for  labour to 
maintain  competitiveness;  and  (ii)  the  need  to  concentrate  production  in 
order to  benefit  from  economies  of  scale.  This is consistent  with the 
theory that,  in  a  unified market,  firms  will  seek to derive maximum 
advantage  through  a  single plant  of minimum  efficient  scale. -65-
s.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
5.1.  Preamble 
This  study  has  been  concerned  with the estimation of  employment  creation 
arising  from  investment  by  EEC  firms  outside their home  country.  The  sector 
chosen  to  study these effects was  the plastics and  synthetics industry.  This 
was  chosen for the reasons mentipned  in  the  introductioR  plus the fact that 
the industry displays an  average  level  of foreign  involvement  compared  to 
other manufacturing  sectors.  For  example~  in a  ranking  of  industrial  sectors 
classified according  to the  level  of foreign  involvement  in  France~  plastics 
and  synthetics were  close to  being  the  median~  both  in terms  of  number  of 
employees  and  sales.  Clearly~  concentration  on  one  industry restricts the 
general  applicability of our  conclusions~  but  has  the merit  of  reducing  inter-
industry variability. 
5.2.  The  Motivation for Foreign  Direct  Investment  within the  EEC 
Several  general  themes  are apparent  in the motivation to  invest  in other 
EEC  countries.  The  case studies  show  that  managers  consider the alternative to 
foreign direct  investment  to  be  the  loss of markets  and  of export  opportunities. 
This is reinforced  by  the more  positive desires to  provide a  more  effective 
service to clients by  being  in close proximity to  them;  to cater for  local 
purchasing  preferences;  and  to adapt fully to  local  specifications and 
standards.  An  additional  factor~  which  may  arise from  the choice of  industry~ 
is the  high  cost  of  transporting~ warehousing  and  insurance  in relation to 
the value of the  product.  Fluctuations in foreign  exchange  rates  between 
European  countries  have  also· pr8vided  an  extra barrier to attempts to  compete 
through  £~ports in the  EEC  market  as  a  whole.  In  essence~  foreign  direct 
investment  is felt to  be  necessary to effective competition  in terms  of price 
and  quality of  service. 
5.3.  Transfer of Technology 
Multinational  companies  are  majo~ vehicles for the international transfer 
of technology.  Technology  can  be  transferred  internationally in  various 
degrees  of  "embodiment"  - via the export  of technology  intensive  goods~  via 
licensing~  and  embodied  in the  production  process as direct foreign  investment. 
No  general  pattern  emerges  from  the case  studies as  regards the effects 
of the transfer of technology  in foreign direct  investment.  Neverthel~ss,  in 
common  with  many  other sectors of  manufactu~ing  industry~  the plastics and 
synthetics  sector is becoming  increasingly capital  intensive~  because of the 
embodiment  of advances  in technology.  A useful  distinction can  here  be  made 
between  product  innovation and  process innovation.  Additional  increases  in 
employment  may  arise from  the  stimulus to the  level  of activity given  by  the 
introduction of  new  technology  in  (i)  increasing  demand  by  extending  the 
product  range  (product  innovation)  and  (ii)  lowering  production.costs  (process 
innovation).  However,  innovation  in the production  process  may  result directly 
in a  fall  in  employment  because  of substitution of capital for  labour. 
Examples  of these contradictory  effects of technological  advance  are  (i)  the 
saving  of  jobs  in the face  of  import  competition  in  Case  Study  6  and  (ii) 
increased capital  intensity reducing  employment  in  Case  Study  3.  In many  of 
the cases  studied  the  "new  product  effect"  is a  noticeable  char~cteristic of 
the foreign  direct  investment  in creating  employment  directly~  but it is 
apparent  that  through the  impact  of  new  technology~  old  products are  sometimes 
replaced  with  ~  consequent  loss of jobs.  Such  an  effect is difficult to meas-
ure. -66-
The  effects of technology  on  skill levels areconsidered  in  5.7 below. 
5.4.  The  employment  market  situation and the direct  employment 
effect  of foreign  direct  investment 
Our  case  studies found  that the  employment  market  situation was  a  more 
important  influence on  investment  decisions  in the larger firms  than  the 
smaller ones.  Large  firms  are more  sensitive to  labour cost differentials 
across the  EEC  than  are  smaller firms. 
An  ILO  study of the direct  employment  effect  of foreign direct  investment 
on  the source  country  found  that this was  more  often  positive than  negative. 1 
Our  findings  are similar.  Very  few  production jobs were  lost in the  source 
country  as  a  result of foreign  investment  and  supporting technical  jobs were 
often created in the  source country to  service the foreign  investment. 
In the eight  case studies,  reorganisation  and  rationalisation  has  been 
introduced gradually and  there  have  been  no  significant wholesale transfers 
of production  internationally.  Case  Study  8  illustrates the slow run  down 
of  employment  involved  in cutting down  a  foreign  production  unit after 
recession  and  retrenchment;  Case  Study  3,  the reorganisation and  reduction 
of  employment  after a  take-over. 
The  nature  of  integration within the firm  is important  in determining 
employment  effects.  Increased  EEC  market  integration appears  to  increase 
functional  or vertical  integration  but  to  decrease  horizontal  integration. 
Case  Study  8  is an  example  of  the  removal  of tariff barriers leading to 
a  centralisation of  production,  closure of  plants and  reduction of  host 
country  employment. 
On  balance,  the  estimated direct  effect  on  EEC  employment  in  each  case 
is shown  in  Table  5.4.1.  Case  Studies  2  3nd  3  have  had  very  small  direct 
effects,  one  positive,  one  negative.  In  Case  Study  7,  attempts  to  increase 
employment  were  defeated  by  recession,  and  Case  Study  8  had  negative direct 
effects.  For the  period after the  UK  joined the  EEC  the other cases  had 
a  direct  employment  creating effect,  taking  the  EEC  as  a  whole. 
5.5.  Indirect  Employment  Effects 
In addition to direct,  or internal,  employment  effects,  foreign  direct 
investment  has  employment  implications  external  to the investing firm. 
Indirect  positive effects on  employme~ in the  host  country  can  arieg from 
subcontracting,  transport,  demand  for  services,  for marketing facilities, 
for  Government  infrastructure,  from  construction expenditure  and  from 
re-investment  of funds  received  as  a  result of a  takeover  by  a  foreign 
entrant.  Negative  effects can arise from  displacement  of  local  producers 
by  foreign  investors. 
A study of  Dutch  based  multinational  enterprises found  that  establishing 
a  foreign  subsidiary creates  2  to  3  indirect jobs for  each  job in the  sub-
sidiary,  mainly  in the  supply  and  service sectors.2  This  estimate,  from  the 
)ILO  "Socjal  and  labour practices of  some  European-based  multinationals  in the 
metal  trades"  Geneva  1978. 
2Netherlands  Ministry of  Economic  Affairs  "Survey of  a  Number  of  Dutch-based 
multinational  enterprises conducted  by  the  Netherlands  Government",  The 
Hague,  1976,  p.21. I 
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TABLE  5.4.1  Estimated  Direct  Employment  Effects  ofSample  Firms 
on  overall  EEC  Employment 
Source  Subsidiary  Estimated  Direct  Effect 
Case  Country  Examined  on  EEC  Employment 
1  UK  Germany  &  France  Positive 
2  UK  Germany  Positive,  but  small 
3  Ireland  UK  Negative,  but  small 
4  UK  Ireland  & 
The  Net her  lands  Positive 
5  Germany  UK  Positive 
6  Germany  UK  Positive 
7  UK  France  Overcome  by  Effects 
of Recession 
8  UK  The  Netherlands  Negative after UK 
entry to  EEC 
Source:  See  Case  Studies Section 4  above -68-
companies  themselves,  is likely to overstate  such  effects.  These multiplier 
effects clearly depend  on  the nature of the  investment  and  the  level of 
activity and  economic  climate in  the  host  country. 
Attempts to estimate indirect  employment  effects of  intra-EEC  invest-
ment  are fraught  with  difficulties.  Estimates from  companies  themselves are 
liable to be  non-objective  and  based  on  imcomplete  information.  In certain 
cases,  we  have  been  able to arrive at tentative conclusions  on  the existence 
of the displacement  effect,  e.g.  in Case  Study  6 it was  suggested that  non-
EEC  imports  rather than  domestic  UK  production  had  been  largely replaced, 
whilst  in  Case  Study  5  displacement  of  competing  domestic  UK  firms  was 
likely. 
In  examining  the  evidence  on  the indirect  employment  creation effects 
of the  sample  investments,  arising from  purchases  of goods  and  services  in 
the  host  country  as  input,  we  find  that this effect is much  less  than  in  the 
Dutch  study  and  that  even  a  1:1  relationship of direct : indirect jobs created 
exaggerates  the effect. 
In the  Irish Republic,  approximately  5%  of the total  value of  production 
in the  plastics industry is represented  by  goods  and  services  provided  locally. 
Admittedly,  this sector represents the smallest first-round  linkage effect  of 
five  sectors  examined  (Food,  Textiles,  Metals  and  Engineering,  Plastics and 
Chemicals);  but  the average first-round  linkage effect  was  only  13%  of the 
value  of final  output. 1  We  would  recommend  the  extension  of this  approach 
to the  study of the effects of multinationals  on  the  employment  market  in 
other industries and  countries.  Similarly,  foreign  owned  firms  have  a  higher 
import  content  than  local firms,  which  accounts for the Jow level of the  second-
round  linkage effects.  Extension of this to our  study requires the division 
of inputs  between  EEC  and  non-EEC  purchases,  as  we  are concerned with the 
overall  employment  effect  on  the  community.  As  well  as  foreign  ownership, 
size also  exerted  a  significant  influence on  input  purchasing  in  Ireland 
- the  larger firms  of  both foreign  and  Irish ownership  exhibiting a  tendency 
to  import  a  higher  proportion of inputs.2 
5.6.  Closures  and  Job Security 
In  only  one  of the  companies  studied  has  there  been  complete closure 
of a  foreign  subsidiary within the  EEC  (Case  Study  7).  Our  evidence 
suggests that multinationals make  strenuous  efforts to avoid  layoffs.  A 
good  example  of this is Company  8  which,  in the face  of  severe trading 
difficulties,  has  adopted  a  strategy of  gr~dual reduction  of  bmployment 
rather than  abrupt  closure.  This  is particularly noteworthy  in what  has 
been,  for the plastics industry,  a  period of considerable adversity following 
successive  increases in the  price of oil.  In these circumstances,  it is 
significant that  the positive effects on  employment  detailed  in  the case 
lPeter J.  Buckley  "Some  Aspects  of Foreign  Private  Investment  in the Manuf-
acturing Sector of the Irish Republic",  Economic  and  Social  Review, 
Vol.5  No.3,  April  1974. 
2Buckley  op.cit.  and  D.  McAleese  "A  Profile of Grant-Aided  Industry in 
Ireland",  Industrial  Development  Authority,  Dublin  1977. -69-
studies  have  been  maintained.  The  firms~  however~ clearly recognise that 
they are subject to the  influence of  exogenous  factors  and that  employment 
levels cannot  therefore be guaranteed.  The  more  successful  firms  in the 
sample still forecast  increasing  levels of employment  in the.EEC  in the 
medium  term. 
We  cannot  generalise from  the experience of the plastics and  synthetics 
industry to industry as a  whole.  In certain sectors of industry the effects 
of foreign  investments  on  employment  are not  necessarily lasting.  The 
experience of the textiles  indu~try,  especially in  Bel~ium,  is an  example. 
A study  by  D.  van  den  Bulkel  of disinvestment  by  foreign multinationals  as 
measured  by  loss of  employment  showed  that  betwt:len  1960  and  1977,  107,378 
jobs were  lost  because  of  plant closures or collective layoffs in  Belgian 
industry.  Twenty  per cent  were  a  result  of decisions  by  foreign  owned 
companies  in Belgium.  Approximately  60%  of the total  employment  loss 
originating in foreign multinational  corporations  in  Belgium  was  in  other 
EEC  owned  multinational  companies,  and  half of  that  was  due  to  Dutch  dis-
investment  alone,  mainly  in textiles and  clothing. 
A study of  plant  closures in  W.  Germany  1972-752  revealed  that  less 
than  1%  of the total  number  of  plants closed  in  that  period  were  foreign-
owned  enterprises - a  total of 28  plants.  Of  these,  only  6  companies  orig-
inated  from  other  EEC  member  states.  The  loss of  employment  resulting from 
intra-EEC  disinvestment  was  less than  1%  of the total  loss of jobs through 
plant  closures in  West  Germany  1972-75.  This  is consistent  with  the results 
of  a  study  of closure in  the  Irish Republic3  which,  contrary to widespread 
belief,  showed  that multinational corporations do  not  constitute an  unstable 
element  ~-~•  the  host  country,  but  that  the  host  country  environment  is more 
relevant  to their performance than  nationality of ownership. 
5.7.  Skills,  training and  the  structure of  employment 
The  transfer of technology  through foreign  direct  investment  is a 
critical factor  in  determining  the structure of  employment  in the firm.  In 
common  with the  experience of other industries,  there is no  evidence  from  our 
case  studies to  suggest  that  the multinationals adapt  their own  technology  to 
the available  supply of  labour.  But  whereas it is the  norm  for multinationals 
to train  labour for the utilisation of their existing technology,  the plastics 
and  synthetics  industry  employs  an  above  average  proportion of  semi-skilled 
and  unskilled  labour.  Consequently,  skilled  employment  provision is limited 
and  systematic  training of  labour  is restricted in  scope. 
At  managerial  level ,  the tendency is to train  local  personnel  to  replace 
expatriates,  but it was  noticeable that  very little transfer of management 
from  the  subsidiary to the  parent  company  took  place  except  on  a  short  term 
basis for training.  Other  short  term transfers  involv8d  technical and  supar-
visory workers  and  those directly involved  in  setting  up  a  new  operation 
(mainly middle management). 
lo.  van  den  Bulke  op.cit.  p.38f. 
2sunderministerium  fUr  Arbeit  und  Sozialordung  (20) 
3McAleese  and  Counahan  op.cit.  (74) -70-
5.8.  Other' labour issues 
Our  interviews  showed  that,  although major  decisions  on  investment  flows 
and  financing  are taken  by  the parent,  local  management  exercises a  large 
measure  of  autonomy  in respect  of.wage  bargaining  and  conditions of  employment 
and that these are  significantly affected by  local  circumstances.  Recruitment 
of management  for  subsidiaries is also the  prerogative of the  parent  company 
although  a  definite prefererce for the appointment  of,  or if possible, 
promotion of,  local  nationals  was  apparent  in most  cases. 
Labour  turnover appears  to  be  primarily determined  by  local  employment 
conditions.  Generdlly,  labour  turnover  in  our  sample  of firms  is  low  but 
in the one  instance where  this was  definitely  not  t~e case,  the rate of 
turnover  had  influenced  the  expansion  path  of the firm,  by  causing it to 
subdivide its activities between  two  separate plants  (Case  Study  5). 
The  whole  spectrum of  company  attitudes to  Trade  Unions  was  evidenced 
in  our  sample.  At  the one  extreme  (Case  Study  3),  the firm  involved  the 
Trade  Unions  before making  a  decision to  invest  in  a  particular country, 
with  a  view to  securing guarantees  on  all aspects  of  labour relations. 
At  the other  extreme  (Case  Study  2)  the firm  based  its strategy on  avoiding 
the recruitment  of  organised  labour.  In  general,  the larger firms  at  least 
prefer to  work  with  established Trade  Unions.  The  attitude of multinationals 
towards the recognition of Trade  Unions  is an  important  issue for the Trade 
Unions  themselves  and  further  investigation of this problem  could  usefully 
incorporate their views  as well  as  thos~ of  the companies. 
5.9.  Implications for Government  Policy 
A clear implication for  Government  policy arises with regard to the 
investment  incentives offered to attract industry  in the various  member 
countries.  Without  exception,  in the cases  studied,  such  incentives were 
not  the overriding  determinant  in the  investment  decision.  Where  such 
incentives were  offered,  they were  generally regarded  as  a  bonuso  Of  more 
importance  were  the  need  for  a  market  presence,  cost  factors  and  the  local 
employment  market  conditions.  Doubts  have  been  expressed  about  the  permanence 
of the  employment  created  in response  to  investment  incentives alone.  Rising 
unemployment  is  in danger  of  causing  Governments  to  adopt  "beggar-my-neighbour" 
policies with  regard  to  such  subsidies,  which  may  lead to  only  temporary 
increases  in  employment. 
The  implicationsfor competition  policy appear to  be  that the opportunity 
costs of  preventing  a  firm's  "preferred"  investment  should  be  carefully 
evaluated.  It  seems  that the alternative to  a  foreign  direct  investment  may 
not  be  a  home  investment  plus  exports  but  in  some  cases  no  investment at all. 
In other words,  foreign direct  investment  and  domestic  investment  are far 
from  being  perfect  substitutes.  Our  study also  indicates the  need  for  a  more 
detailed investigation of  the relative implications of greenfield versus 
takeover  investments for  employment.  The  employment  creating effect of a 
takeover can  be  as  significant  as those  of a  greenfield  development,  partic-
ularly where  the infusion of  new  technology  strengthens the  taken-over 
company's  product-market  position.  A wider  investigation is necessary to 
establish the circumstances  which  determine  such  an  outcome. -71-
Data~  at  a  macro  level~  on  intra-EEC direct foreign  investment  are 
inadequate.  Even  where  such  data  exist~  there is a  lack of consistency 
between  member  countries.  This  basic deficiency means  that any  implications 
one might  seek to  draw  on  the effects of  such  investment  in  terms  of  employ-
ment~  value  added~  wages  and  salaries etc.  are necessarily circumscribed. 
This  has  the obvious  implication that data  collection at a  macro  level  needs 
to  be  undertaken  much  more  systematically~  preferably on  a  community-wide 
basis.  It also  means~  as our pilot investigation  shows,  that many  of the 
issues we  have  touched  upon  can  only  be  dealt  with at  present  by  a  much  more 
broadly based  investigation at  the  level  of individual  enterprise.  In 
addition this  should  enable cross-industry comparisons to  be  made. APPENDIX  I  - QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX  I  - QUESTIONNAIRE 
CX>.MPANY  SIZE  1978/79 
.. 
EMPlOYEES  TURNOVER 
PARENI' 
SUBSIDIARY  ................................ 
SUBSIDIARY  ................................ 
SUBSIDIARY  ................................ 
SUBSIDIARY  ................................ 
SUBSIDIARY  ................................ THE  EFFECTS  OF  INTRA-E.E.C.  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  ON  EMPLOYMENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION  I  - PRODUCTS  AND  INVESTMENTS 
1.  In what  years and  in which  E.E.C.  country(ies)  did you  begin  production? 
2.  Which  markets  do  each of these investments  serve?  (N.B.  Worldwide?) 
3.  Arc  all these investments still in operation? 
If NO  to 3 
4.  tww  long  did this investment  (these investments)  operate? 
5.  Why  was  this investment  (were  these investments)  closed? 6.  Will  you  give me  a  general description of your  current~products 
~anufactured by  your plants within  th~ E.E.C.? 
THE  FOLLOWING  QUESTIONS  WILL  HAVE  TO  BE  ASKED  OF  EACH  INVESTMENT 
SECTION  2  - MOTIVATION 
7.  What  was  the  single most  important'factor that  led your firm to 
set up  production facilities in  •••••••••••••••••••  ? 
8.  Will  you  now  tell me  what  subsidiary factors were  important  in 
that  venture? 
9.  Oidyou  consider any  alternative country(ies)  for the investment? 
(If NO  go  to 12) 
If YES  to  9 
10.  Which  country(ies)? 
.. j 
i 
I 
t  f. 
I 
14.  Why  did you  choose to invest in •••••••••••••••••••••••  rather than 
any  of the  oth~rs you  considered? 
ASK  IF  NOT  ALREADY  MENTIONED  IN  7,  8 or 11 
12.  Did  you  investigate the possibility of Government  inducements 
to invest  in  ••••••••••••••••••  ~.? 
13.  Were  any  such. :f.nducements  offered? 
14.  Did  you  take  up  these inducements? 
15.  How  important a  part did they  play in your decision to invest 
in •••••••••••••••••••••••••••  ? 
SECTION  3  - PROBLEMS 
16.  What  was  the major  problem that you  encounted in setting up  production 
facilities in  •••••••••••••••••••••••w•? 11.  Were  there any  other significant problems? 
18.  How  were  these problems  overcome? 
SECTION  4  LABOUR  (GENERAL) 
19.  Did  you  investigate the Labour  Laws,  statutory conditions of 
employment  etc.  in  ·····················~~? 
.  .  :  .. -=-
20~  Did  your findings  influence your  decision to invest  in······~·~········ 
in any  -v.1ay? 
21.  What  proportion of total costs are represented  by  labour costs 
in  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I? 
22.  How  important  w~s the question of labour costs in your decision 
to invest in  ····~·······•••••••••••? 
23.  \tlas  the general  productivity of labour in .  .............. .  investigated? 
I' 
• 24.  Was  labour turnover in  •••••••••••••••••••••  considered in your 
decision to invest there? 
25.  Was  the industrial relations  record investigated? 
26.  Was  the degree of unionisation investigated in  •••••••••••••  ~ ••• ? 
27.  Did  you  consult the relevant trades  unions  in 
before you  made  the investment?  .  ................ . 
2~.  What  was  the  unions attitude to your proposed  investment? 
29.  How  co-operative did you  find the  labour force? 
30.  TOTAL  EMPLOYED 
Male  Female 
1)  When  you  started production 
in •••••••••••••••••••• 
ii)  End  1978 
iii)  Projected End  1950 
.. 
Total 31.  Of which  Skilled  %,  Semi-skilled  %  Unskilled.  -------- ------ ------
32.  DQ  you  employ  any  guest  labour?  (i.e.  Non-E.E.C.  nationals) 
If YES  to  32 
33.  What  proportion of your total  labour force is  'guest'? 
.  .. 
34.  Did  you  'import'  any  labour from  your other plants? 
If YES  to  34 
SS.  How  much? 
36.  What  skill level? 
37.  Were  they replaced  in the plants from  where  they came? 
38.  Ojd  you  train local  laboJJr? 
39.  Do  you  have  an  ongoing 'training scheme  foi  ne~t recruits? 40.  What  proportion of the present  labour force is local(1)  and  what 
proportion imported? 
41.  Do  you  have  expansion  plans in the near future? 
42.  Where  do  you  intend to recruit your  labour from  to facilitate · 
this expansion? 
' 
SECTION  5  MANAGEMENT  (GENERAL) 
43.  Did  you  intend recruiting local management·  personnel? 
44.  How  many  local managers.did  you  recruit in Year  1? 
45.  ~Jhat  proportion of total management  did that  represent? 
46.  tbw  many  local managers  do  you  employ  now? 
. 
47.  What  proportion o-t  total management  does  this represent? I 
t, 
i  48.  Do  you  intend to recruit  local management  personnel  in the future? 
... 
49.  Do  you  have  a  scheme  for training managers? 
50.  Do  you  prefer to recruit  experienced personnel? 
51.  Who  has  responsibility·for recruiting  1)  ..  management? 
ii)  labour? 
SECTION  6  TYPE  OF  INVESTMENT 
52.  Was  your investment  in  ••••••••••••••••••••••••  a)  a  takeover of an 
existing plant or was  it b)  a  totally new  production  unit? 
. 53.  Wns  th~ plant  producing similar finished  goods  es  you  \otero  producing 
elsewhere? 
54.  Did  the products  from  this plant  represent an  extension of the  range 
of your products? 
55.  Was  this plant  producing  components  required for the types of finished 
goods  that you  were  already producing? 
• QUESTIONNAIRE  APPENDIX  I 
SECTION  1  GREENFIELD  HORIZONTAL  - INVESTMENT 
(N.B.  - Re-establish which  market  this plant  services) 
56.  Had  you  previously  supplied this market  through exports? 
(If NO  go  to 62) 
If VES  to  56 
57.  From  which  of your other plants  had  you  been  servicing markets 
now  supplied from  this plant? 
58.  What  was  the effect of this investment  on  the production  in the 
plant(s)  from  which  you  had  been  previously servicing these 
markets? 
59.  What  proportion of  exports were  replaced in  Year  1  in  each of 
these markets? 
SO.  What  proportion of these markets  are serviced through exports 
from  any  of your other plants  now? 
61.  Is it expected that  exports will  be  entirely supplanted  by 
direct  production? 62.  Was  this market  serviced totally by  other E.E.C.  companies? 
(If  NO  go  to 67) 
If YES  to  62 
63.  Prior to making  this investment,  had  you  anticipated an 
expansion  in the  market? 
64.  What  share of these markets  did  you  have  before thenvestment? 
65.  What  share of the market  do  you  have  now? 
66.  Has  this growth  been  at the  expense  of your competitors? 
67.  Before your  investment.  what  proportion of the  market  was 
serviced  by  imports  from  outside the  E.E.C.? 
68.  What  proportion of the market  was  serviced  by  Non-E.E.C.  imports 
in  Year  1  of your investment? 
69.  What  proportion of the market  is serviced  by  non-E.E.C.  imports  now? 70.  Do  you  anticipate a  decline in  Non-E.E.C.  produced  goods  in this market? 
SECTION  2  GREENFIELD  HORIZONTAL  LABOUR 
71.  What  type of technology did  you  employ  in this direct  investment? 
(N.B.  need  to elicit reponses  in terms  of  K or L intensity) 
72.  Was  labour readily available to facilitate immediate  production? 
78.  How  many  of your  own  employees  did  you  use to set  up  the plant? 
74.  How  many  of these jobs were  permanent? 
75.  Could  you  estimate  how  many  people  were  employed  in the construction 
of your  plant? 
76.  What  proportion of your skilled  labour force did  you  'import'  from 
your other plants when  this investment  became  fully operational? 77.  What  proportion of the skilled labour was  local? 
78.  Did  they  come  from  other  fi~s? 
79.  What  proportion of your semi-skilled  labour force did  you  'import' 
from  your other plants when  this investment  became  fully operational? 
80.  What  proportion of the  semi-skilled  labour was  local? 
81.·  Did  these come  from  other firms? 
82.  What  proportion of your present  labour force is skilled?· 
83.  What  proportion of this skilled labour is  'imported'? 
84.  What  proportion of this skilled labour is local? 
85.  Did  this labour come  from  other firms  in the area? SECTION  3  GREENFIELD  HORIZONTAL  - MANAGEMENT 
86.  Did  you  use  members  of your existing management  team to get 
your new  investment  functioning? 
87.  Where  were  these managers  transferred from? 
88.  Were  they replaced there? 
89.  Did  you  recruit any  local management  personnel  initially? 
90.  Do  you  recruit  local management  personnel  now? 
91.  Where  do  you  recruit them  from? QUESTIONNAIRE  APPENDIX  II 
SECTION  1  GREENFIELD  VERTICAL 
56.  Why  did you  Teel the  need  to  produce  your  own  components? 
57.  Where  had  these  components  been  supplied from  before  you  began 
to  produce  them  yourselves? 
58.  What  proportion of your previous supplier's output  would  you 
estimate your  business accounted for? 
59.  Could  you  say whether or not  the  loss of your  business  has  had 
any  significant effect  upon  your previous supplier(s)? 
60.  Has  the ability to produce  your own  components  led to an  expansion 
of the production of finished  goods  in  your other plants? 
SECTION  2  GREENFIELD  VERTICAL  - LABOUR 
If YES  to  60 
61.  Has  this  led to an  increase  in your  labour force  in your other plants? 
............. 'lit_ .  ·-- -- -· 
62.  By  what  amount? 
63.  What  type of technology did  you  employ  in this direct investment? 
(N.B.  Need  to elicit responses  in terms of K or L intensity) 
64.  Was  labour readily available to facilitate immediate  production? 
65.  How  many  of your own  employees  did  you  use to set  up  the plant? 
66.  How  many  of these jobs were  permanent?  · 
67.  Could  you  estimate  how  many  people  were  employed  in the construction 
of your plant? 
68,  What  proportion of your skilled labour force did you  'import• 
from  your other plants when  this investment  became  fully operational? 
69.  What  proportion of the skilled  labour was  local? 
70.  Did  they  come  from  other firms? 71.  ~hat proportion of your semi-skilled  labour force  did you 
'import'  from  your other plants when  this investment  became 
fully operational? 
72.  What  proportion of the semi-skilled  labour was  local? 
73.  Did  these  come  from  other firms? 
74.  What  proportion of your present  labour force is skilled? 
75.  What  proportion of this skilled labour is  'imported'? 
76.  What  proportion of this skilled labour is local? 
77.  Did  this  labour come  from  other firms  in the area? 
SECTION  3  GREENFIELD  VERTICAL  - MANAGEMENT 
78.  Did  you  use  members  of your existing management  team to get  your 
investment  functioning? 
79.  Where  were  these managers  transferred from? 80~  Were  they replaced there? 
81.  Did  you  rec~uit any  local management  personnel initially? 
82.  Do  you  recruit  local management  personnel  now? 
83.  Where  do  you  recruit them  from? QUESTIONNAIRE  APPENDIX  III 
SECTION  1  TAKEOVER  HORIZONTAL 
56.  Did  this plant previously belong to a  competitor? 
If NO  go  to 59.· 
If YES  to 56 
57.  Which  markets  do  you  intend to service from  this plant? 
58.  How  had  you  previously serviced these markets? 
59.  Why  did  you  want  to enter this market? 
---
60.  Could  you  have  serviced this market  from  any  .of  your other plants? 
61.  Has  the plant expanded  since you  took over? 
62.  Do  you  anticipate an  expansion  in the future? 
... 
.. . 
63.  Did  you  modify  the plant in any  way? 
·. 
• (N.B.  Modern  technology,  Effects on  K/L  Ratio) 
SECTION  2  - TAKEOVER  HORIZONTAL  - LABOUR 
64.  How  many  people were  employed  in  •••••••••••••••  when  you  took over? 
• 
65.  What  is the current  labour force? 
66.  Do  you  anticipate an  expansion  in this number? 
67.  Di~ you  transfer any  labour from  your other plants to  •••••••••••••••••  ? 
If YES  to 87  .· 
68.  Was  this labour replaced? 
69.  What  proportion of the  labour force was  skilled when  you  took over? 
70.  What  proportion is skilled now? ,. 
71.  Did  you  train local  labour? 
If NO  to 11 
72.  Where  did this skilled labour come  from? 
SECTION  3  - TAKEOVER  HORIZONTAL  MANAGEMENT 
73.  Were  you  satisfied with the management  in ••••••••••••••••••  when 
you  took over? 
-··--
74.  Did  you  replace any  of the management? 
I  e 
If  YES  to 74  • 
75.  Where  did the replacements  come  from? 
76.  Did  you  increase the number  of management  personnel? 
If YES  to 76 
77.  Where  did these  people  come  from? 
.. ( 
78.  Did  you  regrade  ~ny of the management  personnel? 
79.  Do  you  have  a  management  training scheme? 
..• --• 
QUESTIONNAIRE  APPENDIX  IV 
-SECTION  1  TAKEOVER  VERTICAL 
56.  Had  this plant  belonged to a  previous  supplier? 
If NO  to  56 
57.  Where  had  you  been  supplied from  previously? 
58.  Had  your business made  up  a  large part of your previous 
supplier's output? 
59.  Why  did  you  feel the  need  to produce your own  components? 
60.  Did  you  expand  production  at  •••••••••••••••••••  ? 
61.  How  many  of your plants do  you  supply with  components  from  ••.•••••••••• ? 
If Not  All  in Answer  to  61 
62.  Where  do  your other supplies  come  from? 63.  Are  you  satisfied with these ·suppliers? 
64.  Have  you  any  plans to take over any  other plants for component 
production? 
65.  Did  you  modify  the  pl~nt in any  way? 
(N.B.  Newer  technologyJ  Effect  on  K/L  Ratio) 
SECTION  2  TAKEOVER  VERTICAL  - LABOUR 
66.  How  many  peopl~ were  emplo~ed in ,,,  •••••••••••••  when  you  took over? 
67.  What  is the current  labour force? 
68.  Do  yo~ anticipate an  ~xpansion in this number? 
69.  Did  you  tr~n~fer any  labour from  your other plants to  •••••••····~·····? 
If YES  to 69 
70.  Was  this labour replaced? 
• 
' 71.  What  proportion of the  labour force  was  skilled when  you  took over? 
72.  What  proportion is skilled now? 
73.  Did  you  train local  labour? 
If NO  to  73 
74.  Where  dtd this  s~illed labour come  from? 
SECTION  3  - TAKEOVER  VERTICAL  - MANAGEMENT 
75.  Were  you  satisfied with the management  in  •••••••••••••••••••  when 
you  took over? 
76,  Did  you  replace any  of the management? 
If YES  to  7-6 
77.  Where  did the  replacements  come  from? 78.  Did  you  increase the  number  of management  per~onnel? 
If YES  to  78 
79.  Where  did  these  p~ople come  from? 
80.  Did  you  regrade any  of the management  personnel? 
81.  Oo  you  have  a  management  training  scheme? PROGRAMME  OF  RESEARCH  AND  ACTIONS  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  LABOUR  MARKET 
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Communities (1)  R.  AGLION 
"French  policy and  American  investments  in  France" 
California Management  Review,  14(4),  Summer  1972,  p.  94-102 
Argues  that  US  investment  has  had  beneficial  effects on  France. 
(2)  T.  AGMON  and  C.P.  KINDLEBERGER 
"Multinationals from  Small  Countries" 
M.I.T.  Press,  Cambridge,  1977,  219  p. 
Includes  a  case  study of France as  a  Host  to Small-Country Foreign 
Investment. 
(3)  Y.  AHARONI 
"The  Foreign  Investment  Decision  Process" 
Harvard University Press,  1966,  362  p. 
An  ~nterview study  of the motivation and  decision process  leading to foreign 
direct  investment. 
(4)  AMBASSADE  DE  FRANCE  A LONDRES 
"French  Investment  Abroad  and  Foreign  Investment  in France  (1976)" 
Note  D'Information  DOC/LON/30/78  (1978)  8  p. 
Shows  the trends  in French  investment  abroad  and  foreign  investment  in 
France from  1971  to 1976,  together with the  impact  on  the  balance of 
payments. 
(5)  AMBASSADE  DE  FRANCE  A LONDRES 
"Foreign  Holdings  in French  Industry at  1  January  1975" 
Note  D'Information,  DOC/LON/40/78  (1978)  11  p. 
Shows  the  extent  of foreign  control  in different  industries  and  its impact 
on  the  French  economy,  particularly as  regards  employment,  sales and 
investment. (6)  H.  ASKENAZY 
"Les  grandes  soci~t~s  Europ~ennes" 
Centre de rechercheet  d'Information Socio-Politiques, 
Brussels,  1971,  278  p. 
If so far the main  purpose of multinationals was  to get  round tariffs, 
the present  trend is towards  increasing division of production between 
units to achieve  economies  of  scale. 
(7)  J.N.  BEHRMAN 
"Industrial  integration and  the multinational  enterprise" 
Annals  of American  Academy  of Political  and  Social Science, 
403,  September  1972,  p.46-57 
Multinationals are means  of integrating  economies  in a  different  way 
than  free trade;  they respond  well  to regional  incentives  but  do  not 
always  produce the type of integration sought  by  host  countries. 
(8)  C.F.  BERGSTEN,  T.  HORST  and  T.H.  MORAN 
"American  Multinationals and  American  Interest" 
Brookings  Institution,  Washington,  1978,  535  p. 
Distils the literature on  national  policy implications of multinationals. 
Statjstical analysis of  US  corporate  income  tax returns and  comparison of 
US  multinationals  with  domestic  firms  leads·to policy conclusions  recom-
mending  US  action leading  to  neutrality in taxation and  incentives to 
"unbundle"  direct  investment. 
(9)  O.H.  BLAKE 
"The  internationalisation of industrial relations" 
Journal  of International Business Studies,  3,  Fall  1972,  p.  17-32. 
Union  strategies are beginning to move  towards  internationalisation in 
response to multinationals. 
(10)  J.J.  BODDEWYN 
"Western  European  Po~icies Toward  U.S.  Investors" 
The  Bulletin,  New  York  University,  No.93-95,  March  1974,  96  p. 
Comparative analysis of European countries'  policies  (including member  nations  of 
EEC)  towards  US  investors. (11)  J.J.  BODDEWYN 
"Foreign Divestment:  Magnitude  and  Factors" 
Journal of International Business Studies,  Vol.  10,  No.  1, 
Spring  1979,  p.  21-27. 
Suggests that  divestment  by  multinational firms  is increasing and  analyses 
some  influences  leading to divestments. 
(  1  2 )  H  •  BORT IS 
"On  the Determination of the  Level  of  Employment  in  a  Growing 
Capitalistic Economy" 
Schweiz  Zeitschrift  fUr  Volkswirtschaft  und  Statistik, 
Heft  1  1976,  p.  67-93. 
Argues  that  the distribution of  income  and  the  balance  of  payments  position 
are the most  important  determinants of the level  of  employment.  A higher 
share of wages  in total  income  and  a  tendency  for  exports to  exceed  imports 
result  in a  higher equilibrium level  of employment. 
(13)  H.  BORTIS  and  F.H.  FLECK 
"La  co-operation Industrielle Est-Ouest" 
La  Politique Economique  de  la Suisse,  1977. 
(~4)  M.Z.  BROOKE  and  H.L.  REMMERS  (EDS) 
"The  Multinational  Company  in  Europe:  Some  Key  Problems" 
Longman,  London,  1972,  194  p. 
Compilation  of writings  on  management  problems  of multinationals in 
Europe. 
(15)  P.J.  BUCKLEY 
"Some  Aspects  of Foreign  Private Investment  in the Manufacturing 
Sector of the Irish Republic" 
Economic  and  Social  Review,  Dublin,  5(3),  April  1974,  p.  301-22 
Critically examines  Irish policy towards  inward  foreign direct  investment, 
with particular attention to  employment  creation,  dualism within  the 
economy  and  the Retained  Value  benefits to the  host  economy. (16)  P.J.  BUCKLEY  and  M.  CASSON 
"The  Future of the Multinational  Enterprise" 
Macmillan,  London,  1976,  116  p. 
Presents a  theory  of the multinational  firm centred  round  the concept  of 
internalisation and  its implications for  location policy.  Tests the 
theory against  data  on  the world's  largest firms  and  contrasts the approach 
with alternative theories.  Derives  predictions,  amongst  which  is the  view 
that multinationals will  grow  by  internalising markets  in skills. 
(17)  P.J.  BUCKLEY  and  J.H.  DUNNING 
"The  industrial  structure of  US  investment  in the  UK" 
Journal  of International Business Studies,  Fall/Winter 1976, 
p.  5-13 
A test of three  hypotheses  to  explain the industrial distribution:  its 
profitability relative· to  exports,  oligopolistic industrial organisation 
and  greater entrepreneurial ability of  US  firms. 
(18)  P.J.  BUCKLEY,  J.H.  DUNNING  and  R.D.  PEARCE 
"The  Influence of Firm Size,  Industry,  Nationality and·  Degree 
of Multinationality on  the Growth  and  Profitability of the 
World's  Largest  Firms,  1962-72" 
Weltvlrtschafliches Archiv.,  Band  114,  Heft  2,  1978,  p.  243-255 
(19)  P.J.  BUCKLEY  and  R.D.  PEARCE 
"Overseas  Production and  Exporting  by  the World's  Largest 
Enterprises:  A Study.in Sourcing  Policy" 
Journal  of  International  Business  Studies,  Vol.  10,  No.  1, 
Spring  1979,  p.  9-20 
Analyses the  networks  linking production to markets  in multinational firms. 
Finds  major  influences on  the  form  of the network  to be  industry,  national-
ity of  ownership  and  research  intensity. 
(20)  BUNDESMINISTERIUM  FUR  ARBEIT  UNO  SDZIALDRONUNG 
"Die  Standortwahl  der  Industriebetriebe in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland  und  Berlin  (West)" 
Bonn,  1977,  p.  27-37 
A  stt~rly  nf  plant  closures  in West  Germany  ovar tha  period  1  Q72-·75. (21)  BUSINESS  INTERNATIONAL 
"The  Effects of  US  Corporate  Investment  1960-1970" 
Business  International,  New  York,  1972 
A study  based  on  the  research results of a  questionnaire  survey designed 
to test the validity of the assertion that the role of  US  multinational 
enterprise foreign  investment  reduces  domestic  investment  and  employment. 
(22)  BUSINESS  INTERNATIONAL 
"The  Effects of  US  Corporate  Investment  1970-76" 
Business  International,  New  York,  1978,  38  p. 
Sixth in a  series of analyses  of which  the previous reference was  the first. 
This report  covers 1976  and  the  1970-76  period  and  is,  in effect,  an  updating 
of the  previous  research  done  for the  years  1960-75. 
(23)  CENTRAL  OFFICE  OF  INFORMATION  (UK) 
"Britain's International  Investment  Position" 
Central  Office of  Information  Pamphlet  98~  H.M.S.O.,  London, 
1971,  67  p. 
An  tnver.~ory of the  estimated  value of the main  components  of Britain's 
public  and  private assets and  liabilities for  1962,  1968  and  1969. 
(24)  M.  CHARONOV 
''La  lutte des classes  dans  1' Europe  des  Trusts" 
La  Vie  Internationals No.  4,  April  1975,  p.  59-67 
An  assessment  of trade  union  responses to multinational  enterprises in 
the  European  Economic  Community. 
(25)  H.J.  CHURDEN  and  A.W.  SHERMAN 
"Personnel  practices of American  companies  in  Europe" 
American  Management  Association,  New  York,  1972,  148  p. 
Interview study finds that  unions  cooperate in  Europe  from  a  position of 
strength.  US  companies  inflexible and  find it difficult to adjust to this. 
(26)  G.  DAVIES 
"West  German  direct  investment  in  Wales .....  a  promising  start" 
Development  Corporation for Wales,  Cardiff,  1978~  63  p. 
Attaches  pa~ticular importance to the role of smaller firms  in employment 
creation. (27)  G.  DAVIES  and  I.  THOMAS 
"Overseas  Investment  in  Wales" 
Christopher Davies,  Swansea,  1976,  221  p. 
A detailed  study  of foreign  investment  in  Wales  for the Development 
Corporation for Wales.  Finds foreign  firms  have  contributed to 
employment  creation and  have  maintained the competitiveness of the 
host  economy. 
(28)  J.  DE  LA  TORRE  ET  AL 
"Corporate Responses  to  Import  Competition  in the  US  Apparel 
Industry" 
Georgia  State University  Press,  Atlanta,  1978,  221  p. 
Analysis  of strategies adopted  by  US  firms  in the face of  import  competition. 
(29)  DELEGATION  A L'AMENAGEMENT  DU  TERRITOIRE  ET  A L'ACTION  REGIONALE 
FIRMES  MULTINATIONALES 
"Investissements  ~trangers et  am~nagement du  territoire" 
Livre  Blanc,  Paris,  1973 
A study  of the  impact  of  US  Foreign Direct  Investment  on  Unemployment  in 
France.  Concerned  particularly with closures of foreign  and  domestic 
enterprises. 
(30)  V.  OROUCOPOULOS 
"Expanding  the Frontiers of Capital:  Evidence  from  West  Germany" 
E.I.B.A.  Conference,  Uppsala,  1977,  11  p. 
Attempts  to  document  the growth  of West  German  foreign direct  investment 
- shows  that,  in  1976,  West  Germany  became  a  net  creditor. 
(31)  J.H.  DUNNING  (ED) 
"The  Multinational  Enterprise" 
Allen  & Unwin,  London,  1~71,  368  p. 
Collection of  papers  on  multinationals;  includes  section on  multinationals 
and  labour. (32)  J.H.  DUNNING 
"The  Location of  International  Firms  in an  Enlarged  EEC" 
Manchester Statistical Society,  1972,  45  p. 
An  analysis  of the  impact  of  an  enlarged  customs  union  on  location of firms 
within the countries of the  union.  Static and  dynamic  reactions for 
Multinationals  considered  separately for  US  and  UK  firms,  drawing  on  trade 
and  location theory. 
(33)  J.H.  DUNNING  (ED) 
"Economic  Analysis  and  the Multinational  Enterprise" 
Allen  & Unwin,  London,  1974,  405  p. 
Collection of  papers  by  experts  includesimpact  on  location,  on  wages  and 
salaries and  on  labour. 
(34)  J.H.  DUNNING 
"Evaluating the Costs and  Benefits of Foreign  Direct  Investment: 
Some  General  Observations" 
Conferenciainternacional  sabre  Economia  Portugesa,  Lisbon, 
1977,  p.  835-896 
Concludes that  the main  contribution of foreign  direct  investment is the 
addition to value added  and  increases  in exports.  Finds that  aggregate 
studies can  be  misleading  and  that  a  firm  level,  selective approach is 
necessary. 
(35)  J.H.  DUNNING  and  P.J.  BUCKLEY 
"International  Production  and  Alternative Models  of Trade" 
Manchester  School,  December  1977,  p.  392  - 403. 
Assesses  the effect of  international  production  on  explanatory  power  of 
"newer"  trade theories. 
(36)  EMERGENCY  COMMITTEE  FOR  AMERICAN  TRADE 
"The  role of the multinational corporation in the  United  States and 
the world  economies" 
Washington,  1972,  47  p.  +  132  p.  data 
Survey  of  74  US  multinationals.  Finds that  domestic  (US)  employment  creation 
of these firms  wos  7S%  greater than All  other manufacturing  firms  and  that 
foreign  investment  stimulated  US  exports. (37)  N.S.  FATEMI  and  G.W.  WILLIAMS 
"Multinational  Corporations:  The  Problems  and  the  Prospects" 
A.S.  Barnes,  South  Brunswick,  1975,  290  p. 
An  overview of the  influence  and  role of USA-based  multinational enterprises, 
including the  impact  of multinationals  on  employment  and  the  balance of 
payments. 
(38)  O.J.C.  FORSYTH 
"US  investment  in  Scotland" 
Praeger,  New  York,  1972,  320  p. 
Economic  evaluation of  impact  of  US  direct  investment  in  Scotland. 
(39}  R.H.  FRANK  and  R. T.  FREEMAN 
"Distributional Consequences  of Direct Foreign  Investment" 
Academic  Press,  New  York,  1978,  157  p. 
An  empirical  study of the  net  effect of overseas direct  investment  by  US 
multinationals  on  the  level  of domestic  employment  in the short run and 
on  the  level  and  distribution of  domestic  income  in the  long  run.  Estimates 
of  "home-foreign  substitution"  are crucial.  Conclusion  is that  a  loss of 
jobs and  a  switch  from  labour to capital  results. 
(40)  L.G.  FRANKO 
"The  European  Multinationals:  A Renewed  Challenge to American  and 
British Big  Business" 
Harper and  Row,  London,  1976,  276  p. 
Describes the  evolution  of 85  Continental  European  Multinationals and 
their role in  European  integration. 
(41)  J.  GENNARO 
"Multinational  corporations and  British labour:  a  review of attitudes 
and  responses" 
British  North  America  Committee,  London,  1972,  53  p. 
Survey of  UK  labour and  industrial relations practices and  of  union  action. 
Short  run  union  action  likely to  be  directed to British Government;  long 
run multinational  cooperation  likely. • 
(42)  R.W.  GILLESPIE 
"The  Policies of  England,  France  and  Germany  as Recipients of 
Foreign  Direct  Investment" 
in  F.  Machlup  et al  (Eds)  "International Mobility and  Movements 
of Capital"  Columbia  University  Press,  New  York~  1972,  p.  397-431 
An  historic  review of policies with  a  comparative statistical analysis. 
Finds  policy unclear and  confused. 
(43)  K.W.  GREWLICH 
"Direct  Investment  in  the  DECO  Countries" 
Sijtoff and  Noordhoff,  Alpen  aan  den  Rign~  1978,  138  p. 
Shows  how  trade  surplus countries  have  increased their share of direct 
investment.  Deals  with  legal anpects and  control of technology. 
(44)  H.  GUNTER  (ED) 
"Transnational  Industrial Relations" 
Macmillan,  London~  1972,  480  p. 
Compilat~on of confsrence  papers  which  includes  impact  of  economic 
integration on  labour relations  systems. 
(45)  R.G.  HAWKINS 
"Job  Displacement  and  the Multinational  Firm:  A Methodological 
Review" 
Center for  Multinational  Studies,  New  York,  Occasional  Puper 
No.  3~  1972,  34  p. 
Compares  studies of  US  employment  creation or displacement  by  US  direct 
investment  abroud  and  concludes that the estimating measures  and  assumptions 
are critical and  that analysis  is uncertain. 
(46)  J.  HEINRICHS,  F.  FROBEL  and  0.  KREYE 
"The  New  International Division  of  Labour" 
Social  Science  Information,  SAGE,  London  and  Beverley Hills, 
17  No  1 ,  19 7  8,  p.  12 3-14  2. 
(47)  M.  HODGES 
''Multlnaiiunal  Coq.JO!'dtions  and  r~ational  Governments" 
Saxon  House,  Farnborough,  1974,  307  p. 
Case  study of  UK  Government's  relationship with multinationals  over the 
period  1964-70 particularly with  respect  to  motor car and  computer  industry. (48)  N.  HOOD  and  S.  YOUNG 
"European  Development  Strategies of  US  Owned  Manufacturing  Companies 
located in Scotland" 
Scottish  Economic  Planning  Department~  Glasgow~  1979~  214  p. 
Demonstrates  the  influence of the entry of the  UK  into the  EEC  on  US  firms 
in Scotland.  Scottish plants in danger of  becoming  basic  production units 
only. 
(49)  T.  HOUSTON  and  J.H.  DUNNING 
"UK  Industry Abroad" 
Financial  Times/EAG~  London~  1976~  368  p. 
A detailed analysis and  appraisal of British industry overseas with copious 
tables. 
(50)  G.C.  HUFBAUER 
"Synthetic Materials and  the Theory  of  International Trade" 
Duckworth,  London~  1966~  165  p. 
Discusses factors  affecting decisions  on  transfer of technology  - implications 
for  licensing and  direct  investment  as means  of transmitting technology. 
(51)  G.C.  HUFBAUER  and  F.M.  ADLER 
"Overseas Manufacturing  Investment  and  The  Balance of  Payments" 
US  Treasury  Department~  Washington~  1968,  92  p. 
Analysis  of the  impact  of  US .foreign manufacturing  investments  on  the  US 
balance of  payments~  in terms of 3  models  and  measured  in  "recoupment 
periods"  - the time taken to  "pay  back"  the outflow. 
(52)  S.H.  HYMER 
"The  multinational  corporation and  the  law  of  uneven  development" 
in  H.  RADICE  (EO)  "International  Firms  and  Modern  Imperialism", 
Penguin,  Harmondsworth,  1975,  p.  37-62 
Argues  that multinationals will  centralise planning and  skill-intensive 
operations and  only decentralise  "lower order"  activities. 
• (53)  INDUSTRIAL  MARKET  RESEARCH 
"How  British and  German  Industry  Exports" 
Industrial  Market  Research Ltd.,  London,  1978,  158  p. 
Describes  and  compares  the organisational  pattern and  methods  employed 
by  export  executives  in  both Britain and  West  Germany. 
(54)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"Multinational  Enterprises and  Social  Policy" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1973,  182  p. 
Conference  report  on  the relationship  between  multinational  enterprises 
and  social  policy,  manpower,working  conditions and  labour relations in 
both the  home  and  host  countries.  Covers  relevant  ILO  conventions and 
international  standards and  includes  recommendations  for further research. 
(55)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"International  principles and  guidelines  on  social policy for multi-
national  enterprises:  Their usefulness  and  feasibility" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1976,  25  p. 
Examines  the relevance to multinational  enterprises of  existing inter-
national  labour  standards that are geared to  implementation  within  a 
national  rather than  international  conte~t. 
(56)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"The  impact  of multinational  enterprises on  employment  and  training" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1976,  32  p. 
Estimates that multinationals account  for 13-14 million  jobs.  Examines 
direct and  indirect effects of foreign  investment  but  concludes that an 
overall macro-estimate of jobs lost or gained  is meaningless.  Analysis 
by  sector is more  productive and  comes  to a  cautiously positive estimate 
that  jobs  may  have  been  created worldwide  in manufacturing. 
(57)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
• 
"Multinationals in  Western  Europe:  The  industrial relations 
experience" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1976,  72  p. 
Compares  the industrial relations  experience of multinational  enterprises 
in.the  food  industries and  in  Ll;e metal  industries in six  European  countries. 
Special attention is paid to  such  issues as  labour problems  and  union 
reactions connected  with  the investment,  production  and  employment  policies 
of multinationals. (58)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"Wages  and  Working  Conditions  in Multinational  Enterprises" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1976,  50  p. 
Compares  the  remuneration,  hours  of  work,  holidays  and  retirement  benefits 
provided  for  locally recruited personnel  by  foreign-owned  firms  and  by 
locally owned  firms. 
(59)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"Social  and  labour practices of  some  European-based multinationals 
in the metal trades" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1976,  143  p. 
The  first  of  a  series of  ILO  studies on  the  labour and  social  policies 
and  practices of multinational  enterprises.  Based  on  information  received 
in response to  a  questionnaire  sent  to the managements  of multinational 
enterprises,  workers'  organisations,  employers'  organisations,  host  country 
governments  and  home  country  governments,  it concentrates  on  matters  relating 
to  employment  and  training,  wages  and  labour relations. 
(60)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE 
"Social  and  Labour  Practices of Some  US-Based  Multinationals  in 
the Metal  Trades" 
ILO,  Geneva,  1977,  172  p. 
Examines  the  role  of  USA-based  multinational  enterprises  engaged  in metal 
manufacture,  with particular reference to  employment  policies and  labour 
relations. 
(61)  A.  JOHNSTONE 
"United States Direct  Investment  in France" 
M.I.T.  Press,  Cambridge,  1965,  109  p. 
Tight  and  excessive control from  the  US  accounts for  French fears  of 
domination  - recommends  decentralisation. 
(62)  R.  JUNGNICKEL  ET  AL 
"Einfluss multinationaler  lilternehmen  auf  Aussenwirtschaft  und 
Branchenstruktur der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland" 
Verlag  Weltarchiv  GmbH,  Hamburg,  1977,  431  p. 
lncludes attempt  to construct  intra-EEC direct  invastment  stock maLrl:x. (63)  J.  KAHN 
"Las travai.lleurs  face  aux  societas multinationales" 
Cahiers du  communisme,  47(5),  May  1971,  p.  42-64 
Implications of economic  policy in  France  with  regard to multinationals and 
economic  integration and  the  implications for trade  unions. 
(64)  A.  KAMIN 
"Western  European  Labor  and  the American  Corporation" 
Bureauof National  Affairs,  Washington,  1970,  546  p. 
Collection of comparative  studies on  labour relations in the  USA  and  in 
Western  Europe,  and  in particular the role of US-owned  multinational 
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